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NATIONAL PRIORITY.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation focuses on the pressing health and health care
issues facing our country. As the nation’s largest philanthropy devoted exclusively to
improving the health and health care of all Americans, the Foundation works with a diverse
group of organizations and individuals to identify solutions and achieve comprehensive,
meaningful and timely change. For more than 35 years the Foundation has brought
experience, commitment, and a rigorous, balanced approach to the problems that affect
the health and health care of those it serves. Helping Americans lead healthier lives and
get the care they need-the Foundation expects to make a difference in our lifetime. For
more information, visit www.rwjf.org.   
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3While significant progress has been made to
better protect the country from health emer-
gencies, funding for essential programs has
been cut, putting these improvements in
jeopardy.  Additionally, a number of critical
areas of preparedness still have significant
gaps, including surge capacity and biosur-
veillance systems, and these problems are less
likely to be addressed as funding decreases.  
Federal funding for state and local prepared-
ness is down more than 25 percent from FY
2005 levels.  In addition, there is no longer
any supplemental funding for states and lo-
calities for pandemic influenza preparedness,
even though state and local public health de-
partments are expected to play a key role in
the nation’s strategy for combating pandemic
influenza.  State and local governments will
not be able to make up for the shortfalls in the
current economic climate.  According to the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 33
states are facing shortfalls to their 2009 state
budgets, and 16 states already project short-
falls to their 2010 budgets.  At the current rate
of economic deterioration, and based on the
course of past recessions, the Center predicts
that 2010 state budget gaps will be about $100
billion.3 Trust for America’s Health (TFAH)
is deeply concerned about the potential im-
pact of these budget cuts on states’ ability to
be prepared for emergencies.
Pandemic flu, emerging infectious diseases,
terrorism, and catastrophic natural disasters
remain serious threats to our national security.
Instead of cutting these programs, President-
elect Obama, his administration, and the
111th Congress must prioritize public health
emergency preparedness and dedicate sus-
tained and increased funding to ensure Amer-
icans are well protected.
Americans expect and rely on the govern-
ment to protect them from terrorism and
natural disasters, since people have little
power to protect themselves from these
crises.  In a recent survey conducted by
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and
Public Opinion Strategies for TFAH, 61 per-
Introduction
More than seven years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001and the subsequent anthrax-laced mailings in October of that year,
and three years after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast
region, America has grown complacent about public health emergency
preparedness.  In January 2009, President-elect Barack Obama will be
inaugurated as president.  Periods of governmental transition, here and abroad,
are often seen as a time when new leaders are tested in international affairs,
especially during war-time.  Many national security experts are concerned that the
United States could face another terrorist attack, which requires higher levels of
vigilance, including increased attention to possible bioterror threats.1 President-
elect Obama has noted the importance of assuring a smooth transition.  Asked
about his transition team’s priorities he told CBS’s 60 Minutes, “Number one, I
think it’s important to get a national security team in place because transition
periods are potentially times of vulnerability to a terrorist attack.”2
A MODERN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM TAKES ON
ALL-HAZARDS 
There has been increasing acknowledge-
ment among America’s leaders and cur-
rent and former public health officials
about the need to modernize the public
health system to respond to a range of
threats, including naturally occurring dis-
eases and disasters, as well as bioterrorism.
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the
potential for a pandemic flu outbreak, in-
creased attention to foodborne illnesses,
and growing concerns about emerging in-
fectious diseases have contributed to a
broad recognition among policy makers of
the need for an all-hazards approach to
public health preparedness.  
In December 2006, Congress took steps to
address many of these concerns when legis-
lators updated and reauthorized the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Act, which
is now known as the Pandemic and All-Haz-
ards Preparedness Act (PAHPA).  In addi-
tion, the White House issued a number of
presidential directives with components
aimed at improving public health emergency
preparedness.  The most recent was Home-
land Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)
21, released in October 2007, which estab-
lishes a National Strategy for Public Health
and Medical Preparedness.  
The next challenge is to ensure that the
measures contained in the legislation and
directives are carried out and translated
into improved public health preparedness,
thereby keeping communities throughout
4
cent of Americans say that preparing for
major disasters is a very important issue for
government to focus on.
It is also clear that Americans will blame the
government if preparedness is lacking dur-
ing future emergencies.  When Americans
learn more about the details of gaps in pre-
paredness, they are very concerned and be-
lieve the government is failing to live up to
its responsibility.  The fact that many U.S.
cities and communities still do not have the
supplies and plans necessary to deal with
these emergencies causes people a great deal
of concern.  Eighty-two percent of Americans
say this fact makes them concerned about
the safety of the country, with 53 percent re-
sponding that it makes them very concerned.
TFAH has issued the Ready or Not? Protecting
the Public’s Health from Diseases, Disasters, and
Bioterrorism report, which examines the
progress that has been made in improving
America’s ability to respond to public health
emergencies, since 2003.  This report, the
sixth annual edition, finds that on some lev-
els, significant progress has been made in the
nation’s preparedness.  There are important
areas, however, where continued, concerted
action is needed.  From assuring an adequate
stockpile of pandemic influenza counter-
measures to having adequate laboratory ca-
pacity to respond to a chemical or
radiological event, federal and state policies
still fall short of their stated goals.  In many
other areas, a lack of transparency makes it
hard for the American people and their
elected representatives to know whether
their government is protecting them. The
variation in preparedness among the states
means that where one lives still determines
how well one is protected.  Until all states
measure up, the United States is not safe.
The report also helps identify ongoing areas
of vulnerability.  Some of the key areas of con-
cern TFAH has raised include the need to:
 Increase accountability;
 Strengthen leadership;
 Enhance surge capacity and the public
health workforce;
Modernize technology and equipment; and
 Improve community engagement.
5the country safer and better protected.
This will require sufficient funding requests
from the president and subsequent ap-
proval by Congress to carry out federal pre-
paredness activities.  Another challenge is
to address federal funding levels for up-
grading state and local public health pre-
paredness, which have been decreasing
yearly since 2004.  This decline, along with
the fluctuations and uncertainty of funding
for other federal preparedness grants, has
adversely affected progress.
The 2008 edition of Ready or Not?  focuses on
evaluating America’s public health emer-
gency preparedness in the context of these
measures passed by Congress and issued by
the Bush administration to try to improve all-
hazards preparedness.  
TFAH issues this report in order to provide
an independent analysis to:
 Inform the public and policymakers about
progress and vulnerabilities in the nation’s
public health preparedness; and
 Foster greater accountability for the
spending of taxpayer dollars on emer-
gency preparedness.
Congress and the public are entitled to know
how well the country is being protected from
health threats.  Moreover, the public health
system and other government entities in-
volved in protecting the public’s health must
be held accountable for how well they are
carrying out their responsibilities as defined
by legislation and administrative directives.  
In addition, without information about the
status of progress and vulnerabilities, it is dif-
ficult to determine whether the resources
and funds devoted to preparedness are suffi-
cient for adequately protecting the public
from health threats.
Ready or Not? 2008: Key Findings
Indicator Finding
1.  Mass Distribution -- Strategic All 50 states and D.C. have an adequate plan to 
National Stockpile distribute emergency vaccines, antidotes, and medical
supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
2.  Mass Distribution -- Antiviral Sixteen states have purchased less than 50 percent 
Stockpiling of their share of federally-subsidized antivirals.
3. Public Health Laboratories -- Twenty-four states and D.C. lack the capacity to 
Lab Pickup and Delivery Services deliver and receive lab specimens on a 24/7 basis.
4. Public Health Laboratories -- Three state public health laboratories are not able 
Pandemic Influenza Planning to meet the expectations of their state’s pandemic 
influenza plans.
5. Biosurveillance Six states do not have a disease surveillance system 
that is compatible with CDC’s National Electronic 
Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
6.  Health Care Volunteer Eight states have limited protection for health care 
Emergency Liability Protection volunteers during times of emergency.
7.  Entity Emergency Liability Twenty-six states lack statutes that extend some level 
Protection of immunity to groups and/or organizations providing
charitable, emergency, or disaster relief services.
8.  Medical Reserve Corps Readiness Seventeen states do not have State Medical Reserve
Corps Coordinators.
9.  Food Safety -- Detection and Twenty states and D.C. identified the pathogen 
Diagnosis responsible for reported foodborne disease outbreaks 
at a rate lower than the national average of 44 percent.
10.  Funding Commitment Eleven states and D.C. cut funding for public health 
from FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08.
6SOME KEY 2008 PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
 January 2008:  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) warns of potential botulism in
canned green beans and garbanzo beans.  Although no illnesses had been reported, FDA in-
structs that all cans from the infected plant should be immediately and carefully thrown away.
 February 2008:  In the largest beef recall in history, 143 million pounds of beef are deemed
“unfit for human consumption.”  The recall occurred after the Humane Society of the
United States released an undercover video showing workers at the California meat com-
pany kicking sick cows and using fork lifts to force them to walk.
 February 2008: Vials of ricin are found in a motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada after a man
suffering from respiratory distress was transported to the hospital.
 February 2008:  An outbreak of 11 measles cases is identified in San Diego, California.  The
strain is identified from an unvaccinated young boy who had recently traveled to Switzerland.
March 2008:  FDA warns of Salmonella risk in cantaloupes imported from a Honduran
grower and packer.  CDC received reports of 50 illnesses in 16 states and nine illnesses in
Canada linked to contaminated cantaloupes.
March and June 2008:  Heavy rains cause severe flooding in the Midwest.  In March, 17 people
died as a result of the flooding, and by the end of June storms and flooding across six states
caused 24 deaths, 148 injuries and more than $1.5 billion in damages to Iowa alone. 
 June 2008:  In June, outbreaks of Salmonella are linked first to tomatoes and months later to
jalapeño and Serrano peppers.  Since April 2008, CDC has identified 1,442 people who
were sickened by the outbreak in 43 states, the District of Columbia (D.C.), and Canada.
 June 2008:  Lightning sparks thousands of California wildfires across northern California.
Over 2,700 individual fires were recorded causing mandatory evacuations and damaging
thousands of acres.
 September 2008:  In early September, Hurricane Gustav makes landfall in Louisiana and
causes widespread destruction statewide, amounting to billions of dollars in damages.
 September 2008:  Just weeks after Hurricane Gustav hit the United States, Hurricane Ike
hits Texas as a category 2 storm, causing extreme damage in Texas.  Twenty-seven deaths
are attributed to the storm that forced hundreds of thousands of residents to evacuate.
 September 2008:  Melamine-contaminated infant formula and related dairy products produced in
China were found in countries across the globe.  U.S. food safety officials conduct a national as-
sessment to determine if any of the contaminated product was imported illegally into the United
States.
ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
The U.S. public health system is responsible for protecting the American people from a range of
potential health threats. An all-hazards public health system is one that is able to respond to and
protect citizens from the full spectrum of possible public health emergencies, including bioterrorism
and naturally occurring health threats. An all-hazards system recognizes that preparing for one
threat can have benefits that will help prepare public health departments for all potential threats.
Under an all-hazards approach, the public health system prepares for and is able to respond to
unique concerns posed by different threats. For instance, threats may be:
 Isolated at our borders, or regionally, or be national or global in scope;
Of limited duration or occur in repeated waves; and
 Preventable and treatable through vaccines and medications, or there may be no pharmaceutical
interventions available.
7EXAMPLES OF MAJOR EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
Agroterrorism: The “...deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of
generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability.”4 Agroterrorism can be
considered a subcategory of “bioterrorism” and foodborne diseases.
Bioterrorism: The intentional or deliberate use of germs, biotoxins, or other biological agents
that cause disease or death in people, animals, or plants. Examples include anthrax, smallpox,
botulism, Salmonella, and E. coli.
Blast Injuries:  Explosions, whether deliberate or accidental, can cause multi-system, life
threatening injuries among individuals and within crowds.  Blunt and penetrating injuries to
multiple organ systems are likely when an explosion occurs.  Also, unique injuries to the lungs
and central nervous system occur during explosions.
Chemical terrorism: The deliberate use of chemical agents, such as poisonous gases, arsenic,
or pesticides that have toxic effects on people, animals, or plants in order to cause illness or
death. Examples include ricin, sarin, and mustard gas. 
Chemical incidents and accidents: The non-deliberate exposure of humans to harmful
chemical agents, with similar outcomes to chemical terrorism.
Foodborne diseases:  Foodborne illness is caused by harmful bacteria, viruses, parasites or
chemicals that are found in food and beverages and enter the body through the gastrointestinal
tract.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates there are approxi-
mately 75 million pathogen-induced cases of foodborne diseases each year in the United
States, causing approximately 325,000 hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths. Examples include bot-
ulism, Salmonella, E.coli 0157:H7, shigella, and norovirus.
Natural disasters: Harm can be inflicted during and after natural disasters, which can lead to
contaminated water, shortages of food and water, loss of shelter, and the disruption of regular
health care. Examples include hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, mudslides, fires, and tsunamis.
Pandemic flu: A novel, potentially lethal strain of the influenza against which humans have no
natural immunity. According to estimates from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), a severe pandemic could result in 1.9 million deaths and 9.9 million hospitaliza-
tions in the United States.5
Radiological threats: Intentional or accidentally-caused exposure to radiological material. A
terrorist attack could involve the scattering of radioactive materials through the use of explo-
sives (“dirty bomb”), the destruction of a nuclear facility, the introduction of radioactive mate-
rial into a food or water supply, or the explosion of a nuclear device near a population center.
Vector-borne diseases: Diseases spread by vectors, such as insects. Examples include the
West Nile virus, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, and malaria.  
Waterborne diseases: Diseases spread by contaminated drinking water or recreational
water, such as typhoid fever and cholera.  According to CDC, over 1,000 persons become ill
from contaminated drinking water and over 2,500 persons become ill from recreational water
disease outbreaks annually in the United States.6
Zoonotic/Animal-borne diseases: Animal diseases that can spread to humans and in some
cases, become contagious from human to human. Examples include Avian flu, West Nile virus,
and SARS.  In 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) identified more than 200 diseases
occurring in humans that were known to be transmitted through animals.7 Experts believe that
the increased emergence of zoonotic diseases worldwide can be attributed to population dis-
placement, urbanization and crowding, deforestation, and globalization of the food supply.  
8WHAT DOES ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE? 
THE GOALS OF 24/7 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE INCLUDE:
 Rapid detection of emergency disease threats, including those caused by bioterrorism.
 Intensive investigative capabilities to quickly diagnose an infectious disease outbreak or to
identify the biological or chemical agent used in an attack.
 Surge capacity for mass events, including adequate facilities, equipment, supplies, and
trained health professionals.
Mass containment strategies, including pharmaceuticals needed for wide-scale vaccination,
antibiotic, or antidote administration and isolation and quarantining when necessary.
 Streamlined and effective communication channels so health workers can swiftly and accu-
rately communicate with each other, other front line workers, and the public about 1) the
nature of an emergency or attack, 2) the risk of exposure and how to seek treatment when
needed, and 3) any actions they or their families should take to protect themselves.
 Communications must also be able to reach and take into consideration at-risk populations.
 Streamlined and effective evacuation of at-risk populations with special medical needs.
 An informed and involved public that can provide material and moral support to professional
responders, and can render aid when necessary to friends, family, neighbors, and associates.
What it will take to achieve basic levels of preparedness:
 Leadership, planning, and coordination: An established chain-of-command and well de-
fined roles and responsibilities for seamless operation across different medical and logistical
functions and among federal, state, and local authorities during crisis situations, including po-
lice, public safety officials, and other first responders.
 An expert and fully-staffed workforce: Highly trained and adequate numbers of public
health professionals, including health care providers, epidemiologists, lab scientists, and
other experts, in addition to back-up workers for surge capacity conditions.
Modernized technology: State-of-the-art laboratory equipment, information collection,
and health tracking systems.
 Pre-planned, safety-first rapid emergency response capabilities and precautions:
Tested plans and safety precautions to mitigate potential harm to communities, public health
professionals, and first responders.
 Immediate, streamlined communications capabilities: Coordinated, integrated communi-
cations among all parts of the public health system, all frontline responders, and with the public.
Must include back-up systems in the event of power loss or overloaded wireless channels.
9FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH JURISDICTIONS
The federal role: Includes policymaking, funding programs, overseeing national disease prevention
efforts, collecting and disseminating health information, building capacity, and directly managing
some services.8 Some public health capabilities, such as the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), are
federal assets managed by federal agencies that are available to supplement a state’s and commu-
nity’s response to a public health emergency that overwhelms or may overwhelm their capabili-
ties.  Public health functions are widely diffused across eight federal agencies and two offices.
State and local roles: Under U.S. law, state governments have primary responsibility for the
health of their citizens. Constitutional “police powers” give states the ability to enact laws and
issue regulations to protect, preserve, and promote the health, safety, and welfare of their resi-
dents. In most states, state laws charge local governments with responsibility for the health of
their citizens.  State and local health departments and first responders are the front line in any
public health emergency.  
Some of the ongoing problems resulting from this diffused structure include:
1. Lack of clear roles for the various state, local, and federal agencies.
2. Differing responsibilities and capacities among the some 3,000 local health departments.
3. Limited coordination among the levels of government, including determination of how fed-
eral assets would be deployed to states and localities, and across jurisdictions, such as shar-
ing assets and resources among states.
4. No minimum standards, guidelines, or recommendations for capacity levels or services are
required of state and local health departments. This results in major differences in services
and competencies across state and local agencies.
5. Lack of funding flexibility and comprehensiveness due to a federal funding structure that is
largely based on categorical or program grants. These often restrictive grants also lack a sys-
tem of accountability.
6. Ineffective and random capacity to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations, com-
munity groups, and the private sector.
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES
In 2003, HSPD-8 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to draft a national all-hazards
preparedness goal, and in 2007 DHS released the National Preparedness Guidelines.  The
Guidelines include three important elements -- the National Planning Scenarios, the Universal
Task List and the Target Capabilities List.9 These three documents illustrate the magnitude of
the federal, state, and local preparedness efforts.
The National Planning Scenarios is a list of 15 potential threats including terrorist attacks, natu-
ral disasters, and other emergencies. 
National Planning Scenarios
Improvised Nuclear Device Toxic Industrial Chemicals Radiological Dispersal Device
Aerosol Anthrax Nerve Agent Improvised Explosive Device
Pandemic Influenza Chlorine Tank Explosion Food Contamination
Plague Major Earthquake Cyber Attack 
Blister Agent Major Hurricane
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The Target Capabilities List includes 37 specific capabilities that all sectors of society should
possess in order to respond to any disaster.  
The Universal Task List (UTL) is a menu of over 1,600 tasks that assist efforts to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from the 15 scenarios listed above.  The UTL is not a
static list and will continue to be edited and expanded as additional tasks are addressed and
considered.  The UTL is organized using four levels that define the type of tasks performed --
National Strategic Tasks, Planning, Coordination and Support Tasks, Incident Management
Tasks, and Incident Prevention and Response Tasks.  Combining the UTL with the Target
Capabilities List provides officials at all levels of government with a framework to evaluate their
level of preparedness.10
Target Capabilities List
Communications Critical Infrastructure Protection
Community Preparedness and Participation Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation
Planning Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
Risk Management Laboratory Testing
Intelligence/Information Sharing Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and 
and Dissemination Related Services)
CBRNE Detection Mass Prophylaxis
Information Gathering and Recognition Medical Supplies Management 
of Indicators and Warnings and Distribution 
Intelligence Analysis and Production Medical Surge
Counter-Terror Investigations and Onsite Incident Management
Law Enforcement
Animal Health Emergency Support Emergency Public Safety and 
Security Response
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Responder Safety and Health
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
Emergency Operations Center Management Search and Rescue (Land-Based)
Emergency Public Information and Warning Volunteer Management and Donations
Environmental Health WMD/Hazardous Materials Response 
and Decontamination
Explosive Device Response Operations Economic and Community Recovery
Fatality Management Restoration of Lifelines
Fire Incident Response Support Structural Damage Assessment 
Isolation and Quarantine
11
All Americans have the right to expect funda-
mental health protections during public
health emergencies, no matter where they live.  
States and localities play the central role in pro-
tecting the public’s health, whether in response
to routine threats or emergencies, such as a
bioterrorist attack or a natural disaster. Under
the U.S. Constitution, each of the 50 states has
primary legal jurisdiction and responsibility for
the health of its citizens. Therefore, the chief
focus of this report is the capacity of the states
to protect citizens from public health threats and
emergencies -- and the federal government’s im-
portant role in developing that capacity. The
federal government also plays a crucial role by
providing leadership, scientific evidence, and
critical resources to assure that every jurisdiction
is adequately and equally prepared.  (The fed-
eral role is discussed further in Section 2.)  
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the Bush administration and Congress
have made state and local preparedness a pri-
ority, directing CDC to funnel more than
$6.3 billion to state and local health depart-
ments.  The large infusion of cash has led to
progress in a number of key areas:
 Development of emergency response plans  
 Eighty percent of states have response
plans for anthrax, 98 percent for small-
pox, 67 percent for botulism toxin, 69
percent for nuclear events, and 49 per-
cent for nerve agents.12
 Distribution of medical countermeasures
 All states have developed strategies and
plans to receive and distribute SNS
medical supplies.13
 Expansion of laboratory capacity  
 The number of Bio-Safety Level-3 Labs
has grown from 69 to 139.
 The number of labs participating in the
Laboratory Response Network (LRN)
for infectious diseases exceeds 150, with
at least one in each state.14
Workforce  
 All state public health departments
have staff on call 24 hours a day, seven
days a week, 365 days a year to evaluate
urgent disease reports.15
 Emergency communications  
 Public health departments in all 50 states
and D.C. have trained public health pro-
fessionals about their roles and responsi-
bilities during an emergency as outlined
by the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) Incident Command Sys-
tem (ICS); in 1999 only 14 states did so.16
While TFAH applauds this progress, much
work remains to be done.  In addition, CDC
and other agencies must do a better job of
communicating progress and gaps to policy
makers and the general public.  The Ameri-
can people deserve to know how prepared
their states and communities are for differ-
ent types of health threats, particularly when
their taxpayer dollars are being spent to sup-
port preparedness efforts.  Currently, the
American public is not equipped with
enough information to monitor and hold
public officials accountable for whether their
communities are adequately prepared.
State-By-State Public
Health Preparedness 
Indicators and Scores
1S E C T I O N
MEASURING PREPAREDNESS IS CRITICAL TO EVALUATE PROGRESS.      11
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Despite allocation of more than $6.3 billion
in federal public health preparedness funds
to states and localities over the past six years,
reliable, valid performance measures to eval-
uate emergency preparedness are still to be
fully developed.  Currently, CDC is using new
capability-based performance measures for
the state and local grantees.18 As CDC and
the research community build a stronger re-
search base on preparedness, CDC expects to
roll out new objectives.  Until recently, what
little data that is collected on public health
preparedness generally was not made publicly
available.  However, in February 2008, the
CDC released its first report on the Public
Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Co-
operative Agreement, Public Health Prepared-
ness: Mobilizing State by State.  The report
included data on all 50 states and four major
U.S. cities: Chicago, D.C., Los Angeles, and
New York City.  CDC’s release of information
about the progress states have made to im-
prove public health emergency preparedness
was an important step forward for trans-
parency and accountability.  
To further the discussion about state pre-
paredness, TFAH annually develops 10 indi-
cators focused on key areas of preparedness
using the limited data currently available for
all 50 states and D.C.  Each state receives one
point for achieving an indicator or zero points
if they do not achieve the indicator, thus zero
is the lowest possible overall score and 10 the
highest.  Taken collectively, these indicators
offer a composite snapshot of preparedness
including strengths and vulnerabilities.  
TFAH has repeatedly called for the govern-
ment to develop national performance stan-
dards and to publicly release information on
a routine basis about states’ progress in meet-
ing these standards.  The indicators in this
report were selected based on:
 Reflection of a fundamental, systemic pub-
lic health need;
 Consultation with key experts about areas
important to serving basic public health
emergency needs; and
 The availability of state level data that were
verified through independent means or in
consultation with states.
Scores focus on relative achievements in
areas of preparedness, and highlight areas
where increased prioritization and invest-
ment must be made to address problems.
TFAH is only able to assess states compara-
tively where there are data available for all 50
EVERY STATE IS DIFFERENT, BUT THERE ARE BASIC EXPECTATIONS EVERY
STATE SHOULD MEET TO ENSURE PREPAREDNESS FOR ALL-HAZARDS
States differ in how they structure and deliver public health services.  In some states, the public
health system is centralized, and the state has direct control and supervision over local health
agencies.  In other states, local public health agencies developed separately from the state and
are run by counties, cities, or townships, and usually report to one or more elected officials.17
Each state has different strengths, weaknesses, and unique challenges that affect its ability to
prepare for and respond to public health emergencies.  This report assesses how states are
performing with respect to meeting their preparedness responsibilities.  
To help assess public health emergency preparedness capabilities, each state received a score
based on 10 key indicators, which TFAH derived from current publicly available data.  Low
state scores reflecting weaknesses and challenges are not intended to be punitive.  Rather, this
report is intended to help identify where and how states can improve or overcome obstacles
to an all-hazards approach to public health preparedness.  In addition, providing information
about which states have particular strengths allows others to know which states to turn to for
best practices and models to guide their own preparedness efforts.
STATE SCORES
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states and D.C.  Many states have taken ac-
tion in other areas of preparedness or may
be in the process of increasing certain capa-
bilities not reflected in this report.  In some
cases, TFAH is reporting data that shows an
improvement upon the state scores CDC
published in February 2008, representing
progress over the past year. 
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STATE PREPAREDNESS SCORES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Has adequate Purchased State public State public Has a disease Has laws Has laws State has a State identified Increased or 
plans to 50 percent health lab has health lab tracking that reduce that reduce Medical the pathogen maintained 
distribute or more of an intra-state can meet the system to or limit or limit the Reserve responsible for level of 
emergency their share courier system expectations collect and the liability liability for Corps MRC reported funding 
vaccines, of federally- non-mail that of the state’s monitor exposure for businesses and Coordinator foodborne for public 2008
States antidotes subsidized operates 24 pandemic data health care non-profit disease health Total 
and medical antivirals hours per day influenza electronically volunteers organizations outbreaks at services Score
supplies from for specimen plan via the who serve in that serve a rate that met from 
the SNS pickup and Internet a public in a public or exceeded the FY 2006-07 
delivery health health national average to 
emergency emergency of 44 percent FY 2007-08
(combined data 
2004-2006)
Alabama          9
Alaska       6
Arizona      5
Arkansas         8
California        7
Colorado        7
Connecticut      5
Delaware         8
District of Columbia        7
Florida      5
Georgia         8
Hawaii         8
Idaho       6
Illinois        7
Indiana          9
Iowa         8
Kansas       6
Kentucky        7
Louisiana           10
Maine       6
Maryland      5
Massachusetts       6
Michigan          9
Minnesota         8
Mississippi       6
Missouri        7
Montana      5
Nebraska      5
Nevada       6
New Hampshire           10
New Jersey        7
New Mexico        7
New York        7
North Carolina           10
North Dakota         8
Ohio         8
Oklahoma        7
Oregon        7
Pennsylvania          9
Rhode Island        7
South Carolina          9
South Dakota         8
Tennessee          9
Texas       6
Utah        7
Vermont          9
Virginia           10
Washington         8
West Virginia        7
Wisconsin           10
Wyoming        7
Total 50+D.C. 34+D.C. 26 47+D.C. 44+D.C. 42+D.C. 24+D.C. 33+D.C. 30 39
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Some indicators reflect states’ use of funds
received through bioterrorism and public
health cooperative agreements from the
CDC and the Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
at the HHS, other health capacity readiness
programs, and state public health funds for
health emergency preparedness.  Other in-
dicators, however, illustrate the breadth of
all-hazards public health preparedness and
examine state laws and state collaboration
with planning partners.  
Data from these indicators were drawn from
a range of publicly available sources, includ-
ing CDC, ASPR, a survey conducted by the
Association of Public Health Laboratories
(APHL), the Association of State and Terri-
torial Health Officials (ASTHO), public an-
nouncements from states, and interviews
with government officials.
Indicators  What the Indicators Measure  
1.  Mass Distribution -- Strategic National Stockpile - Did the This indicator assesses a state’s emergency response plan to quickly 
state test its plan to distribute emergency vaccines, antidotes, provide medications to communities during emergencies.
pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies from the SNS, and receive a 
passing grade from CDC?
2.  Mass Distribution -- Antiviral Stockpiling -- Did the state The federal government has declared stockpiling antivirals to be a 
purchase 50 percent or more of its federally-subsidized antivirals shared responsibility between the federal government and the states.  
drugs to stockpile for use during an influenza pandemic? This indicator assesses the state’s ability to provide antivirals to high-risk
populations during an influenza pandemic.  
3. Public Health Laboratories -- Lab Pickup And Delivery This indicator reflects whether states have the capacity to deliver and 
Services -- Does the state public health lab currently have an receive laboratory specimens on a 24/7/365 basis.
intra-state courier system (non-mail) that operates 24 hours per 
day for specimen pickup and delivery? 
4. Public Health Laboratories -- Pandemic Influenza Planning -- This indicator demonstrates the ability of the states to ensure 
Does the state public health laboratory meet the expectations of the surveillance and laboratory capability during each phase of a pandemic.
state’s pandemic influenza plan?
5. Biosurveillance -- Does the state use a disease surveillance This indicator demonstrates information about which states track health 
system that is compatible with CDC’s national system, including threats in a manner compatible with the standards of CDC’s National 
integrating data from multiple sources, using electronic lab results Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).  This system makes it 
(ELR) reporting, and using an Internet browser? possible to quickly identify and track outbreaks and share the information 
in a consistent way across health agencies and states.
6.  Health Care Volunteer Emergency Liability Protection -- This indicator helps evaluate states’ abilities to call up a health care 
Does the state have laws that reduce or limit the liability exposure volunteer workforce in the event of a public health emergency.  The 
for health care volunteers who serve in a public health emergency? lack of liability protection is a serious deterrent to many volunteers who
may want to offer their health care services but are fearful of doing so
without clear liability laws. 
7.  Entity Emergency Liability Protection -- Does the state have This indicator helps evaluate states’ abilities to work with the private 
laws that reduce or limit the liability for businesses and non-profit sector in the event of a public health emergency.  The lack of liability 
organizations that serve in a public health emergency? protection is a serious deterrent to many businesses and non-profits 
that may want to offer their services but are fearful of doing so without
clear liability laws.
8.  Medical Reserve Corps Readiness -- Does the state have a This indicator assesses the state MRC program on the presence of a 
Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) Coordinator? State MRC Coordinator, who is responsible for working with all MRC
units in the jurisdiction.
9.  Food Safety -- Detection and Diagnosis -- Did the state This indicator reflects the ability of states to identify the pathogen 
identify the pathogen responsible for reported foodborne disease responsible for foodborne disease outbreaks.
outbreaks at a rate that met or exceeded the national average of 
44 percent (combined data 2004-2006)?
10.  Funding Commitment -- Did the state maintain or increase This indicator, adjusted for inflation, demonstrates states’ commitment 
funding for public health programs from FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08? to funding public health programs, which support the infrastructure
needed to adequately respond to emergencies.
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TREND ANALYSIS OF SELECT READY OR NOT? KEY INDICATORS
In the six years that TFAH has evaluated states preparedness, there has been considerable im-
provement.  Although TFAH does not use the same 10 key indicators each year, the report has
tracked the following six indicators over time: Strategic National Stockpile; Public Health Labo-
ratories -- Bio-Threat Testing;  Public Health Laboratories -- Workforce; Biosurveillance --
NEDSS; State Pandemic Influenza Plans; and Seniors’ Seasonal Flu Vaccination Rates.  
Does the state have an adequate 
SNS plan?
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**Note: In 2007, CDC switched from a green-yellow-red
stoplight model of evaluating state SNS plans to a 100-
point scale, where 69 and above is deemed sufficient.
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Does the state have sufficient lab 
capabilities to test for bio-threats?
Does the state public health lab have 
adequate staffing to provide 24/7 coverage 
to analyze samples in an emergency?
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influenza plan?
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PROGRESS IN REPORTING STATE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Since 2002, CDC has administered the PHEP cooperative agreement, which channels federal
dollars to state and local public health departments.  
In February 2008, CDC released its first report on the progress states have made using these
dollars and the existing challenges.  The report, Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State by
State, includes national data as well as state-specific snapshots for all 50 states and four directly
funded localities: Chicago, Los Angeles County, New York City, and D.C.  
Areas where progress was noted include the following: 
 The number of epidemiologists in public health departments working in emergency re-
sponse has doubled from 115 in 2001 to 232 in 2006;
 The number of state and local public health laboratories able to detect biological agents has
increased from 83 in 2002 to 110 in 2007; and 
 Seventy-three percent of states reviewed have satisfactorily documented their plans to re-
ceive, store, and distribute the SNS.
Among areas where challenges to emergency preparedness and response remain were the following:  
 Sixteen states did not report any plans to electronically exchange health data with regional
health information organizations;
 Thirty-one state public health laboratories reported difficulty recruiting qualified laboratory
scientists; and
 No state public health laboratories can rapidly identify priority radioactive materials in clini-
cal samples.
As CDC continues to work with state and local public health departments, the agency priori-
tized the following initiatives, which include:  
 Increasing the use of electronic health data for preparedness and response by networking
surveillance systems and using real-time data;
 Expanding laboratory testing; and 
 Improving legal preparedness for public health emergencies.
In September 2008, the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Partners Workgroup, composed
of members of ASTHO, APHL, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), and
the National Association of Country and City Health Officials (NACCHO) released its own survey
of the PHEP Cooperative Agreement.  The report, Public Health Emergency Preparedness: Six Years
of Achievement, also highlights improvements and challenges, but fails to list any state-specific data.  
Among the accomplishments listed, the report details the following:
 All states have developed all-hazards emergency response plans;
 Nearly two-thirds of state health agencies have implemented workforce planning programs
to recruit, train, and retain a skilled workforce; 
 State health agencies participated in more than 700 exercises of all types in 2007, and an
even greater number of exercises occurred at the local level; and
 Nearly all states (96 percent) now have 24/7 communications systems linking hospitals, state
and local public health officials and law enforcement, up from 80 percent in 2002.
The ongoing challenges include the following:
Many local health departments lack plans for mass patient care and fatality management;
 Forty-three percent of small local health departments and nine percent of medium-sized
ones have no staff dedicated to preparedness activities; and 
 Epidemiologists, environmental health workers, and laboratorians are “very-to-moderately”
affected by overall health care workforce shortages.
The report calls for “...a steadfast commitment of federal leadership, guidance, technical assis-
tance and resources” to continue to develop and strengthen state and local preparedness.
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50 states and D.C. scored 69 or higher 0 states scored below 69 on CDC’s 
on CDC’s SNS TAR evaluation tool, SNS technical TAR evaluation tool, 
indicating they have adequate plans in indicating they do not have adequate 
place to receive and distribute medical plans in place to receive and distribute 
countermeasures from the SNS medical countermeasures from the SNS 
(1 point). (0 points). 
State Last TAR Date SNS Score State Last TAR Date SNS Score
Alabama1 9/26/2007 92
Alaska1 12/11/2006 80
Arizona 6/17/2008 83
Arkansas 3/18/2008 93
California 6/17/2008 100
Colorado 5/25/2008 94
Connecticut  1/28/2008 84
Delaware 3/28/2008 96
D.C. 6/16/2008 94
Florida 1/15/2008 95
Georgia 5/13/2008 73
Hawaii 7/10/2008 74
Idaho 10/10/2007 90
Illinois 5/21/2008 96
Indiana 6/25/2008 96
Iowa 5/14/2008 93
Kansas 6/17/2008 93
Kentucky 5/28/2008 86
Louisiana 4/4/2008 94
Maine1 10/28/2008 90
Maryland 8/1/2008 93
Massachusetts 3/25/2008 91
Michigan 11/28/2008 95
Minnesota 12/17/2007 84
Mississippi 3/7/2008 95
Missouri 11/27/2007 96
Montana 7/15/2008 91
Nebraska 8/27/2008 81
Nevada2 11/18/2008 84
New Hampshire 1/24/2008 86
New Jersey 12/6/2007 98
New Mexico 7/16/2008 71
New York 5/22/2008 97
North Carolina 2/12/2008 93
North Dakota 11/6/2007 77
Ohio 1/23/2008 90
Oklahoma 6/12/2008 97
Oregon2 8/6/2008 85
Pennsylvania 9/23/2008 82
Rhode Island 7/29/2008 93
South Carolina 1/10/2008 87
South Dakota 7/17/2008 87
Tennessee 8/12/2008 89
Texas 9/19/2007 97
Utah 8/6/2008 85
Vermont 3/14/2008 93
Virginia 7/14/2008 100
Washington2 7/30/2008 94
West Virginia 9/4/2008 83
Wisconsin1 12/19/2007 86
Wyoming2 10/16/2008 80
Indicator 1: MASS DISTRIBUTION -- STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS) 
FINDING:  All 50 states and D.C. have adequate plans to receive and distribute emergency vac-
cines, antidotes, pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies from the SNS based on CDC’s technical as-
sistance review (TAR).
1 State had a TAR this year but the
preliminary scores were unavailable
as of November 19, 2008.
2 State SNS score is preliminary
and awaiting final review. 
Source: CDC.  States were
evaluated between December 11,
2006 and September 23, 2008.
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The SNS is a national repository of antibiotics,
chemical antidotes, antiviral drugs, antitoxins,
life-support medications, intravenous (IV) ad-
ministration equipment, airway maintenance
supplies, and medical and surgical items. The
SNS is designed to supplement and re-supply
state and local public health agencies in the
event of a national emergency anywhere and
at anytime within the United States or its terri-
tories.  As a condition of federal public health
preparedness grants, states are required to de-
velop a plan for the receipt and distribution of
SNS contents and then exercise the plan.19
According to CDC, “Preparedness to receive,
stage, store, and distribute SNS materiel is es-
sential to saving lives at risk during a public
health emergency.”20 For example, in a 2007
study, researchers used a computer model to
illustrate the importance of rapidly receiving
and dispensing medical countermeasures in
the event of a bioterrorist anthrax attack.  Ac-
cording to the study’s authors, “The number
of people infected who become seriously ill
can be reduced by 81 percent if mass prophy-
laxis is initiated two days after the release (of
the anthrax) and finished two days later.  If
mass prophylaxis is initiated five days after the
release and finished 10 days later, the number
of casualties is reduced by only 39 percent.”21
CDC evaluates states’ SNS distribution pre-
paredness plans based on a zero-to-100 point
scale.  The agency’s TAR relies primarily on a
checklist tool for evaluating SNS plans and
supporting documents.  The evaluation takes
place over the course of one day during an on-
site CDC staff visit.22 There are 13 functions
on which states are evaluated.23 The scoring
system assesses planning and management of
the stockpile.  It does not reflect the actual ca-
pacity of the state to deploy countermeasures
and other supplies from the SNS.  
According to CDC, states must obtain a score
of 69 or higher on the SNS TAR by December
31, 2008.  As of November 19, 2008, 50 states
and D.C. scored 69 or higher.  When CDC
published its report on state preparedness in
February 2008, there were 13 states that failed
to score above 69.   The 13 states that brought
their SNS TAR scores above 69 over the past
year are Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia.  
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THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)
The SNS maintains a variety of critical pharmaceuticals and
medical supplies including antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin and
doxycycline, chemical nerve agent antidotes like atropine and
pralidoxime, antiviral drugs such as Tamiflu® and Relenza®,
pain management drugs such as morphine, vaccines for agents
like smallpox, as well as radiological countermeasures such as
Prussian blue and DTPA. In addition to pharmaceuticals, the
SNS contains supportive care supplies like endotracheal tubes
and IV supplies, burn and blast supplies such as sutures and
bandages, ventilators, personnel protective equipment such as
N-95 respirators and sterile gloves and other life-saving med-
ical materiel. While this list is not comprehensive, it is repre-
sentative of the items contained in the SNS. 
The SNS is positioned in undisclosed locations throughout the
United States and is configured to provide a flexible response
strategy.  Included in the formulary are a dozen 12-hour Push
Packages, which contain over 50 tons of pharmaceuticals and
medical materiel.  These assets are pre-configured in deploy-
able containers and strategically located to enable rapid deliv-
ery to the site of a national emergency within 12 hours of the
federal decision to deploy.  
The majority of the SNS formulary is maintained in managed in-
ventory.  Like the 12-hour Push Packages, these assets are also
strategically located around the nation.  They provide the ability
to configure and deliver significant quantities of pharmaceuticals
and medical materiel as an initial response if the nature of the
public health emergency is well defined, or as follow-on to a
“push package” delivery.  Delivery of assets from managed inven-
tory are planned to begin arriving within 24 to 36 hours after the
federal decision to deploy them.  Quantities in the SNS change
based on national planning guidance and prioritization, modeling
scenarios, and standard inventory management procedures.  
In April 2007, Gerald W. Parker, ASPR Principal Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary, testified before the U.S. House of Representa-
tives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science & Technology regarding the development of medical
countermeasures.  According to Dr. Parker, some of the con-
tents of the national stockpile include:24
 Enough smallpox vaccine to protect 300 million people, or
every man, woman, and child in America;
Over 41 million regimens of countermeasures against anthrax; 
 Therapeutic anthrax antitoxins to treat symptomatic patients;
 Countermeasures to address radiation exposure including
over 460,000 combined doses of Calcium-DTPA (Diethyl-
enetriamine pentaacetate) and Zinc-DTPA; and
 1.7 million doses of liquid potassium iodide (KI) in a formu-
lation that is more suitable for young children for use in the
event of a release of radioiodines.
The SNS also has been increasing its supply of countermeasures
that could be used during an influenza pandemic.  For example,
HHS has allocated a total of $1.1 billion for the purchase of an-
tiviral medications, $660 million of which has been obligated as
of May 2007.  Overall, as of November 2, 2007, the SNS con-
tained the following pandemic flu countermeasures:25 
 40 million regimens of Oseltamivir capsules; 
 10 million regimens of Zanamivir;
 105.8 million N95 respirators; and   
 51.7 million surgical masks.
SNS and Children
As of November 2008, there are over 3.8 million regimens of pe-
diatric antiviral formulations in the SNS to treat a potential pan-
demic flu for the nation’s 73.6 million children.26 For planning
purposes, the federal government has assumed that antivirals
would be needed for at least 25 percent of the population.  How-
ever, they have not set any target for stockpiling pediatric antivi-
rals, even though children and adolescents are known to often be
disproportionately affected by contagious respiratory illnesses.  
An Aging Stockpile
Several of the medical countermeasures in the SNS were pur-
chased under the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276).
Congress appropriated nearly $5.6 billion for the procurement
of medical countermeasures through FY 2013, of which not
more than $3.418 billion was to be obligated during FY 2004
through 2008.  More than four years later, many of the vac-
cines and some of the drugs are beginning to expire.  The
BioShield Act, however, does not allow for replenishing the
stockpile, nor does it factor in the storage, security, and main-
tenance costs associated with the SNS.  
An October 2007 GAO report identified a major issue of con-
cern with regard to anthrax vaccines in the SNS.  According to
the report, beginning in 2008, several lots of BioThrax will begin
to expire.  Annual replacement costs of the anthrax vaccine are
estimated at $100 million per year in lost stockpile.  To remedy
the problem, HHS/ASPR and the Department of Defense
(DOD) signed a Memorandum of Understanding that enables
DOD to procure, under the Economy Act, anthrax vaccine from
the SNS.  Moreover, all DOD anthrax vaccine was transferred to
the SNS in 2008 and a joint inventory was created.  The SNS
maintains a rotating stock of vaccine that is appropriately distrib-
uted to military sites and civilian laboratories to minimize the
amount of product that must be discarded upon expiration.
Other Concerns
 The 460,000 combined doses of Calcium-DTPA (Diethylen-
etriamine pentaacetate) and Zinc-DTPA are far short of
what would be needed to address radiation exposure from
a catastrophic nuclear event in any large U.S. city.
 The quantity of non-pharmaceutical interventions for pan-
demic influenza, such as N95 respirators and surgical masks,
falls far short of what may be needed.  The U.S. stockpile
contains 105.8 million N95 respirators and 51.7 million sur-
gical masks, while France, with a population one-fifth that of
the United States, has stockpiled 300 million N95s and one
billion surgical masks.27
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DISTRIBUTING MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES
Source: White House Homeland Security Council28
The Bush administration has been very concerned about the pos-
sibility of a major bioterrorist attack.  In the scenario presented
below, the White House estimates that a terrorist flying a small
airplane, such as a crop duster, could spray anthrax over a major
metropolitan area contaminating upwards of three million people
with the bacteria.
In light of such dire estimates, the U.S. government has devel-
oped three strategies to distribute and dispense medical coun-
termeasures -- push, pull, and preposition.   
Push
One strategy involves direct distribution, which emergency planners
refer to as a “push” mechanism, because antibiotics or antivirals are
pushed to people.  In October 2008, HHS announced an innovative
“push” approach to distribute medical countermeasures in the event
of an anthrax attack: public health officials will rely on U.S. Postal Serv-
ice letter carriers who volunteer to deliver medicines directly to res-
idences in their communities in a public health emergency.  
To help protect these volunteers from contracting anthrax, HHS
will issue medical kits containing small quantities of antibiotics for
future use by postal workers and their families during an anthrax
emergency.  “In an anthrax attack, time is of the essence in pre-
venting illness and death by getting antibiotics to those who may
have been exposed,” HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt said.  “By
providing advance protection to letter carriers who volunteer to
deliver antibiotics in an affected community, we can gain the
benefits of the unique capabilities of the Postal Service to get
much needed medicines to those who need it quickly.”29
HHS and the Postal Service have pilot tested this approach in
three U.S. cities -- Seattle, Philadelphia, and Boston.  In Philadel-
phia, 50 letter carriers, each accompanied by a police officer,
reached 55,000 households in less than eight hours.30 Based on
the success of these early tests, the project will be rolled out in
Minneapolis and St. Paul in 2009.  The Postal Service will recruit
700 letter carriers, enough to cover about one-quarter of all
households.  The volunteers will be medically screened, fitted
with N95 respirators, and issued a supply of doxycycline for
their household.  On October 3, 2008, FDA invoked the Emer-
gency Use Authorization powers it has under the 2004 BioShield
Act and approved the pre-positioning of doxycycline emergency
kits for their use by eligible Postal Service employees and their
household members in the event of an anthrax attack.31   
Although some U.S. cities are interested in the possibility of
partnering with the Postal Service, others have concerns.  The
major barrier for some cities is the requirement that postal
workers be accompanied by an armed law enforcement offi-
cer when delivering the countermeasures.  Although sympa-
thetic to the postal workers concern about their own security,
city officials do not think they will be able to provide this type
of police protection after a major anthrax attack or other pub-
lic health emergency, as law enforcement personnel will be
occupied with other first responder duties.
Pull
Many argue that partnering with private sector entities will be
crucial to the successful mass dispensing of medical counter-
measures as local health departments are unlikely to have
enough staff on-hand to do the job.  According to an Institute
of Medicine (IOM) workshop summary, “Any private establish-
ment that can rapidly serve large numbers of customers rep-
resents a potential opportunity for a public-private
partnership.”32 (Please see Indicator 7: Entity Liability Protec-
tion for a discussion on the importance of legal protections for
private sector and non-profit entities.)
The private sector would be crucial partners in the second strat-
egy that government officials have developed, which involves
point of dispensing, or PODs, also known as a “pull” mechanism
because people will be pulled to the antibiotics.  The IOM work-
shop summary report listed several activities that could be car-
ried out through public-private partnerships, including:
 Coordinating logistics, warehousing, and distribution of
countermeasures; 
 Setting up PODs; 
 Providing labor to staff PODs and perform other functions; 
 Training and screening of volunteers; 
 Preregistering individuals to screen for adverse health effects; 
 Tracking and registering people who receive countermeasures; 
 Providing education and communication for recipients of
countermeasures; and
 Providing security for PODs.   
CATASTROPHIC BIOTERRORISM -- ANTHRAX ATTACKS
October 2001 Attacks: 1 gram of anthrax Future Attack:  1-2 kilograms sprayed by 
mailed out via letter a crop duster over a major U.S. city
Antibiotic Treatment 30,000 Antibiotic Treatment 1.9 -3.4 million
Illnesses 22 Illnesses ~450,000
Deaths 5 Deaths ~380,000
Decontamination 3 buildings Decontamination City-wide
Projected economic cost (direct costs) >$1 billion Projected economic cost (direct costs) >$1.8 trillion
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Pre-position
While the “push” and the “pull” strategies have their strengths, some experts argue that
neither will be sufficient to provide countermeasures in the necessary time frame during a
disaster.  These public health experts favor the pre-positioning of MedKits, small supplies of
countermeasures for use at home during an emergency when directed to by public health
authorities.  Pre-positioning would give the public access to medical countermeasures in the
event of a public health emergency, while also buying time for public health authorities to ramp
up their distribution activities
Other public health officials, however, have raised doubts about the feasibility of pre-positioning.
They are concerned that households will not follow the directions and may use the antibiotics
or antivirals in the MedKits to treat a household member who becomes sick during a non-
emergency.  A CDC study conducted in collaboration with the Missouri Department of Health
and Senior Services examined how 4,076 households in St. Louis would react to the distribution
of a MedKit with a five-day supply of ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, or both, and detailed
instructions.  The survey found that 97 percent (3,946) of all study respondents returned the
MedKits upon completion of the study and 99 percent of the returned MedKits were intact.33
Of the 130 households (three percent) that did not return the MedKits, 125 of these could not
find their MedKits, and five refused to return them.
Although this one CDC study suggests that with clear instructions households will use MedKits
appropriately, there are still major concerns.  Will the MedKits go only to the households of
first responders and health care workers or the entire population?  Who will pay for the
MedKits?  If households are expected to buy the MedKits, how will the government avoid
economic disparities in coverage?  If families do put their own money towards the purchase of
MedKits, what happens if there is a bioterror attack several years down the road at which
point there may be questions about the shelf-life of the product?   Finally, in the event of an
anthrax attack, exposed victims need to take 60-days worth of antibiotics, but the MedKits
contain a five-day supply.  How will public health officials get the remaining treatment courses
to the victims and ensure that they complete their treatment regimen?  According to a report
from the Center for Biosecurity, “If the many thorny issues surrounding this strategy can be
addressed adequately, MedKits may prove to be an innovative and useful tool.”34
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Indicator 2: MASS DISTRIBUTION -- STATE ANTIVIRAL PURCHASES 
FINDING:  Thirty-four states and D.C. have purchased 50 percent or more of their federally-
subsidized antivirals to stockpile for use during a pandemic influenza.
Notes: *The percent reflects total
state antiviral purchases and may
include unsubsidized state pur-
chases, which is why some states
exceed 100% of their federally-
subsidized allocation.  **The pop-
ulation count for California and
Illinois does not include residents
of Los Angeles County or Chicago,
respectively.  These two localities,
along with D.C., received their
own allocation of federally-subsi-
dized antivirals based on their
populations.  ***New York State
antiviral purchases include those
made by New York City.   Please
see Appendix B: Influenza Antiviral
Drug Purchases by States, Locali-
ties, and Territories for a complete
breakdown of antiviral purchases.
Source: ASPR, information up-
dated as of September 30, 2008.
34 states and D.C. have purchased 16 states have purchased LESS than 
50 percent or more of their federally- 50 percent of their share of federally-
subsidized antivirals drugs to stockpile subsidized antiviral drugs to stockpile 
for use during an influenza pandemic for use during an influenza pandemic 
(1 point) (0 points)
State All Antivirals Percent of State All Antivirals Percent of 
Purchased by Allocation Purchased by Allocation 
Entity as of Purchased* Entity as of Purchased*
09/30/2008 09/30/2008
Alabama 533,553 112.84% Arizona 67,717 11.56%
Alaska 77,030 113.17% Colorado 215 0.05%
Arkansas 382,398 133.52% Connecticut 22,829 6.24%
California** 2,752,151 102.43% Florida 66,000 3.70%
Delaware 121,164 141.05% Idaho 8,567 5.97%
D.C. 45,000 76.86% Maine 0 0%
Georgia 474,022 52.03% Maryland 210,727 36.41%
Hawaii 172,487 131.56% Massachusetts 50,662 7.52%
Illinois** 516,018 50.25% Montana 8,174 8.48%
Indiana 650,912 100.00% Nebraska 71,952 39.44%
Iowa 312,631 101.21% New Mexico 77,409 39.25%
Kansas 286,084 100.00% Oklahoma 54,015 14.67%
Kentucky 216,224 50.01% Oregon 26,523 7.09%
Louisiana 471,804 100.00% Rhode Island 11,900 10.53%
Michigan 1,076,950 101.74% Texas 1,023,141 44.09%
Minnesota 340,640 64.07% Utah 52,033 21.07%
Mississippi 338,648 111.89%
Missouri 600,477 100.00%
Nevada 135,514 57.56%
New Hampshire 68,000 50.26%
New Jersey 880,293 97.01%
New York*** 2,444,836 121.20%
North Carolina 677,882 76.67%
North Dakota 57,000 85.71%
Ohio 1,388,858 115.65%
Pennsylvania 1,298,792 100.00%
South Carolina 459,960 105.59%
South Dakota 80,310 100.00%
Tennessee 613,706 100.00%
Vermont 71,036 109.24%
Virginia 827,661 107.03%
Washington 417,902 64.92%
West Virginia 227,561 119.65%
Wisconsin 363,729 63.28%
Wyoming 52,718 100.00%
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The federal government’s current goal is to
stockpile 81 million treatment courses of an-
tiviral drugs for use in the event of a pandemic
influenza.  Current HHS policy dictates that
this goal is a shared responsibility between the
federal government and the states.  HHS is
stockpiling 44 million antivirals and allocating
them to states based on population.  Mean-
while, states are responsible for stockpiling an
additional 31 million treatment courses.
In order to encourage states to develop their
own antiviral stockpiles, HHS designated $170
million  to subsidize the purchase of up to 31
million treatment courses of Tamiflu® and Re-
lenza®.  HHS will subsidize 25 percent of the
cost, and states will pay the other 75 percent.
According to HHS, as of September 30, 2008,
state and local jurisdictions have stockpiled
nearly 22 million treatment courses of antivi-
rals, of which almost 21 million treatment
courses were purchased using the federal gov-
ernment subsidy.  Twenty-three states have
purchased 100 percent or more of their fed-
erally-subsidized antivirals; 26 states and D.C.
have purchased 75 percent or more; 34 states
and D.C. have purchased 50 percent or more;
and 38 states and D.C. have purchased 25 per-
cent or more.  
The antivirals Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) and Re-
lenza® (zanamivir) have been shown to re-
duce symptoms and help prevent the spread
of seasonal influenza by suppressing the
growth of the influenza virus.  Antivirals dif-
fer from vaccines in that they target the virus,
while vaccines trigger an immune response in
the body.  Antivirals do not need to be for-
mulated to match a specific strain of the in-
fluenza virus to be effective.  As such, they can
be manufactured and stockpiled in advance
of a potential pandemic influenza outbreak.  
States that have not purchased their entire al-
lotment of federally-subsidized antivirals give
several reasons.  First, according to the Na-
tional Governors Association (NGA) many
have “...expressed concerns about the reliance
on antivirals given that their effectiveness in
treatment may be compromised by the devel-
opment of resistance by the pathogen.”35
Some scientists believe that a combination an-
tiviral treatment might reduce the likelihood
of resistance, but this would require a broader,
larger stockpiling program.  
Other states have questioned the effectiveness
of antivirals, particularly “...if they are used
more than 48 hours after the onset of symp-
toms in an infected individual.”36 Additional
limitations include concerns about the drugs’
potential side effects and financial constraints.
Given the projected budget shortfalls, many
states are reluctant to spend resources on pur-
chasing and stockpiling antivirals that have a
limited shelf-life.  Though this shelf-life recently
expanded from five years to seven years, it is still
too short for many state health officials.  
Although TFAH recognizes these concerns,
current national policy calls for the stockpil-
ing of antivirals to be a shared federal-state
responsibility.  The successful containment
of a pandemic is threatened by differences in
capacity among states.
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PRIVATE SECTOR ANTIVIRAL STOCKPILING
Under current HHS guidelines, state and local jurisdiction’s stockpiles of antivirals are to be
used only for treatment of pandemic influenza, rather than as a prophylaxis.  However, new
draft guidance on antiviral use during a pandemic recommends that private employers and
health care facilities consider purchasing antivirals for use as prophylaxis (the draft guidance is
not HHS policy).  Such use would be undertaken in an attempt to slow the spread of the pan-
demic by providing them to healthy individuals who have been exposed and to key personnel,
such as health care workers, who will be exposed to the new virus.37
HHS draft guidance on employer antiviral stockpiling lists several reasons companies may want
to buy antivirals:38
 To provide prophylaxis treatment for health care workers and emergency responders;
 To protect workers who are needed to maintain essential community services;
 To provide early treatment for workers who fall ill; and
 To protect overseas employees and operations in areas where federal pandemic response
activities will not reach.
According to HHS Deputy Secretary Tevi Troy, “Preparation is a shared responsibility, and busi-
nesses and private industry can contribute greatly to community resiliency.”39 In fact, more
than 300 large U.S. businesses have already stockpiled the antiviral Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) to
protect their workers and maintain business operations, according to George Abercrombie,
Chief Executive Officer and President of Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., maker of the drug.40  
Some public health experts, however, have raised concerns regarding the advisability of private
sector stockpiles.  They note that while stockpiling of antivirals may be feasible for large corpora-
tions, there are many businesses that will not be able to afford this luxury.  Stockpiling will also be
difficult for businesses that lack warehouse space and employ part-time or uninsured employees.
Other barriers to employers’ stockpiling include concerns related to antivirals’ shelf-life and the
fear that state or federal governments might seize the stockpiled drugs in the event of a pandemic.  
The Center for Biosecurity voiced its concerns with the proposed guidance, noting that “It is
unrealistic to expect the private sector to create sufficient antiviral stockpiles or to unilaterally
accept this burden, and it is especially troubling that segments of critical infrastructure are cov-
ered under the private sector’s voluntary participation. If the private sector does not stockpile
sufficient supplies of antivirals, serious consequences, including higher than necessary absen-
teeism rates among health care providers during a pandemic, will likely result.”41
REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Meningitis Outbreak in Chicago, Illinois, April 2008.
By the end of April 2008, the city of Chicago had 10 cases of group C meningococcal invasive dis-
ease for the year -- compared with only 13 cases in all of 2007.  The Chicago Department of
Public Health took a proactive approach and decided to launch a mass vaccination campaign fo-
cused on the at-risk population -- children aged 11 to 18.  Due to a preparedness investment in
previous years, the city was able to vaccinate 7,213 children in two weeks.  Not only was the city
able to curb a potential outbreak, but they were also able to test the mass dispensing and mass
vaccination plans they had developed with support from the PHEP cooperative agreements.  
Cluster of Neurological Illnesses in Rhode Island, December 2006. 
In December 2006 five school aged children in Rhode Island were found to have a severe neu-
rological illness that was suspected to have been caused by Mycoplasma pneumoniae infection.
After learning of the cluster of ill children, the Rhode Island Department of Health contacted
the CDC for assistance and testing.  The health department then distributed antibiotics to all
the students, staff, and family members from the affected school. Public health authorities also
closed down three nearby school districts as a precautionary measure.  The investments the
Department of Health made in its Medical Emergency Distribution plan facilitated the quick
and efficient distribution of antibiotics to over 1,000 people.
Source: ASTHO42
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SEASONAL FLU VACCINATION RATES
Note: States in red type had statistically significant (p<0.05) increases.  No state had a statistically significant decrease.
Source: BRFSS.  Data include three year comparisons.  Please note that each state has a different sample size so the rates of increase and decrease are not
comparable across states -- each state has a different range to reach statistically significant changes.  See Appendix C for the methodology.
Routine vaccinations have helped prevent countless illnesses
and deaths, and are extremely cost-effective, sparing the
healthcare system the expense of caring for those who might
otherwise become ill.  
According to CDC, five to 20 percent of Americans contract
the seasonal flu, more than 200,000 people are hospitalized
from flu complications, and approximately 36,000 people die
from the flu each year.43 Certain people, such as the elderly, the
very young, and those with compromised immune systems are
more vulnerable to complications from seasonal flu.44 Compli-
cations of flu can include bacterial pneumonia, dehydration, and
worsening of chronic medical conditions, such as congestive
heart failure, asthma, or diabetes.  CDC’s Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends that individuals
at high-risk for complications and their caregivers receive sea-
sonal flu vaccinations at the beginning of each flu season.
Over the past three years, states have made vaccinating one
key high risk group, adults aged 65 and older, a public health
priority.  According to data from CDC’s Behavioral Risk Fac-
tor Surveillance System (BRFSS), in 2008 50 states and D.C.
either increased or maintained vaccination rates for seniors,
up from 39 states and D.C. in 2007. 
50 states and D.C. increased or maintained rates for vaccinating adults aged 65 and older 
for seasonal flu (comparing 2004-2006 to 2005-2007)
STATE 2004-2006 2005-2007 Difference between STATE 2004-2006 2005-2007 Difference between 
rates rates 2004-2006 and rates rates 2004-2006 and 
2005-2007 2005-2007
Alabama 63.0% 64.0% 1.0% Montana 71.4% 71.7% 0.2%
Alaska 62.5% 62.7% 0.2% Nebraska 73.9% 74.3% 0.3%
Arizona 64.7% 65.7% 1.0% Nevada 56.5% 57.7% 1.1%
Arkansas 67.5% 68.1% 0.6% New Hampshire 71.0% 73.3% 2.4%
California 67.9% 67.4% -0.5% New Jersey 65.8% 66.8% 1.0%
Colorado 76.3% 75.5% -0.8% New Mexico 69.3% 68.5% -0.8%
Connecticut 71.8% 72.3% 0.5% New York 64.2% 65.7% 1.6%
Delaware 68.5% 70.0% 1.6% North Carolina 67.3% 68.8% 1.4%
D.C. 56.9% 58.7% 1.8% North Dakota 71.9% 71.3% -0.6%
Florida 60.7% 60.7% 0.0% Ohio 66.8% 68.5% 1.7%
Georgia 63.4% 64.5% 1.1% Oklahoma 72.9% 73.3% 0.4%
Hawaii 73.9% 75.5% 1.6% Oregon 70.4% 71.1 0.7%
Idaho 65.1% 66.1% 1.1% Pennsylvania 63.8% 66.7% 2.9%
Illinois 62.6% 63.5% 0.9% Rhode Island 71.6% 73.9% 2.3%
Indiana 64.5% 67.1% 2.6% South Carolina 63.2% 64.8% 1.5%
Iowa 73.1% 73.3% 0.2% South Dakota 75.8% 75.9% 0.2%
Kansas 68.9% 70.7% 1.8% Tennessee 66.1% 67.4% 1.3%
Kentucky 64.2% 67.3% 3.1% Texas 65.0% 64.9% -0.1%
Louisiana 65.2% 65.2% 0.0% Utah 72.4% 72.7% 0.4%
Maine 70.6% 72.3% 1.7% Vermont 68.6% 71.3% 2.7%
Maryland 63.3% 65.6% 2.4% Virginia 68.2% 70.5% 2.3%
Massachusetts 71.1% 73.6% 2.4% Washington 68.8% 70.2% 1.4%
Michigan 68.4% 69.8% 1.3% West Virginia 65.9% 66.9% 1.0%
Minnesota 76.7% 77.2% 0.5% Wisconsin 72.7% 72.6% 0.0%
Mississippi 64.6% 65.6% 1.0% Wyoming 72.5% 73.4% 0.9%
Missouri 67.7% 67.8% 0.1%
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Each state should have the capacity to deliver
and receive laboratory specimens on a 24-
hour, seven days a week basis as part of public
health preparedness.  Such a service, whether
state-owned and operated or contracted to a
designated carrier, is essential to ensure the
timeliness of laboratory testing and subse-
quent treatment or decontamination.    
According to APHL’s survey of state public
health laboratory directors, as of October
2008 only 26 state public health laboratories
report having this capacity.  Twenty-four
states and D.C. do not have this capacity.
Cuts in federal and state budgets have sig-
nificantly impacted the ability of states to
develop and maintain courier services; fur-
ther budget cuts are expected due to the
current economic outlook.  These cuts
threaten to undermine state laboratory pre-
paredness as rapid recognition of an event
requires that samples coming from first re-
sponders, clinical or other laboratories be
delivered to public health laboratories with-
out delay. Continuous sample referral and
timely ground transportation are the keys to
state readiness.
Indicator 3: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- LAB PICKUP AND DELIVERY SERVICES 
FINDING:  Twenty-four states and D.C. do not have the capacity to deliver and receive laboratory
specimens on a 24-hour, seven days a week basis as part of public health preparedness.
Source: APHL 2008 Survey of State Public Health Lab Directors
26 states report that their public
health laboratories have an intra-
state courier system (non-mail) that
operates 24 hours a day for specimen
pickup and delivery (1 point).
Alabama North Carolina
Arkansas Ohio
Delaware Oklahoma
Iowa Oregon
Kansas Pennsylvania
Louisiana South Carolina
Maryland South Dakota
Michigan Texas
Minnesota Tennessee
Mississippi Vermont
Missouri Virginia
Montana Wisconsin
New Hampshire Wyoming
24 states and D.C. report that their
public health laboratories do NOT have
an intra-state courier system (non-mail)
that operates 24 hours a day for 
specimen pickup and delivery (0 points).
Alaska Maine
Arizona Massachusetts 
California Nebraska
Colorado Nevada
Connecticut New Jersey
D.C. New Mexico
Florida New York
Georgia North Dakota
Hawaii Rhode Island
Idaho Utah
Illinois Washington
Indiana West Virginia
Kentucky
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PROGRESS IN LABORATORY PREPAREDNESS
Since the first Ready or Not? report in December 2003, state public health laboratories have
made enormous strides in emergency preparedness.  An annual survey of state public health
laboratory directors by APHL for TFAH has revealed major gains in terms of laboratory capac-
ity and workforce.  
For instance, in 2003, only six states reported that they had sufficient Bio-Safety Level 3 (BSL-
3) laboratory facilities.  BSL-3 labs are equipped with technology and trained staff that allows
them to safely handle infectious agents that may cause serious or potentially life threatening
diseases as a result of exposure via inhalation.  The number of states with sufficient BSL-3 ca-
pacity has grown steadily over the years to 16 in 2004, 37 in 2005, 39 in 2006, and 44 in 2007.    
State public health laboratories have also bolstered their workforce of trained lab scientists.  In
2004, only 21 states reported having sufficient, trained laboratory scientists to manage tests for
anthrax or plague in a suspected outbreak.  The number of states with sufficient, trained labo-
ratory scientists to manage tests for anthrax or plague in a suspected outbreak doubled to 41
states and D.C. in 2005, and grew again to 46 states and D.C. in 2006.  
In 2008, CDC received FDA clearance of a new CDC-developed test for rapidly detecting
seasonal and novel influenza viruses.  This test will be deployed at all public health laboratories
and other laboratories participating in influenza surveillance.  The test has high sensitivity and
specificity and will be used to confirm the first cases of pandemic influenza in a community
with subsequent initiation of community interventions.
In the midst of all this progress, there are still some gaps.  For instance, while 44 state public
health labs have Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS), only 24 have the ability
to create, send, and receive Public Health Information Network (PHIN) messaging.45 PHIN
messaging uses standard messages and vocabularies to ensure interoperability among public
health systems, as well as ensuring that public health systems can work with health care, envi-
ronmental, homeland defense, and other external systems and networks. 
State public health laboratories’ progress is due in part to the influx of money from CDC for
upgrading state and local public health laboratory capacity.  In addition to the accomplishments
detailed above, state labs have used these funds to:
 Purchase new instrumentation, adopt new technologies, and develop electronic reporting;
 Recruit and retain laboratory personnel;
Maintain outreach programs to hospital and clinical laboratories and first responders; and 
 Assure a coordinated response effort with federal partners.
However, as a result of funding cuts, much of this progress is threatened.  A 2008 APHL survey of
state public health laboratories found that labs are experiencing difficulties in the following areas:46
 Hiring and maintaining personnel;
 Reduced analytical capabilities;
 Fewer employee training courses offered; and 
 Inability to purchase critical equipment and supplies.
Other challenges include logistical problems with getting samples to the labs, duplicative efforts
between federal and state agencies, and the lack of communication about these efforts.  This is
especially important in an era of declining funding.
An increase in funding would allow state public health labs to focus on new priorities, including:
 Expanded chemical terrorism detection;
 Funding for reagents, the diagnostic materials that are required to analyze suspect samples
for biological agents; and 
 Funding to improve public health laboratory capability to investigate or confirm radiation
sickness or genetic mutations.
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States submitted revised pandemic influenza
plans on July 9, 2008 based on the most re-
cent HHS guidance.  As a condition to re-
ceive PHEP cooperative agreement funding
from CDC in FY 2009, state pandemic plans
must meet certain national standards.  Spe-
cific supporting activities from the state pan-
demic influenza operating plans were
identified to be used as part of the assess-
ment in determining whether a particular ju-
risdiction’s PHEP funding may be subject to
a partial withholding in FY2009.  These ac-
tivities (chosen across six operating objec-
tives) were selected because they 1) are
important for a pandemic influenza re-
sponse, 2) are ones in which the states have
received some guidance or had an opportu-
nity to prepare, and 3) could easily be evalu-
ated by reviewers.  One of the PHEP-related
supporting activities involved the evaluation
of a state’s ability to collect, handle, ship, test,
and report on influenza virus specimens.  
According to APHL’s survey of state public
health laboratory directors, as of October 2008
public health laboratories in 47 states and D.C.
reported that their labs met the expectations
of their state’s pandemic influenza plan.  
Indicator 4: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING 
FINDING:  Only three state public health laboratories report that they cannot meet the expec-
tations of their state’s pandemic influenza plan.
Source: APHL 2008 Survey of State Public Health Lab Directors
47 states and D.C. report that their
public health laboratories meet the
expectations of the state’s pandemic
influenza plan (1 point).
Alabama Louisiana North Dakota
Alaska Maine Oklahoma
Arizona Maryland Oregon
Arkansas Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Colorado Michigan Rhode Island
Connecticut Minnesota South Carolina
Delaware Mississippi South Dakota
D.C. Missouri Tennessee
Florida Montana Texas
Georgia Nebraska Utah
Hawaii Nevada Vermont
Idaho New Hampshire Virginia
Illinois New Jersey Washington
Indiana New Mexico West Virginia
Iowa New York Wisconsin
Kentucky North Carolina Wyoming
3 states report that their public health
laboratories do NOT meet the 
expectations of the state’s pandemic 
influenza plan (0 points).
California
Kansas
Ohio
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LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK (LRN)
The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is a network of state, local, and federal public
health, military, and international laboratories that provides public health, food, veterinary, and
environmental testing capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism and other pub-
lic health emergencies.  The LRN provides emergency assistance and support through the
pooling of resources and personnel based on cooperative agreements.  
Over the past six years CDC has expanded the number of LRN labs from 91 in FY 2001 to 164
in FY 2007.47 CDC has also worked with LRN member labs to improve their ability to rapidly
and accurately identify biological threat agents, raising the passing rate from 83 percent in FY
2005 to 91 percent in FY 2007.  Currently, more than 90 percent of LRN labs can perform
tests for bioterror agents such as anthrax, tularemia, and plague, and more than 9,000 clinical
lab workers have been trained to detect, diagnose, and report public health emergencies.48    
LRN labs undergo proficiency testing on a regular basis.  CDC evaluates the LRN labs based on
their performance in four to six challenges per year that use simulated clinical and environmen-
tal samples to mimic real events.  If LRN labs fail a challenge, CDC and APHL provide technical
assistance to the labs and they are re-tested.  
CHEMICAL LABORATORY CAPABILITY
According to CDC, there are over 80 chemical agents that can kill or seriously injure a person
that have been identified as likely terrorist agents.49 Many of these are common commercial
and industrial chemicals that can be easily weaponized.
To help address the critical gaps in chemical laboratory preparedness, CDC has expanded the
Laboratory Response Network (LRN), an integrated network of approximately 160 labs en-
compassing federal, state, local, veterinary, military, environmental, food testing, and interna-
tional labs, to include a chemical network.50 The chemical LRN (LRN-c) is made up of 62
state, territorial and metropolitan public health laboratories.  LRN-c labs undergo proficiency
testing and are put through three challenges per year per chemical testing method.  According
to CDC, in FY 2007, the LRN-c labs had a 90 percent passing rate on exercises.
Of the 62 LRN-c labs, only 10 are characterized as Level I laboratories.51 These 10 Level I labs
have “biomonitoring” capabilities, meaning they are equipped to detect an expanded number
of chemical agents in human specimens (blood, saliva, urine), plus run analyses for mustard
agents, nerve agents, and other toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical warfare.
Of these 10, half are ‘new’ labs that need to be brought “to analytical parity with existing Level
I laboratories,” a process that is expected to take two more years.52 The five existing Level 1
labs are in California, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Virginia.  The five new Level I
labs will be located in: Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.53
In the event of a chemical terrorist attack, labs will not only need to be able to test clinical
specimens, but also environmental samples, such as water, air, soil, or food, to determine the
source, route, and potential extent of contamination.  Very few public health laboratories,
however, are able to test for chemical warfare agents in environmental samples.  In 2006, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began developing the environmental arm of the LRN
(eLRN) which will include equipment standards, testing protocols, and training modules for
laboratory workers.  Without adequate funding, however, it is unclear how many states will be
able to upgrade their public health labs.
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RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY PREPAREDNESS
Under the all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness, the United States must be ready
to respond to any number of public health catastrophes, including the detonation of a so-called
dirty bomb.  A dirty bomb, or radiological dispersal device, releases radioactive material
through the use of a conventional explosive.  Although the detonation of a dirty bomb is un-
likely to cause massive casualties or physical destruction, it could expose thousands of individu-
als to small traces of radioactive materials, which can require medical treatment and leave the
exposed at higher risk of developing cancer.
The National Planning Scenarios put together by the Homeland Security Council for use in na-
tional, federal, state, and local homeland security preparedness activities includes a scenario
that features the detonation of a dirty bomb in a downtown business district of three U.S.
cities.  Under National Planning Scenario #11, public health emergency responders will have
to screen, monitor, and decontaminate up to 300,000 victims (100,000 at each site).54 How-
ever, according to a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee report, “...validated meth-
ods to test clinical specimens in a radiological emergency exist for only six of the 13 highest
priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario.”55 Additionally, for those
isotopes for which validated methods do exist, screening 100,000 victims in the wake of a dirty
bomb could take more than four years due to current gaps in laboratory preparedness, includ-
ing lack of equipment, trained personnel, and facilities.56 Testing the environmental samples
after a dirty bomb attack could take up to six years given current laboratory capacity.  A 2006-
2007 APHL survey found that fewer than 25 percent of state public health laboratories can
screen or test clinical specimens for radiation.57
The weakness of current U.S. radiological laboratory capacity was seen in November 2007
when a former Russian KGB agent was poisoned with the radioisotope Polonium-210 in Lon-
don.  After the agent’s death, CDC identified 160 U.S. citizens who were potentially exposed
to the radioactive material while staying at the same hotel or eating in the same restaurants.
However, CDC was only able to find one U.S.-based laboratory capable and qualified to con-
duct the necessary clinical tests for potential exposure to Polonium-210.58
That there are major gaps in radiological laboratory preparedness is not new information.  In
fact, a 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report highlighted the weaknesses in
current federal efforts.59 More recently, in January 2007, the White House issued HSPD-18 to
address “Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction.”  HSPD-18 warned
of the threats posed by nuclear and radiological devices and called on the United States to im-
prove its radiological clinical laboratory testing capabilities.60
Two federal agencies have funded and are establishing surge capacity in several state public
health laboratories to close the gap in radiological laboratory preparedness.  The EPA has
funded three state public health laboratories for surge capacity to build a National Environ-
mental Radioanalytical Laboratory Response Network. Once built, the network would drasti-
cally decrease the environmental sampling shortfall by 80 percent.61 FDA has funded and
established five surge capacity state public health laboratories.62
CDC has detailed plans to establish a Radiological Laboratory Response Network (LRN-R) that
would include five state radioanalytical labs to expand the federal response.  The LRN-R would
cost an estimated $20.6 million over the next five years, but if implemented, would reduce the
time to analyze the clinical samples from a dirty-bomb attack from four years to three weeks.63
The president’s FY 2009 budget request included $10 million that would be used expand the
urine radionuclide screen into five states through the creation of the LRN-R.64 The screen will
be able to test for 22 high priority radionuclides likely to be used in a terrorist attack.  
Congress, however, failed to pass a FY 2009 budget, instead enacting a Continuing Resolution
holding funding at FY 2008 levels for six months, through March 2009.  
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Delivering effective public health services de-
pends on timely and reliable information.
Health departments can not protect people
from existing or emerging health threats, such
as a pandemic flu, or a bioterrorist attack, with-
out correct and pertinent information.  The
lack of timely and comprehensive data can
delay the identification of and response to se-
rious and mass emergency health problems.  In
addition, federal, state, and local health de-
partments and private health care providers
must all work together to effectively track in-
formation about and respond to health threats.  
The National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS) was developed to integrate
and standardize the tracking of specific infec-
tious diseases.  It promotes standards-based,
electronic reporting for more rapid, accurate,
and integrated information.  In fact, a study
published in January 2008 found that auto-
mated electronic laboratory results (ELR)
identified nearly five times as many cases as tra-
ditional, paper-based reporting and identified
these cases nearly eight days earlier.66 The au-
thors noted, that “Public health monitoring of
disease outbreaks, including reports of notifi-
Indicator 5:  BIOSURVEILLANCE -- NEDSS COMPATIBILITY
FINDING:  Six states do not use a disease surveillance system that is compatible with CDC’s 
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
Source: CDC National Center for Public Health Informatics, Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services.
44 states and D.C. report that they 
use a disease surveillance system that is
compatible with CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance System
(NEDSS) (1 point)
Alabama Kentucky Ohio
Alaska Louisiana Oklahoma
Arizona Maine Oregon
Arkansas Maryland Pennsylvania
California Massachusetts Rhode Island
Colorado Michigan South Carolina
Delaware Missouri South Dakota
D.C. Montana Tennessee
Florida Nebraska Texas
Georgia New Hampshire Vermont
Hawaii New Jersey Virginia
Idaho New Mexico Washington
Illinois New York West Virginia
Indiana North Carolina Wisconsin
Iowa North Dakota Wyoming
6 states report that they do NOT use a
disease surveillance system that is
compatible with CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance 
System (NEDSS) (0 points)
Connecticut
Kansas
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nevada
Utah
IF WE WANT TO DO ANYTHING IN REAL TIME, IF WE WANT TO
ACTUALLY RESPOND TO AN OUTBREAK IN SOME WAY, WE’RE GOING TO HAVE TO
COMPRESS THE TIME FROM THE DATA MOVING FROM THE CLINICAL CARE SYSTEM TO THE
STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENTS TO THE CDC, PARTICULARLY WHEN
IT’S A DISEASE OF NATIONAL INTEREST OR IMPORTANCE SUCH AS PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA OR A SUSPECTED BIOTERRORISM RELATED CONDITION.      65
—  DR. LESLIE LENERT, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS, CDC.
“
”
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able conditions from laboratories and health
care providers to public health authorities, is
fundamental to the prevention and control of
population-based disease.”67 NEDSS also has
the advantage of producing “...integrated sur-
veillance systems, where the disease issues of
reportable conditions in public health are
tracked in an environment that allows you to
see that patients who have HIV also have hep-
atitis C and tuberculosis, and you can take in-
tegrated public health action.”68
The tracking of specific (i.e., notifiable) dis-
eases does not, however, address the impor-
tant need to detect health events of urgent
concern due to conditions not already called
out for surveillance.  Additionally, detection
is often necessary before the specific cause
has been identified even when due to a re-
portable condition.  Early detection of un-
usual patterns of disease and health
behaviors can provide critical lead-time for
unexpected events and unexpected occur-
rences of common conditions (like diarrheal
illness).  Therefore, NEDSS is working
closely with CDC’s BioSense program to
identify best practices and explore ways to
use the same IT infrastructure for both sur-
veillance systems.  In 2008, the two programs
began testing the integration of their systems
for automated laboratory reporting to state
and local public health authorities.  Further
integration of case-based surveillance sys-
tems, like NEDSS, with event-based detection
is needed at the state and local levels.
According to CDC, to be considered NEDSS-
compatible, states must have systems that
meet the following requirements:
1. Disease data entry directly through an Inter-
net browser-based system, thereby creating a
database accessible by health investigators
and public health professionals.
2. Electronic Laboratory Results (ELR) re-
porting, which allows labs to report cases
to health departments.
3. Integration of multiple health informa-
tion databases creating a single repository.
A fourth component, electronic messaging ca-
pabilities, allowing states to share information
efficiently with CDC and other health agen-
cies, is being upgraded system-wide, and is,
therefore, not included among the criteria.
In order to determine FY 2009 grant allocations,
CDC’s Division of Integrated Surveillance Sys-
tems and Services queried state health depart-
ments on the status of their Public Health
Information Networks.   According to CDC’s
2008 Assessment of States NEDSS Status, 44 states
and D.C. are NEDSS-compatible, including
seven states that achieved NEDSS-compliancy
for the first time in 2008: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Iowa, New Hampshire, and
Wyoming.  Six states are identified as non-com-
patible with NEDSS.  The majority of the non-
compatible states meet two of the three criteria.
These states are making steady progress towards
meeting the third requirement.    
According to CDC, 2009 is the first year of
the new project period for the NEDSS coop-
erative agreement with the states.  As part of
the NEDSS strategic planning process, which
is currently underway, CDC will develop new
criteria for NEDSS-compliance.  TFAH will
use the new criteria in its 2009 report.
In early 2007, hospitals in Alaska were pushed to their limit dur-
ing a Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV) outbreak.  By March, 53
infants and young children were diagnosed at a small, 10-bed
hospital in Barrow, Alaska.  The surge of patients led to the hos-
pital going through nine months of supplies in just six weeks.
The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services activated
its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to support the hospi-
tals affected by the illness and developed and distributed fact
sheets around the state describing the symptoms and warning
signs of RSV.  Such diligence paid off in September 2007 when
an outbreak of enterovirus occurred, as well as during the 2008
RSV season.  When four infants were admitted in a single week
with an unknown illness the hospital staff immediately notified
the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services.  The rapid
disease monitoring and reporting prevented the health system
from encountering the overload it had seen the previous year.
REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Respiratory Syncytial Virus Outbreak in Alaska, 2007.
Source: ASTHO69
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BIOSENSE
BioSense is CDC’s early-event detection system that collects
clinical information from hospitals, such as patients’ symptoms,
quantities and types of drug prescriptions, and the number of
emergency room visits, among other data.  This so-called “sys-
tem of systems” links data “from large hospital systems, data-
aggregating systems, and state/county surveillance systems to
provide a unified national view.”70 This type of surveillance,
known as syndromic surveillance, relies on information avail-
able well before an official diagnosis or confirmed lab result.
Some public health officials believe this type of surveillance can
be crucial to alerting them to possible disease outbreaks or
bioterrorism, while others are skeptical about the merits of
syndromic surveillance in providing outbreak recognition.
According to CDC, as of November 2007, BioSense had more
than 1,900 hospitals and health care facilities around the country
transmitting data.  This includes 423 hospitals transmitting real-
time data, covering 38 states and 71 major metropolitan areas,
and 1,500 federal military and veterans’ outpatient facilities.71
BioSense officials told TFAH that another 200 hospitals joined
the program in 2008, as well as the Georgia State Public Health
Department and Quest Diagnostics.72
Over the past year, the BioSense program has undergone
major revisions based on serious concerns expressed by Con-
gressional overseers and state and local health departments.
BioSense is moving away from the previous model of connect-
ing hospitals directly to CDC, which bypassed state and local
health departments.  According to one CDC official, “This
model is kaput.”  Instead, the BioSense program is focusing on
creating a national system that builds on state and local health
departments surveillance systems.  
The shift in mission has led to new priorities.  Over the next
four years (2008-2012) the program plans a rapid expansion
that will integrate existing state and local real time surveillance
systems to maximize coverage.  CDC plans to work with state
and local health departments and offer technical and financial
support for their real time systems in exchange for data.  
CDC is also sponsoring the formation of regional collaboratives
for real time surveillance.  The first grants for these regional
partnerships were awarded in October 2008.  The four partner-
ships that received CDC funding cover the following geographic
regions: the National Capital Region (Maryland, Virginia, and
D.C.); Ohio and Pennsylvania; the St. Louis area; and a Southern
States collaborative (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, and Tennessee).  The grantees will focus on
developing procedures to collect and share data; information in-
frastructure; and legal issues around data sharing agreements.
Another program goal is focused on data stewardship.  Cur-
rently, states have independent systems that are not con-
nected to one another, and in many cases, local health
departments are not connected to state systems.  To build
trust among federal, state, and local partners, CDC is devel-
oping a federated database model that would ease the sharing
of data among partners.  This technology would underpin the
regional collaboratives.  Under the federated database model,
data is stored in different geographic locations around the
country.  By storing data locally at state and local health de-
partments, but providing access to CDC and other authorized
organizations to access and analyze the data, CDC says this
“eliminates the risk of a single point of failure thus creating a
robust, safe-fail framework.”73 BioSense program officials be-
lieve this model will entice the participation of those cities and
counties that had been reluctant to share data.
Finally, BioSense will work to improve case-detection capabili-
ties, which will allow the surveillance system to capture data
more quickly from health care settings and move the informa-
tion to public health departments at the federal, state, and local
levels.  CDC also plans to offer incentives to hospitals and
health care providers to join the BioSense network by enhanc-
ing the system’s ability to share data from the public health de-
partments with clinical care providers, and by allowing data
collected via BioSense to be used to support research activities.  
The president’s FY 2009 budget request included $49.9 mil-
lion for BioSense, an increase of $15.5 million over the previ-
ous fiscal year.74 The additional funds were to be used to:
 Enhance syndromic surveillance capabilities and develop
case-based surveillance ones;
 Support basic and applied research and evaluation;
 Implement connections with the new Regional Health Infor-
mation Organizations (RHIOs) and Health Information Ex-
changes (HIEs); and 
 Increase BioSense coverage in major metropolitan areas.
Congress, however, failed to pass a FY 2009 budget, instead
opting for a six-month Continuing Resolution at FY 2008 levels
through March 2009.  
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In the event of a catastrophic public health
emergency, such as a bioterrorist attack, pan-
demic influenza, or natural disaster, govern-
ment officials will depend on volunteer health
professionals to treat the surge of patients com-
ing forward to seek care.  However, relying on
volunteer health professionals presents several
issues including: licensing; permissible scope
of practice; the relationship between volun-
teers, the relief organizations, and local health
care, emergency management, and licensing
agencies; the eligibility of volunteers for im-
munities from liability; and volunteer protec-
tion laws and workers’ compensation benefits.  
Indicator 6:  HEALTH CARE VOLUNTEER EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION 
FINDING:  Eight states have “low” protections for health care volunteers during times of emer-
gency, meaning that those states have only Good Samaritan or similar laws under which volunteers
may be provided with an affirmative defense, but not necessarily immunity from liability.
Notes:  
States in bold font have “high” protections for health care
volunteers during an emergency.
1 State not only pays for liability coverage, but also handles
some aspect of legal representation of emergency workers
if necessary.
2 Health practitioners explicitly named as a covered class.
3 Introduced UEVHPA legislation; not yet codified.
4 Statute mandates that care provided be uncompensated.
5 State has not codified the UEVHPA but appears to have
covered all bases for full immunity for volunteers.
6 State has adopted the UEVHPA.
7 Based on 2007 TFAH review.
Source: Legal review conducted by the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health Services and
School of Medicine and Health Sciences.
42 states and D.C.  have “high” or
“medium” protections for health care
volunteers during times of emergency 
(1 point). 
Alabama Kentucky6 Oklahoma3
Arizona1 Louisiana3 Oregon3
Arkansas Maine2,3 Pennsylvania3
California2,3 Michigan2,4 Rhode Island2
Colorado6 Minnesota3,4 South Carolina2
Connecticut1 Mississippi3,4 South Dakota4,7
Delaware1,2 Missouri2,4 Tennessee6
D.C. Nebraska4,7 Utah6
Georgia2,4 Nevada Vermont3
Hawaii2,3 New Hampshire2 Virginia2
Idaho New Jersey Washington2
Illinois2,3,4,7 New Mexico6 West Virginia2
Indiana6 New York Wisconsin2
Iowa1,4,5 North Carolina2,5
Kansas2,4 North Dakota
8 states have “low” protections for 
health care volunteers during times 
of emergency (0 points).
Alaska
Florida2,4
Maryland3,4
Massachusetts4
Montana4
Ohio4
Texas4
Wyoming2,4
REGARDLESS OF THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MALPRACTICE CLAIMS MAY OR MAY
NOT BE BROUGHT AGAINST VOLUNTEER PRACTITIONERS, AND THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF
ANY CLAIMS THAT MAY ARISE, THE RISK OF EXPOSURE TO LIABILITY GREATLY CONCERNS
PRACTITIONERS WHO ARE CONSIDERING VOLUNTEERING THEIR SERVICES, AND MAY CLEARLY
DETER SOME SKILLED PERSONNEL FROM VOLUNTEERING DURING EMERGENCIES. 75
— MICHEALLE CARPENTER, JAMES G. HODGE, AND RAYMOND P. PEPE, 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF DISASTER MEDICINE
“
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In a recent survey conducted by the Ameri-
can Public Health Association, almost 60 per-
cent of clinicians reported that having
medical malpractice insurance coverage
would be important (24.3%) or essential
(35.4%) in their decision to travel out of
state to provide assistance during an emer-
gency. At the same time, almost 70 percent
of respondents answered that immunity from
civil lawsuits would be an important (35.6%)
or essential (33.8%) factor in deciding
whether to volunteer in an emergency.76  
While federal laws such as the 1996 Federal
Volunteer Protection Act (FVPA), the 2002
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the
2006 Public Readiness and Emergency Pre-
paredness (PREP)   Act all provide some fed-
eral liability coverage, there is no uniform
federal law that acts as a shield to liability for
health care volunteers during declared pub-
lic health emergencies.77 (Please see Section
2: Federal Preparedness for a further discus-
sion on federal law.)
Good Samaritan laws, which exist in all 50
states and D.C., are narrow in scope and gen-
erally provide protection only for emergency
aid at the scene of an emergency.  Health care
volunteers who provide non-emergency care
at a facility following the acute phase of an
emergency, for example, would likely not be
protected by a state’s Good Samaritan law.78
Furthermore, a Good Samaritan statute offers
only an affirmative defense in a liability action;
it is not a legal grant of immunity from suit.  
In response to this gap in nature and scope
of legal liability protection extended to vol-
unteers, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), along with a number of health
care professional organizations, developed
the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health
Practitioners Act (UEVHPA).  The Act offers
model legislation to facilitate the deploy-
ment of health care volunteers during emer-
gencies.  The UEVHPA addresses a number
of important issues, such as registration, li-
censing and accreditation of qualified health
care volunteers for the purpose of swift and
effective deployment.79 The UEVHPA also
extends civil liability protections to registered
health care volunteers similar to the immu-
nity provided to state employees under the
Emergency Management Assistance Com-
pact (EMAC), as well as provision for work-
ers compensation.  
Researchers examined the extent to which,
as of October 2008, states had either adopted
UEVHPA or had legislated its elements in
equivalent fashion.  Researchers adopted the
following three-tier approach to the review: 
1) States adopting the UEVHPA or enacting
its full equivalent, as measured by the
terms of state statutory law; 
2) States whose laws offer some, but not all,
of the emergency volunteer protections
available under UEVHPA; and 
3) States offering only minimal protections
in the form of Good Samaritan Statutes.
The “minimal protections” or “low” category
represents those states with only Good Samar-
itan or similar laws under which volunteers
may be provided with an affirmative defense,
but not necessarily immunity from liability.
The “some protections” or “medium” group
of states extend protections to volunteers dur-
ing times of emergency, but may not explicitly
identify health practitioners, may require af-
filiation with a regional or local emergency
compact, or may not provide coverage to vol-
unteers in the event of injury during render-
ing of services.  Finally, the “UEVHPA” or
“high” protection states have adopted the
model statute or all of its elements.  
Based on the research team’s findings,
TFAH awarded a full point to “high” and
“medium” protection states.  Forty-two states
and D.C. have “high” or “medium” liability
protection for health care volunteers during
an emergency, while 8 states have “low” lia-
bility protection.  
The number of states with “high” or
“medium” protection for health care volun-
teers in an emergency grew from 29 states and
D.C. in 2007, and TFAH expects state efforts
to increase.  
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There are also efforts underway in the states
to use their legal reforms to incentivize volun-
teerism.  For example, in Arizona, state and
local government agencies joined the Arizona
Medical Association’s Disaster Preparedness
Task Force and collaboratively produced the
“Disaster Preparedness and Awareness Guide
for the Arizona Physician.”80 Colorado now
hosts an annual educational seminar focused
on legal issues in emergency management
through their Division of Emergency Manage-
ment during which they address issues of vol-
unteer liability among other topics.81 Texas
has focused on systematically registering and
credentialing volunteers through their Disas-
ter Volunteer Registry.  
In the two years since the NCCUSL adopted
the UEVHPA, six states have adopted the
UEVHPA model statue or all of its elements:
Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico,
Tennessee, and Utah.  Another 12 states have
introduced UEVHPA legislation although it
has not been passed or signed into law: Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
The UEVPHA offers the most complete im-
munity protections for volunteer health prac-
titioners.82 Because the model act includes a
prospective designation process, licensing re-
quirements, worker’s compensation, and im-
munity from liability, the UEVHPA sets forth
an ideal set of conditions under which prac-
titioners can render emergency care during
disasters.  By alleviating immediate concerns
about personal safety and liability, the
UEVHPA establishes a legal climate in which
health care professionals are free to provide
emergency care in areas under emergency or
disaster declarations.
Whether or not a state has explicitly
adopted the UEVHPA, most states now pro-
vide some level of protection to disaster re-
lief workers during emergencies. At the
same time, it is somewhat surprising that
nearly a decade after September 11th, all
states have not, at a minimum, incentivized
volunteerism among health professionals by
extending to such professionals the level of
immunity accorded a public official acting
in an official capacity.  
REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Southern California Wildfires, November 2007.
In the fall of 2007, California saw the largest evacuation in state history due to a series of
wildfires that caused 10 deaths and 139 injuries.  The California Department of Public Health
deployed 2,000 alternate care site beds that had been purchased by the state to improve the
emergency preparedness capabilities.  The department also coordinated evacuations from 23
nursing homes, two acute care facilities and a psychiatric hospital.  Because of the fast moving
and unpredictable nature of the wildfires, approximately 1,600 patients were moved from long
term care facilities and hospitals -- all of which was done safely and effectively.  Throughout the
entire incident the California Department of Public Health provided important information to
local health agencies through the Health Alert Network.  
Source: ASTHO83
Just as volunteer health professionals will be
called upon to provide treatment in a cata-
strophic public health emergency, so too will
private sector and non-profit organizations.
In fact, many state preparedness plans envi-
sion the role private companies will play in
distributing medical countermeasures in the
event of a pandemic or bioterrorist attack.
(Please see Indicator 1: Strategic National
Stockpile for a discussion of the role of the
private sector in the distribution and dis-
pensing of medical countermeasures.)
A 2008 IOM workshop examined the issues
surrounding the dispensing of medical coun-
termeasures for public health emergencies,
including the need for liability protection for
private-sector volunteers and entities.84 As
the workshop summary report noted, “few
states furnish immunity from liability to cor-
porations and other entities when they act as
Good Samaritans.”85 This is disconcerting as
businesses may not be able to maintain typi-
cal quality control standards in their efforts
to meet demand for resources.  During de-
clared states of emergency, legitimate con-
cerns about liability thus could deter or delay
health care professionals and entities from
fully participating in relief efforts.
Researchers examined state law to identify
states that have enacted “volunteer entity” pro-
tections to incentivize emergency response by
public and private actors.  In assessing state
law relevant to entity protections, the research
team drew from model language developed
Indicator 7:  ENTITY EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION
FINDING: Twenty-four states and D.C. have statutes that extend some level of immunity to
groups and/or organizations providing charitable, emergency, or disaster relief services, although
these laws varied greatly among states.
Notes:
1 Statute specifies that entity service must come at the
request of a political division or state agency.
2 Statute limits the role an entity may play in the emergency.
3 Statute requires entity to provide service without com-
pensation.
4 Statute limits the kind of legal entity that may provide
emergency services.
5 Statute only extends immunity to health care entities.
6 State provides liability protection to real property owners
who voluntarily offer their premises for disaster response
purposes.
7 A separate telephone survey of state health attorneys by
the UNC Institute of Public Health concluded these
states offer entity liability protection, however, a facial
read of the plain text of the statute suggests remaining
ambiguities regarding the extent to which the statute
confers unequivocal entity liability. 
Source: Legal review conducted by the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health Services and
School of Medicine and Health Sciences.
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24 states and D.C. have statutes that
extend some level of immunity to
groups and/or organizations providing
charitable, emergency, or disaster 
relief services (1 point).
Alabama1 Nevada7 
Arkansas1,2,3 New Hampshire
California1,2,3,4 New Jersey3,4
Colorado4  North Carolina1,3
Delaware1 Ohio1
D.C.7 Pennsylvania1,3
Georgia1,3 Rhode Island2,3,4
Idaho1 Texas1,3
Indiana2,4,5 Utah
Iowa1,3 Vermont
Louisiana3,4 Virginia3
Michigan1,3,4,5 Washington6,7
Wisconsin
26 states do NOT have statutes that
extend some level of immunity to
groups and/or organizations providing
charitable, emergency, or disaster 
relief services (0 points).
Alaska Missouri
Arizona Montana
Connecticut Nebraska
Florida6 New Mexico
Hawaii New York
Illinois North Dakota
Kansas Oklahoma6
Kentucky Oregon
Maine South Carolina
Maryland South Dakota
Massachusetts Tennessee
Minnesota West Virginia
Mississippi Wyoming6
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by the Public/Private Legal Preparedness Ini-
tiative, a special undertaking of the North Car-
olina Institute for Public Health.86 Key
elements of this model law are as follows:
 The establishment of a specific coverage
trigger (e.g., a Gubernatorial declaration
of a state of emergency); 
 Retroactive coverage that reaches pre-
planning and training activities; and 
 An approach to protection that follows the
immunity model used for volunteers
rather than the more limited, “affirmative
defense” approach.
State statutes that extended to entities what
might be thought of as “property” immunity
-- that is, immunity with respect to injuries
involving real or other property owned or
controlled by an entity -- were not included.
Rather, in order to qualify for designation, a
state statute must have focused on protect-
ing conduct undertaken by entities during
an emergency.  
As of October 2008, 24 states and D.C. had ex-
tended some level of immunity to groups
and/or organizations providing charitable,
emergency, or disaster relief services.  At the
same time, these statutes exhibit a wide degree
of variation.  For example, 12 state laws specify
that the provision of services by a covered entity
must  come at the official request of a state po-
litical division; four states limit the role that a
covered entity can play in the emergency (e.g.,
allowing only the provision of goods in re-
sponse to a disaster); 12 state laws require that
the service provided be without compensation;
seven state laws limit the types of legal entities
that can provide services (i.e., immunizing spe-
cific professional groups, such as architectural
and engineering firms, rather than extending
immunities to all corporate entities); and two
states only extended legal protections to health
care entities.  Though Florida, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming provide liability protection to real
property owners who voluntarily offer their
premises for disaster response purposes, they
did not qualify for the entity liability indicator.
STATE EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION INDICATORS
Faculty and staff at The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services
and School of Medicine and Health Sciences conducted the research and analysis for “Indicator 8:
Health Care Volunteer Emergency Liability Protection” and “Indicator 9:  Entity Emergency Liability
Protection.”  TFAH thanks:
Jennifer Lee, MD; Assistant Professor, Department of Emergency Medicine,
Orriel L. Richardson, MPH; JD anticipated 2011 (GW Law), Research Associate, Department
of Health Policy,
Ross Margulies, JD-MPH anticipated 2012, Research Assistant, Department of Health Policy, and
Sara Rosenbaum, JD; Chair and Hirsh Professor, Department of Health Policy.
The full-length write-up and the associated table of “State Liability Protections and Relevant
Statutes” are available online at http://healthyamericans.org/bioterrorism-and-public-health-
preparedness/. 
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILLS
State public health departments are encouraged to carry out a
variety of drills and exercises, or to use real-world events, to
measure their ability to respond in an emergency.  According
to a Congressional Research Service report “Exercises and
drills test the ability of jurisdictions to execute their plans, and
they detect planning gaps.  Consequently, assessments of re-
sponse capability rest not only on assessments of planning, but
also on assessments of exercise programs and integration of
findings into subsequent rounds of planning.”88
There are three key reasons to measure public health emer-
gency preparedness by drilling, testing and exercising.  First,
drills and exercises allow planners and policy makers to focus
on the most critical aspects of emergency planning, such as
mass countermeasure distribution or vaccination and mass ca-
sualty care.  Second, drills and exercises performed and evalu-
ated in a transparent manner hold officials accountable to the
public.  Finally, well-designed exercises allow evaluators to
identify and address weaknesses in emergency plans.
CDC categorizes preparedness exercises into three groups:
tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full-scale exercise.
Tabletop exercises involve discussing responses to emergency
scenarios and focus on training and problem solving.  Functional
exercises test and evaluate capabilities and functions in respond-
ing to a simulated emergency, such as a disease outbreak.  Full-
scale exercises text and evaluate multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional
coordinated response to an actually deployment of resources
under crisis conditions as if a real incident had occurred.89
Under the 2006 PAHPA legislation, preparedness funding is
tied to state and local public health departments’ incorporation
of drills and exercises to test emergency preparedness.  The
legislation also calls on HHS to develop evidence-based per-
formance measures and criteria to evaluate state and local
health departments’ performance in these drills.  Nearly two
years after the PAHPA legislation was signed into law, however,
neither CDC nor ASPR have put forth evidence-based guide-
lines regarding conduct of an emergency preparedness exer-
cise in terms of what outcomes are expected from each drill.  
As CDC and ASPR work to develop federal guidelines for pub-
lic health emergency preparedness drills and exercises, there
are some existing federal programs that may offer guidance.
The first model is the Homeland Security Exercises and Eval-
uation Program (HSEEP), “a capabilities and performance-
based exercise program.”90 HSEEP provides Homeland Security
agencies and grantees with “...a common exercise policy and pro-
gram guidance capable of constituting a national standard for all
exercises.”91 HSEEP uses consistent terminology so that exercise
planners from all federal agencies can communicate more easily.  
In order to be compliant with HSEEP protocols, there are four
distinct performance requirements.92 They include:
1. Conducting an annual training and exercise plan workshop
and developing and maintaining a multiyear training and ex-
ercise plan;
2. Planning and conducting exercises in accordance with the
guidelines set forth by HSEEP;
3. Developing and submitting an after-action report; and 
4. Tracking and implementing corrective actions identified in
the after-action report.
CDC has encouraged states to use HSEEP but has not
required it. 
A second model is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), which has stringent emergency preparedness planning
procedures in place for NRC headquarters, regional offices,
and individual nuclear power plants.  Before the NRC licenses a
nuclear power plant, NRC must have “reasonable assurance
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the
event of a radiological emergency.”93 NRC determines
whether or not the nuclear power plant has provided reason-
able assurance by reviewing plant emergency planning proce-
dures and training.  According to NRC, “these reviews include
regular drills and exercises that assist licensees in identifying
areas for improvement.”94 Each plant owner is required to ex-
ercise its emergency plan with the NRC, the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA), and offsite authorities at
least once every two years to ensure state and local officials re-
main proficient in implementing their emergency plans. Plants
also self-test their emergency plans regularly by conducting
drills. Perhaps, most importantly to assure accountability and
transparency, each plant’s performance in drills and exercises
can be accessed through the NRC Web site.95
TOOLS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY LEGAL PREPAREDNESS
In 2007-2008, CDC’s Public Health Law Program released a set
of tools for policy makers and practitioners to use in assessing and
strengthening their state’s or locality’s legal preparedness for all-
hazards public health emergencies.  These include, among others,
the Forensic Epidemiology 3.0 and Public Health Emergency Law
3.0 training curricula, guides for developing MOUs for improved,
cross-sector investigation and response, suggested provisions for
mutual aid agreements, the National Action Agenda for Public
Health Legal Preparedness, and the Social Distancing Law Assess-
ment Template.  The National Action Agenda contains 100 ‘ac-
tion options’ states, tribes, and localities can consider as they
work to improve their legal preparedness.  (These and other
tools can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/phlp).    
The Social Distancing Law Assessment Template grew out of a
CDC-ASTHO project in which 17 states assessed their legal
and operational sufficiency to implement quarantine, school
closure, and other non-pharmaceutical measures in an in-
fluenza pandemic.  Fourteen states conducted multi-sector and
multi-jurisdiction exercises.  Many of the participating states
concluded that their relevant laws were adequate but most
identified potential problems in implementing social distancing
measures effectively.  These findings were reflected also in the
National Governors Association’s 2008 report on pandemic
planning that found that 22 states had experienced problems
with school continuity and that 13 had cited legal issues.87
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Indicator 8:  MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS READINESS
FINDING: Seventeen states do not have State-level Medical Reserve Corps Coordinators.
Note:  D.C., Guam, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not required to have State MRC Coordinators, but
they do have unit coordinators.  
Source: Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps, www.medicalreservecorps.gov.
CENTERS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND PREPAREDNESS 
AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE RESEARCH CENTERS
The Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP) are a network of 30 academic-based pre-
paredness education and training programs located in 27 accredited schools of public health
and three universities.  The initial mission of the CPHPs was to link their academic expertise
with the needs of states for emergency responders and public health professionals trained in
public health emergency skills.  However, under PAHPA, CPHPs were reorganized.  Now, in
addition to focusing on the development, implementation, and dissemination of competency-
based programs to train public health practitioners, they are required to focus on public health
systems and emergency preparedness research.  The change in focus to include public health
systems research was deemed necessary because legislators found that there has been
“tremendous financial investment made to date for public health preparedness with no evi-
dence-based measures for evaluating progress or preparedness.”96
Before establishing these new Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers (PERRCs),
CDC asked the IOM to produce a report on near-term research priorities for emergency
preparedness and response.97 IOM held a series of public meetings and workshops in December
2007 on the subject and then identified four priority areas for research into PHEP.  They include:
enhancing the usefulness of PHEP training; improving timely emergency communications; creating
and maintaining sustainable response systems; and generating effective criteria and metrics.  The
final research area is vital as currently “...it is difficult to measure objectively the progress that has
been made and the preparedness gaps.”98
In October 2008, CDC awarded $10.9 million to seven accredited schools of public health for
the establishment of the PERRCs.  CDC awarded the five-year grants (2008-2013) to Emory
University; Harvard School of Public Health; Johns Hopkins University; University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis; University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
and University of Washington, Seattle.
33 states and D.C. have Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) Coordinators (1 point).
Alabama Louisiana Ohio 
California Maine Oklahoma
Colorado Maryland Pennsylvania 
Connecticut Massachusetts South Carolina
D.C. Michigan Tennessee
Florida Minnesota Utah
Georgia New Hampshire Virginia
Hawaii New Jersey Washington
Illinois New Mexico West Virginia
Indiana New York Wisconsin
Kansas North Carolina
Kentucky North Dakota
17 states do NOT have Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) Coordinators (0 points).
Alaska Nebraska
Arizona Nevada
Arkansas Oregon
Delaware Rhode Island
Idaho South Dakota
Iowa Texas
Mississippi Vermont
Missouri Wyoming
Montana
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The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) is a national
network of community-based groups which en-
gage civilian volunteers to strengthen public
health, emergency response, and community
resilience. MRC volunteers include profession-
als from fields such as public health, medicine,
and nursing, as well as non-health professionals
who work on administration, logistics, commu-
nications, and other support tasks.
The MRC network is supported by the Office
of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve
Corps (OCVMRC), which is run out of the
Office of the U.S. Surgeon General in coor-
dination with ASPR.  As of October 28, 2008
there were 170,413 volunteers enrolled in 791
MRC units in 49 states, D.C., Guam, Palau,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
It is recognized that local governmental serv-
ices may be quickly overtaxed in a major pub-
lic health emergency, and that MRC
volunteers could help deliver essential med-
ical care and other services. For example, in
HSPD-21, the White House emphasized the
need for state and local jurisdictions to have
a cadre of trained volunteers who can come
to the aid of their fellow community mem-
bers.  This presidential directive envisions a
country “where local civil leaders, citizens,
and families are educated regarding threats
and are empowered to mitigate their own
risk, where they are practiced in responding
to events, where they have social networks to
fall back upon, and where they have famil-
iarity with local public health and medical
systems.”99 Groups such as MRC fulfill this vi-
sion and “will significantly attenuate the re-
quirement for additional assistance.”100 
In the 2007 Ready or Not? report, TFAH
looked at the number of MRC volunteers per
100,000 persons in each state.  In the absence
of federal guidelines and evidence-based best
practices, TFAH set the threshold for the
2007 indicator at the 25th percentile, mean-
ing 75 percent of states received a point for
having met or exceeded 14 Medical Reserve
Corps volunteers per 100,000 persons.  
For the 2008 report, TFAH, in coordination
with the MRC Program Office, looked at a
number of factors in assessing the MRC units
within a state, in addition to having volunteers.
 Is there a state-level MRC Coordinator?
All states have been encouraged to ap-
point an MRC State Coordinator to pro-
vide recommendations to OCVMRC about
new (and continued) MRC unit registra-
tions, and to provide technical assistance
and support to the local MRC units within
a state. The appointment of an MRC State
Coordinator shows a level of commitment
from the state to the MRC. In some states,
the same individual serves a dual role as
the MRC State Coordinator as well as co-
ordinator for the Emergency System for
Advance Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (ESAR-VHP).
As of October 28, 2008, 33 states had an MRC
Coordinator:  Alabama, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia
 Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 per-
cent) in a state in compliance with the Na-
tional Incident Management System
(NIMS) requirements? The National Inci-
dent Management System (NIMS) pro-
vides a consistent nationwide mechanism
for federal, state, tribal, and local govern-
ments, and private sector and nongovern-
mental organizations to effectively work
together to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from emergency incidents.  The
federal government requires all volunteers
and emergency responders to be NIMS
compliant, and an understanding of NIMS
is one of the MRC Core Competencies.101
As of October 28, 2008, 16 states and D.C.
met this benchmark: Alaska, Colorado, D.C.,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington. Most
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MRC units indicate that they are working to-
wards NIMS compliance.
 Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 percent)
in a state integrated with state ESAR-VHP
systems? The MRC and ESAR-VHP are na-
tional initiatives of HHS to improve the na-
tion’s ability to prepare for and respond to
public health and medical emergencies.
While MRC units are made up of individuals
from local communities who support public
health activities year-round, and are trained
to respond in times of emergency, the ESAR-
VHP system is primarily a means of register-
ing and verifying the credentials of volunteer
health professionals in advance of an emer-
gency.  HHS recommends the two programs
integrate so as to strengthen the local-state-
federal coordination of volunteers in the
event of a public health emergency.102
As of October 28, 2008, 16 states and D.C.
met this benchmark: Colorado, D.C., Florida,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Montana, North Carolina, North
Dakota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, Utah, and West Vir-
ginia. Many MRC units indicate that they are
working towards integration with ESAR-VHP.
For the 2008 report, TFAH awarded states a
point based on the presence of an MRC State
Coordinator.  Not only does this position en-
hance the collaboration among MRC units
across a state, but it is also a position that
demonstrates a state’s level of funding and
commitment to its MRC programs.  
For the 2009 report, TFAH will also evaluate
states on the second two criteria: NIMS-com-
pliance and ESAR-VHP integration.  Although
states usually do not have direct control of the
MRC units operating within their borders,
state governments can affect community 
resiliency and other MRC-related outcomes
through policy, funding, and coordination.  
REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Major Flooding in Ohio, August 2007.
The Ohio Department of Health emergency response system was tested when flooding hit
nine counties in the summer of 2007.  In Allen County, one of the affected counties, the local
health department used its recently updated communication equipment to share information
with local and state officials regarding the flood damage and needs within their community.
Public information staff, who had been trained with funds from a CDC cooperative agreement,
worked with the media to get information to the public regarding building clean-up, mold pre-
vention, and the potential need of tetanus and other vaccines.  Volunteers from the local MRC
unit set up a mass dispensing tetanus vaccine clinic, a plan which had been developed as part of
SNS preparations.  The Ohio Department of Health’s Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveil-
lance (RODS) System was used to detect an increase in complaints related to insect bites in
the flooded region, and personal protective measures after a flood were shared with the public
in order to reduce the risk of vector-borne illness outbreaks.
Source: ASTHO103
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Source:  CDC’s Summary Statistics for Foodborne Outbreaks, 2004, 2005, and 2006.  Available online at
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/outbreak_data.htm
Indicator 9:  FOOD SAFETY -- DETECTION AND DIAGNOSIS
FINDING:  Twenty states and D.C. were unable to identify the pathogen responsible for reported
foodborne disease outbreaks at a rate that met or exceeded the national average of 44 percent
(combined data 2004-2006).
30 states were able to identify the 20 states and D.C. were NOT able to 
pathogen responsible for reported identify the pathogen responsible for 
foodborne disease outbreaks at a rate reported foodborne disease outbreaks 
that met or exceeded the national at a rate that met or exceeded the 
average of 44 percent (combined data national average of 44 percent 
2004-2006) (1 point). (combined data 2004-2006) (0 points).
State Percent of Confirmed Outbreaks State Percent of Confirmed Outbreaks 
(combined data 2004-2006) (combined data 2004-2006)
Alaska 83% Alabama 2%
Arkansas 88% Arizona 40%
Colorado 63% California 30%
Connecticut 83% Delaware 25%
Hawaii 94% D.C. 22%
Idaho 61% Florida 17%
Indiana 100% Georgia 38%
Louisiana 58% Illinois 32%
Massachusetts 55% Iowa 42%
Minnesota 77% Kansas 24%
Nebraska 100% Kentucky 0%
Nevada 50% Maine 33%
New Hampshire 48% Maryland 42%
New Mexico 75% Michigan 28%
North Carolina 66% Mississippi 33%
North Dakota 57% Missouri 12%
Ohio 44% Montana 33%
Oklahoma 71% New Jersey 30%
Oregon 63% New York 43%
Pennsylvania 66% Texas 30%
Rhode Island 100% Washington 28%
South Carolina 68%
South Dakota 50%
Tennessee 65%
Utah 67%
Vermont 75%
Virginia 89%
West Virginia 100%
Wisconsin 95%
Wyoming 54%
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Approximately 76 million Americans -- one
in four -- are sickened by foodborne disease
each year.  Many of these cases go unre-
ported although there are an estimated
325,000 individuals who are hospitalized an-
nually due to foodborne illness and 5,000
who die each year.104
CDC defines a foodborne disease outbreak
as the occurrence of two or more cases of a
similar illness resulting from the ingestion of
a common food.  State, local, and territorial
health departments report foodborne dis-
ease outbreaks to CDC each year via the elec-
tronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting
System (eFORS).  CDC’s goal is for 75 per-
cent of outbreaks to have a preliminary re-
port in eFORS within 60 days of the date the
first individual became ill.105  
Between 2004 and 2006, the last year for
which CDC data was available at the time of
publication, state public health departments
reported a total of 3,548 foodborne disease
outbreaks that sickened 74,077 individuals.
Of the 3,548 reported outbreaks, state public
health departments were only able to con-
firm the etiology, or causative pathogen, in
1,552 cases, or 44 percent of outbreaks.
Monitoring the public’s food supply is a real-
world example of public health preparedness
as it requires the same skills and technologies
needed to detect and mitigate bioterrorism
and infectious disease outbreaks: a strong sur-
veillance system and adequate lab capacity.
According to Michael Taylor, former Deputy
Commissioner for Policy at FDA and former
Administrator at USDA’s FSIS, “ensuring the
safety of the food supply is centrally impor-
tant to the public’s health and underpins the
success of the nation’s trillion dollar food and
agriculture industries.”106
The 30 states that earned a point on this in-
dicator were successful at identifying the bac-
teria, virus, parasite, or chemical that caused
the outbreak at rate that met or exceeded
the national average of confirmed food-
borne disease outbreaks of 44 percent (com-
bined data 2004-2006).    
REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Salmonella Outbreak in Southern Colorado, March 2008.
Salmonella was first reported in Alamosa, Colorado on March 6, 2008, and by mid-March the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment was able to pinpoint the source of
the outbreak to the water supply.  The department then activated its public information hot-
line, and issued a mutual aid request to water experts as well as requesting donations of bot-
tled water for the affected area.  With CDC cooperative agreement funds, the state health
agency placed epidemiologists in each of the state’s nine all-hazards regions.  These epidemiol-
ogists conducted case interviews and phone surveys and tracked cases and hospitalizations.
The greatest challenge the state faced was keeping the public informed of the outbreak, specif-
ically when it was safe to use the water.  The Colorado Department of Public Health and Envi-
ronment and the local Joint Information Center issued news releases, kept web sites up to
date, and produced and handed out informational fliers.  Also, with federal cooperative agree-
ment funding, the department was able to contract with the Rocky Mountain Poison and Drug
center to run the Colorado Health Emergency Line for the Public, which proved to be very
helpful -- answering 2,544 calls.
Source: ASTHO107
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STATES’ ROLE IN FOOD SAFETY
State health departments are on the front lines of food safety.  A May 2008 report by the Food
Safety Research Consortium (FSRC), a multidisciplinary collaboration among eight research in-
stitutions to improve the U.S. food safety system, identified the following as the primary roles
of state food safety agencies:108
 Lead responsibility, in collaboration with local health departments and sometimes CDC, of
many major outbreak investigations.
 Frontline responsibility for ongoing foodborne illness surveillance, working both independ-
ently and in collaboration with CDC and localities on FoodNet, PulseNet, OutbreakNet,
and other surveillance initiatives.
 Responsiblity for the great majority of all food-related laboratory testing, including testing
for pathogens in clinical isolates and chemical and microbial contaminants in food.
 Carrying out more than 80 percent of all non-retail food establishment inspections, other
than in meat and poultry establishments, including the majority of “FDA inspections” con-
ducted by state agencies under contract with FDA.
Overseeing farm inspections of animal health and other conditions related to food safety, in-
cluding primary jurisdiction for enforcement of federal pesticide use restrictions, which re-
late directly to the possibility of unsafe residues in food.
 Informing and educating consumers and commercial participants in the food safety system.
Apart from CDC’s Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity for Infectious Diseases grants to
state public health departments, which includes the program goal of reporting 75 percent of
foodborne disease outbreaks to eFORS within 60 days of the first case, quantitative standards
to measure state food safety surveillance are lacking.   To address this gap, the Council to Im-
prove Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) is developing a series of performance indica-
tors to measure effective foodborne disease surveillance and outbreak response at the state
and local level.
On the regulatory side of food safety, in lieu of official required national standards, FDA has
pushed two voluntary efforts to create more uniform standards and practices as well as en-
hance the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation’s food safety system:  FDA’s Food Code
and a Voluntary National Retail Food Regulatory Program.  Both programs seek to provide
local, state, and federal regulatory officials with science-based measures of performance that
will lead to more effective and uniform regulation of the food service and food retail sectors by
state and local food safety programs.
THE FOODBORNE DISEASES ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK
The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) is an active surveillance system,
which means that FoodNet staff routinely contact all clinical laboratories in the 10 FoodNet sites
to collect information on every confirmed case under surveillance of nine foodborne diseases.
The nine pathogens are Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Listeria, Salmonella, Shiga
toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157, Shigella, Vibrio, and Yersinia. FoodNet is a collaborative
project of CDC, 10 states* with a population of 45.5 million persons, or 15 percent of the U.S.
population, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the FDA.  There are four main Food-
Net objectives:109  
1. Determine the burden of foodborne illness in the United States.
2. Monitor trends in the burden of specific foodborne illness over time.
3. Attribute the burden of foodborne illness to specific foods and settings.
4. Develop and assess interventions to reduce the burden of foodborne illness.
Note: * the 10 states that are part of FoodNet are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee.
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MANDATORY REPORTING ON FOODBORNE DISEASES
In the late spring/early summer of 2008, a nationwide Salmonella outbreak sickened more than
1,442 individuals in 43 states and D.C.  At least 286 persons were hospitalized, and the infec-
tion might have contributed to two deaths.110 Food safety officials initially warned consumers
to stay away from fresh tomatoes, although this warning was later rescinded as scientists fo-
cused instead on raw jalapeño and Serrano peppers.  Some epidemiologists and laboratorians
have attributed the delay in identification to gaps in mandatory reporting requirements.  For
example, although 559 individuals (38.7 percent) were sickened in Texas alone from the out-
break, and although Texas was also where the farm with the contaminated peppers was lo-
cated, it took officials nearly four months to identify the source of the outbreak.  Some
epidemiologists have questioned whether this delay was related to the fact that Texas does not
require labs to collect all clinical specimens associated with a foodborne disease outbreak.
Identifying foodborne disease outbreaks requires regular submission of clinical isolates and speci-
mens to state public health labs.  However, according to APHL, hospital and clinical laboratories
are sometimes reluctant to send isolates of foodborne pathogens to a SPHL due to cost and time
issues.  A May 2008 survey of APHL members revealed that only 26 states have laws or rules on
the books requiring nongovernmental (e.g. clinical, hospital-based) laboratories within the state
to send clinical isolates or specimens associated with reportable foodborne diseases to the state
public health laboratory.  According to APHL, “failure by these nongovernmental laboratories to
submit isolates, specimens and samples could delay timely identification of an outbreak, prolong-
ing exposure to the contaminated product and leading to increased incidence of disease.”111 
Among the 26 states that do mandate the collection of clinical specimens to state public health labs,
25 states require the submission of E.Coli specimens or isolates, 23 states require Salmonella, 22
states require Shigella, 21 states require Listeria monocytogenes, and 20 states require Vibrio samples.  
ENHANCING THE ROLES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
IN THE FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
Much of the food safety debate has been over the reforms needed at FDA and USDA in order
to streamline the nation’s food safety system.  While a federal restructuring is necessary, a suc-
cessful food safety system that focuses on preventing foodborne disease must also include co-
ordination and collaboration with food safety regulators and health officials at the state and
local level.  In order to strengthen the roles of state and local agencies, in both their commu-
nity-based food safety efforts and as integral parts of the nation’s food safety system, the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is funding a series of meetings among state and local offi-
cials, their federal counterparts, and food industry and consumer groups.  
The project brings together members of the Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO),
ASTHO, and NACCHO.  Participants will focus on five goals:
1. Formulate and express a modern vision of the role of state and local government in an inte-
grated, prevention-oriented food safety system;
2. Identify gaps or constraints in current law, policy and practice at the federal, state and local
levels that inhibit fulfillment of that vision;
3. Recommend changes in law, policy, and practice that are needed to enhance the effective-
ness of state and local agencies in addressing food safety problems at the local, state, and na-
tional level;
4. Identify specific opportunities to improve collaboration among state, local, and federal agen-
cies; and
5. Describe current funding patterns and resource needs at the state and local level. 
A report is due out in early 2009.
48
This indicator, adjusted for inflation, illus-
trates a state’s commitment to funding public
health programs that support the infrastruc-
ture -- including workforce -- needed to ade-
quately respond to emergencies.
Every state allocates and reports its budget in
different ways.  States also vary widely in the
budget details they provide.  This makes
comparisons across states difficult.  For this
analysis, TFAH examined state budgets and
appropriations bills for the agency, depart-
ment, or division in charge of public health
services for FY 2007-2008, using a definition
as consistent as possible across the two years,
based on how each state reports data.  TFAH
defined “public health services” broadly, in-
cluding most state-level health funding.
Based on this analysis, 11 states and D.C. ex-
perienced cuts in their public health budgets.
With the present economic downturn, states
are encountering great economic distress and
many states have tried to close shortfalls by in-
creasing taxes and/or cutting spending.  Cur-
rently, 33 states are facing shortfalls to their
2009 state budgets, and 16 states already proj-
ect shortfalls to their 2010 budgets.  At the
current rate of economic deterioration, and
based on the course of past recessions, the
Indicator 10: PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDING COMMITMENT -- STATE PUBLIC
HEALTH BUDGETS
FINDING: Eleven states and D.C. cut funding for public health from FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08.
NOTES: Biennium budgets are bolded.
1 May contain some social service programs, but not Medi-
caid or CHIP.  
2 General funds only.
3 Includes federal funds.
4 Budget data taken from appropriations legislation.
5 Missouri’s percent change based on FY 2006-07 and FY
2007-08 actual expenditures.
6 Georgia’s budget data for FY 2006-07 taken from appro-
priations legislation.  
7 North Dakota’s budget data for the 2007-2009 biennium
taken from appropriations legislation.
8 Excludes one-time funding for anti-virals.
Source: Research by TFAH of publicly available state
budget documents and interviews with health and budget
officials in the states.
39 states increased or maintained level
funding for public health services from
FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08 (1 point)
State and percent increase (adjusted
for inflation)
Alabama (7.2%) Montana (47.4%)
Alaska (0.8%)2 New Hampshire (6.0%)
Arizona (13.4%) New Mexico (6.2%)
California (8.7%)8 New York (12.3%)
Delaware (4.8%)2 North Carolina (8.8%)2
Florida (3.3%)2 North Dakota (52.7%)7
Georgia (7.5%)6,8 Ohio (9.0%)4
Hawaii (7.2%)2 Oregon (29.7%)
Illinois (3.7%) Rhode Island (4.9%)
Indiana (50.9%) South Carolina (1.8%)
Iowa (9.2%) South Dakota (21.7%)
Kansas (9.6%) Tennessee (10.5%)
Kentucky (1.5%) Texas (8.6%)8
Louisiana (20.0%) Utah (9.2%)8
Maine (9.3%)2 Vermont (1.8%)3
Massachusetts (3.1%)4 Virginia (5.5%)4
Michigan (2.8%)4 Washington (20.4%)4
Minnesota (14.9%)2 Wisconsin (9.0%)4
Mississippi (3.3%)2,8 Wyoming (3.9%)
Missouri (2.9%)5,8
11 states and D.C. DECREASED fund-
ing for public health services from FY
2006-07 to FY 2007-08 (0 points)
State and percent decrease (adjusted
for inflation)
Arkansas (-0.2%)
Colorado (-0.2%)
Connecticut (-0.2)2
D.C. (-2.8%)
Idaho (-2.2%)
Maryland (-9.5%)2
Nebraska (-3.5%)4
Nevada (-6.9%)
New Jersey (-4.3%)
Oklahoma (-4.1%)1,8
Pennsylvania (-0.8%)2
West Virginia (-0.7%)
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Center on Budget and Policy Priorities pre-
dicts that 2010 state budget gaps will be about
$100 billion.112 TFAH is deeply concerned
about the potential of state budget cuts and
the effect they will have a state’s ability to be
prepared for emergencies over the next years.
Several states that received points for this in-
dicator may not have actually increased their
spending on public health programs.  The
ways some states report their budgets, for in-
stance, by including federal funding in the
totals or including public health dollars
within health care spending totals, makes it
difficult to determine “public health” as a
separate item.
Few states allocate funds directly for bioter-
rorism and public health preparedness as
part of their public health budgets.  Instead,
most rely on federal funds to support these
activities.  The infrastructure of other public
health programs, however, also supports
their underlying preparedness capabilities.
The PAHPA legislation states, however, that
beginning with FY 2009, public health and
hospital preparedness grant awardees must
contribute non-federal funds to support the
cooperative agreements.  States are required
to match five percent of the total federal
funding for FY 2009, and 10 percent of the
total amount thereafter.113 Non-federal funds
may come from state public funding or pri-
vate donations and may be in cash or in-kind.
Those states with stagnant or decreasing state
public health budgets may be challenged to
identify funds required for the state match.  
While this indicator examines whether states’
budgets increased or decreased, it does not
assess if the funding is adequate to cover pub-
lic health needs in the states.  This also does
not take into account ongoing hospital needs
and funding.
(For additional information on the methodol-
ogy of the budget analysis, please see Appendix
C:  Data and Methodology for State Indicators.)  
REAL LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Killer Tornado in Kansas, May 2007. 
An EF5 tornado tore through the town of Greensburg, Kansas on May 4, 2007, leaving 11 dead
and $268 million in damages.  In the months following the storm, the Kansas Department of
Health and Environment led the effort to protect the health and safety of residents.  The Kansas
Center for Public Health and Preparedness helped to secure medical supplies; the Kansas National
Guard deployed its mobile hospital facility to assure that medical care was accessible; the Kansas
Department of Health and Environment reissued 355 birth and marriage certificates; the Food
Safety division inspected food vendors and oversaw the destruction of perishable food and over
the counter drugs; and the Bureau of Disease Control and Prevention distributed vaccines and
helped with administering and registering vaccines.  The health agency had been trained in the
NIMS ICS and was able to respond to the emergency in a more integrated and informed manner
than it would have been capable of in the past.  
The all-encompassing response by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment illustrates
the importance of a well-funded state public health department, which is why TFAH evaluates
states on their ability to increase, or at a minimum, maintain state public health funding.
Source: ASTHO114
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UNDER PAHPA STATES MUST MATCH FEDERAL DOLLARS
The 2006 PAHPA legislation included a requirement that states receiving CDC PHEP coopera-
tive agreement funding must match those federal dollars with nonfederal contributions begin-
ning in FY 2009 (CDC PHEP budget period August 10, 2009 -- August 9, 2010).  The concept
of requiring states to match federal dollars is not new.  HRSA’s Maternal and Child Health
Block Grant includes a required state match, as do other federal programs.  
The PHEP grantees will be required to provide nonfederal contributions (match) “directly or
through donations from public or private entities and may be in cash or in-kind, fairly evaluated,
including plant, equipment, or services.”115 For FY 2009 states will be required to match at least
five percent of the PHEP grant, or $1 for each $20 of federal funds.  However, for any subse-
quent fiscal year, states will be required to match no less than 10 percent of such costs, or $1 for
each $10 of federal PHEP funds.  States must thoroughly document their in-kind match to the
level that it can pass a U.S. government audit.  If they cannot document their five percent match,
then their PHEP grant award will be reduced to the level where they can document a match.  
In addition, PAHPA includes language on the maintenance of funding which suggests that while
states are required to put hard dollars in their public health budget for emergency prepared-
ness and response, if the states are not contributing hard dollars, there is no penalty.  The dis-
parity between the severe penalty for the match and the absence of any penalty for the
maintenance of funding requirement has led to serious concerns among state health officials.  
SELECT 2009 STATE PREPAREDNESS INDICATORS
Based on feedback from state health departments and federal public health officials, TFAH will,
for the first time, give states and the public a preview of select indicators that will be measured
in the 2009 Ready or Not? report.  By doing so, TFAH expects to incentivize local, state, and
federal health officials and policy makers to take action to bolster preparedness in key areas.
The indicators presented on pages 51-53 give readers an overview of current preparedness
efforts in the following areas: Medical Reserve Corps readiness and food safety.  They are not
included in the 2008 overall state preparedness scores, but will be used in the 2009 report.
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For the 2009 report, TFAH will assess the
MRC units within each state on three factors,
in addition to having volunteers.
 Is there a state-level MRC Coordinator?  
 Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 per-
cent) in a state in compliance with the Na-
tional Incident Management System (NIMS)
requirements?
 Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 per-
cent) in a state integrated with state ESAR-
VHP systems? 
Although states usually do not have direct
control of the MRC units operating within
their borders, state governments can affect
community resiliency and other MRC-re-
lated outcomes through policy, funding, and
coordination.  
The results, as of October 2008, are listed
below.
Future Indicator 1:  COMMUNITY RESILIENCY -- MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS
*Note:  D.C., Guam, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are not required to have State MRC Coordinators, but do
have unit coordinators.  
Source: Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps
6 states and D.C. have: 1) Medical
Reserve Corps (MRC) Coordinators,
2) a majority of MRC units in
compliance with NIMS, and 3) a
majority of MRC units integrated with
state ESAR-VHP systems (1 point).
Colorado
D.C.*
Florida
Kentucky
North Carolina
North Dakota
Utah
44 states do NOT have: 1) Medical
Reserve Corps (MRC) Coordinators, 
2) a majority of MRC units in compliance
with NIMS, and 3) a majority of MRC
units integrated with state ESAR-VHP
systems (0 points).
Alaska Montana
Alabama Nebraska
Arkansas New Hampshire
Arizona New Jersey
California New Mexico
Connecticut Nevada
Delaware New York
Georgia Ohio
Hawaii Oklahoma
Iowa Oregon
Idaho Pennsylvania
Illinois Rhode Island
Indiana South Carolina
Kansas South Dakota
Louisiana Tennessee
Massachusetts Texas
Maryland Virginia
Maine Vermont
Michigan Washington
Minnesota Wisconsin
Missouri West Virginia
Mississippi Wyoming
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For the 2009 report, TFAH will assess states
on their implementation of the Voluntary
National Retail Food Regulatory Program.  
The FDA -- in collaboration with federal, state,
and local regulatory agencies; the academic
industry; trade associations; and consumers - -
has also established a Voluntary National Re-
tail Food Regulatory Program.  The pro-
gram’s goal is to reduce or eliminate the
occurrence of illnesses and deaths from food
produced or handled at the retail level.116  
The program seeks to provide local, state,
and federal regulatory officials with science-
based measures of performance by state and
local food regulatory programs that will lead
to more effective and uniform regulation of
the food industry.
Participation in the program is voluntary.  To
be part of the program, the jurisdiction must
carry out an initial self-assessment of its retail
food safety program within 12 months of en-
rollment in the program, conduct self-assess-
ments every 36 months after that, and submit
to verification audits by outside parties.   
As of July 2008, 40 states had at least one state-
wide agency enrolled in the program.  Of
these 40 states, 33 had completed the initial
self-assessment of their program.  The self-as-
sessment is used to identify each program’s
strengths and weaknesses.  Programs are as-
sessed in nine areas.  If a state meets any of the
nine standards, it reports that self-assessment
result to FDA.  Thirty-two states met at least
one of the nine standards based on their self-
assessment.  Thirteen states had that achieve-
ment verified by an external evaluator.  
States that have their self-assessments verified
by an external evaluator will earn a point on
this indicator.
Future Indicator 2:  FOOD SAFETY -- IMPLEMENTATION OF FOOD 
SAFETY PROGRAMS
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Status of States Enrolled in Voluntary National Retail Regulatory Program
State State Agency Self-Assessment Achieved at least Achievement 
Enrolled Completed 1 of 9 Standards Verified by 
Based on External 
Self-Assessment Evaluator
Alabama  
Alaska    
Arizona*
Arkansas   
California   
Colorado   
Connecticut   
Delaware 
D.C. 
Florida    
Georgia    
Hawaii   
Idaho    
Illinois   
Indiana
Iowa    
Kansas    
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland   
Massachusetts    
Michigan    
Minnesota   
Mississippi   
Missouri    
Montana   
Nebraska   
Nevada   
New Hampshire
New Jersey 
New Mexico   
New York
North Carolina    
North Dakota
Ohio   
Oklahoma   
Oregon    
Pennsylvania   
Rhode Island    
South Carolina
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas    
Utah 
Vermont
Virginia 
Washington
West Virginia   
Wisconsin   
Wyoming   
Source: Data as of July 2008 as re-
ported by FDA’s Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition.117
Note: *No state-wide agency is enrolled
in the program.  However, 11 of 15
counties in Arizona are enrolled.  Of the
11 counties, five have had their achieve-
ments verified by an outside auditor.
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VOLUNTARY NATIONAL RETAIL FOOD REGULATORY PROGRAM
The nine standards enshrined in the program seek to provide local, state and federal regulatory
officials with sound, science-based measures that will lead to a more uniform regulation of the
food industry.
The Standards address the following program areas: 
1. Regulatory Foundation 
2. Trained Regulatory Staff 
3. Inspection Program Based on HACCP Principles 
4. Uniform Inspection Program 
5. Foodborne Illness and Food Security Preparedness and Response 
6. Compliance and Enforcement 
7. Industry and Community Relations 
8. Program Support and Resources 
9. Program Assessment 
The Program’s high standards are not static but ever changing as new problems and new solu-
tions come to light.  A built-in framework allows for continuous improvement based on scien-
tifically-sound performance measures.  
States and local jurisdictions that choose to participate in the voluntary program must follow a
continuous improvement model.  First, the jurisdiction carries out an initial self-assessment of its
retail food safety program within 12 months of enrollment in the Program, and every 36 months
thereafter.  The self-assessment is used to determine whether or not the jurisdiction meets the
NRFRP’s standards.  After the self-assessment, the jurisdiction must conduct a verification audit
within 36 months of the initial self-assessment.  The verification audits are to be performed by
an outside party and these results are used to confirm the accuracy of the self-assessment.
Once the verification audit is finished, the jurisdiction begins the whole cycle anew by complet-
ing another self-assessment.  This allows the jurisdiction a chance to meet more of the nine
standards, while accounting for changes and updates in food safety regulations.
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December 2008 marks the two-year anniversary
of the signing of PAHPA and the one-year an-
niversary of HSPD-21: Public Health and Med-
ical Preparedness.  Both the PAHPA legislation
and the Presidential Directive represent signif-
icant advances in the nation’s preparedness as
they set out key deliverables and benchmarks
for government agencies.  While much
progress has been made in meeting these de-
liverables, TFAH finds that the federal govern-
ment continues to lag in several key areas:
 Congress has failed to deliver a sustained fi-
nancial commitment towards preparedness
-- especially at the state and local level --
where many of the essential preparedness
and response activities occur.
 The federal government has failed to align
its own policies with the recommendations
and guidance it set forth for individual
and household preparedness.
 The current federal emergency prepared-
ness structure is complex and overlapping;
the Obama administration will need to un-
tangle this. 
Issues addressed in this section include:  
1. Funding for pandemic and all-hazards pre-
paredness; 
2. The state of federal preparedness; 
3. Implementation of the PAHPA of 2006; and
4. Additional federal issues, including the
lack of an emergency health benefit and
deficiencies in sick leave policies, liability
protection for federal health care workers,
and the shelf-life extension program for
medications and vaccines.
Over the past six years, the federal government
has invested more than $6.3 billion in state and
local preparedness, and provided an additional
$600 million for state and local pandemic pre-
paredness.  Federal funding, however, has been
inconsistent and has declined over the past sev-
eral years.  A report from the Center for Study-
ing Health System Change noted that “federal
funding is fragmented ...coming from several
sources with varied requirements, making it dif-
ficult for communities to pursue a compre-
hensive strategy.”118  
Federal funding also has declined steadily
over the past four fiscal years.  Congress failed
to pass the FY 2009 budget and instead,
passed a continuing resolution that funded
programs at the FY 2008 level through March
2009.  This flat funding represents a 25 per-
cent cut from the public health preparedness
funding level in FY 2005.
Federal Preparedness
In this section of the report, TFAH examines federal preparedness activities.  
1. Funding for Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
2S E C T I O N
*Note:  Upgrading State and Local Capacity includes funds
for: PHEP Cooperative Agreements, Centers for Public
Health Preparedness, Advanced Practice Centers, and all
other state and local capacity.  HPP line represents actual
grant awards to states and does not include non-grant pro-
gram funds used to support HPP evaluation activities or
federal administration costs.
Source:  1) Upgrading State and Local Capacity funding
from CDC’s FY 2009 Budget Justification document.119 2)
Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) funding from HHS’s
FY 2009 Budget Justification document.120
$0
$200,000,000
$400,000,000
$600,000,000
$800,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$1,200,000,000
FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 
Fiscal Year
U
.S
. D
ol
la
rs
State and Local HPP
CDC’s Upgrading State and Local Capacity* and ASPR’s Hospital 
Preparedness Program (HPP) Funding FY 2003 -- FY 2008
56
State and local preparedness funds have re-
mained relatively stagnant since FY 2003.
Congress failed to pass the FY 2009 budget,
instead opting for a six-month continuing
resolution until March 2009, so funding will
remain at the FY 2008 level unless Congress
strengthens the program in March.  
According to ASTHO, steep cuts in the pre-
paredness grants “will seriously hinder the
ability of state and local health agencies to
plan and carry out future activities.”121 Cut-
ting the budget will affect the ability of state
public health agencies to carry out the fol-
lowing activities:122
 Recruitment and training of a highly
skilled, professional workforce;
 Improvement in state response plans;
 Expansion of laboratory capacity for bio-
logical, chemical, and radiological agents
of terrorism;
 Enhancement of surge capacity for mass
casualties; and 
 Improvements in disease detection and
surveillance technologies and programs.
A. UPGRADING STATE AND LOCAL CAPACITY
Inconsistent and decreasing funding also has
plagued the HPP grants.  For instance, in FY
2007, ASPR competitively awarded $18.1 mil-
lion to Health care Facilities Partnerships “for
the purpose of improving surge capacity and
enhancing community and hospital pre-
paredness for public health emergencies in
defined geographic areas.”123 Another $25
million was awarded to Health care Facilities
Emergency Care Partnerships to help inte-
grate emergency care systems into overall pre-
paredness strategies and plans.124 Both
programs were zeroed out in the FY 2009
budget.  Although Congress failed to pass the
FY 2009 budget and instead, passed a six-
month Continuing Resolution that funds pro-
grams at FY 2008 levels through March, it is
unclear if these programs will receive funding.
According to a 2008 GAO report, state health
officials have expressed concern that “federal
funding for ASPR’s HPP decreased while pro-
gram requirements increased, making it diffi-
cult for states to plan for maintenance of
emergency preparedness systems, meet new re-
quirements, and replace expired supplies.”125
State officials have argued that a three-year
funding cycle would allow for long-term plan-
ning and more realistic work plans.126 ASPR of-
ficials are said to be aware of these concerns and
considering a change beginning in FY 2009.  
B. HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (HPP)
In FY 2008, Congress appropriated $120 mil-
lion to CDC’s Coordinating Office for Ter-
rorism Preparedness and Emergency
Response to upgrade CDC capacity in the
area of public health emergency prepared-
ness initiatives.  This funding supported a va-
riety of programs including:
 Laboratory Response Network (LRN),  
 Radiological Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN-R);
 Select Agents Program; 
 Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS);127 
C. UPGRADING CDC CAPACITY
Upgrading CDC Capacity Funding Levels FY 2004 -- FY 2008
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The president’s FY 2009 budget proposal in-
cluded $250 million for BARDA, an increase
of $148 million over FY 2008.  An August 1,
2008 White House amendment to the FY 2009
budget proposed to increase BARDA funding
by about $500 million.  The additional funds
would have been used to support the ad-
vancement of medical countermeasures for
12 biological threat agents, volatile nerve
agents, and radiological and nuclear threats.
In addition to these funds for advanced re-
search and development, $25 million was in-
cluded to support the advanced development
of next generation ventilators to help patients
in acute respiratory distress in a pandemic or
other public health emergency. The request
also included $22 million to manage Project
BioShield, slightly more than FY 2008. 
Given the passage of the continuing resolu-
tion that funded programs at FY 2008 levels
through March 2009, it is unclear if BARDA
will be able to meet its development goals.
D. BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BARDA)
Congress passed a continuing resolution that
funded programs at FY 2008 levels through
March 2009.  In FY 2008, Congress funded
$322 million for ongoing pandemic pre-
paredness activities at CDC, FDA, NIH, and
the Office of the Secretary of HHS.  
In September 2008, CDC announced it had
awarded $24 million to fund 55 programs in
29 state and local public health departments
that could serve as innovative approaches
for influenza pandemic preparedness.130
The $24 million for the new projects is part
of the $600 million allocated toward state
and local pandemic influenza preparedness
back in FY 2006.  
The $600 million for state and local pandemic
preparedness was supplemental funding that
has been exhausted, although states will con-
tinue to work on pandemic influenza planning
through the all-hazards PHEP cooperative
agreement.  However, CDC estimates that $20
million of the $600 million went to hire quali-
fied personnel for specific pandemic planning
positions.  When this money is exhausted,
these employees will be let go.  Meanwhile, at
the same time the federal government has cut
all state pandemic influenza preparedness
funding, the PAHPA legislation links the qual-
ity of state pandemic plans to their eligibility
for future PHEP grants.
E. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS
 CDC Director’s Emergency Operations
Center (DEOC); and 
Monitoring and evaluation of COTPER-
funded programs, including the state and
local grants.
As with other CDC programs, funding has
declined significantly over the past five years,
yet PAHPA and HSPD-21 require programs
to meet higher benchmarks and deliverables.
Policy directives without the adequate fund-
ing to support them are rhetoric and do not
show a serious commitment on the part of
the administration and Congress towards
emergency preparedness and response.
BARDA Funding FY 2007 - 2009
FY 2007 actual $103,921, 000
FY 2008 enacted $101,544,000
Source:  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services129
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In the three years since the White House issued
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,
much progress has been made to ready the na-
tion for a future pandemic influenza outbreak.
The federal government has:131
 Stockpiled pre-pandemic vaccines and
antivirals;
 Created a domestic vaccine production ca-
pacity commensurate with the expected
requirements of a pandemic;
 Sponsored advanced development proj-
ects toward the next generation of vac-
cines, therapeutics, and diagnostics; and  
 Provided financial and technical assistance
to states to help them, among other
things, create complementary stockpiles of
antiviral drugs and develop and test vari-
ous mitigation strategies.
Pandemic preparedness, to date, has focused
on the low-hanging fruit.  Now that the easier
to solve problems have been addressed, HHS
Secretary Michael Leavitt notes that, “We have
entered a new phase in our preparations. The
milestones are farther apart but no less signif-
icant. We are now tackling some challenging
issues that can only be resolved with the col-
laboration of the full range of stakeholders --
state and local officials, public health and
medical professionals, religious leaders and
ethicists, the business community, organized
labor, non-governmental organizations, and
individuals from all walks of life.”132
Among these challenging issues are four
areas of crucial importance to pandemic pre-
paredness:
 Real-time disease detection and clinical
surveillance;
Mass casualty care / Surge capacity;
 Swift distribution of medical countermea-
sures; and
 Legal and feasibility issues associated with
community mitigation strategies.
If unaddressed, these could significantly limit
the effectiveness of the national pandemic
response.
2. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
The National Pandemic Implementation Plan
includes 324 action items; 17 of these call for
states and local governments to lead national
and sub-national efforts; 64 of these require
state involvement.  The 2006 PAHPA legisla-
tion requires states to develop pandemic in-
fluenza plans that meet national standards.133
HHS collected the first round of state plans in
April 2007; however, an initial review of these
plans by HHS and other federal agencies
found the plans to be lacking.  According to a
separate GAO report published in September
2008, the HHS-led review of state pandemic
influenza response plans found “many major
gaps” in state pandemic planning in 16 out of
22 priority areas.134 The GAO report faulted
HHS and other federal agencies, noting that
“while the federal government has provided
some support to states in their planning ef-
forts, states and localities have had little in-
volvement in national planning for an
influenza pandemic....even though the Na-
tional Pandemic Implementation Plan relies
on these stakeholders efforts.”135  
In between the initial submission of state
pandemic plans and the publication of the
GAO report, HHS revised its set of pandemic
planning criteria to remedy gaps in state
plans and address state and local officials’
concerns.  In July 2008, states re-submitted
their revised plans to HHS.  These plans are
currently under review.   
The quality of state pandemic plans takes on
additional significance beginning in FY 2009
(CDC PHEP budget period August 10, 2009
-- August 9, 2010), as the PAHPA legislation
mandates that CDC link the quality of state
plans to public health emergency prepared-
ness (PHEP) funding.  To evaluate the qual-
ity of state plans, experts from HHS, CDC
and the states developed grading criteria.
State plans must demonstrate the state’s abil-
ity to accomplish the following objectives:136
FEDERAL - STATE PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS COLLABORATION
59
 Ensure public health continuity of opera-
tions during each phase of a pandemic;
 Ensure surveillance and laboratory capa-
bility during each phase of a pandemic;
 Implement community mitigation inter-
ventions;
 Acquire and distribute medical counter-
measures; 
 Ensure mass vaccination capability during
each phase of a pandemic; and 
 Ensure communication capability during
each phase of a pandemic.  
HHS has indicated that they will release the
results of the state pandemic influenza oper-
ational plan review in December 2008, al-
though the transition of administrations may
result in changes to how or when the results
are released.137
Although there have been many achieve-
ments over the past seven years, including
the development of medical countermea-
sures for use in a pandemic flu or bioterror-
ist attack, the creation and implementation
of a National Strategy for Pandemic In-
fluenza, and the creation of volunteer med-
ical and public health emergency response
teams, among others, there are many crucial
areas where much remains to be done.  In
addition, the current system has many re-
dundancies that need to be addressed and
streamlined.  This should be a top priority of
the Obama administration.
3. The State of Federal Preparedness:  What the Obama Administration
Needs to Know
The Obama administration must address
how public health emergency preparedness
and response can be better organized.  Many
experts have called for more clarity around
the roles and responsibilities of federal agen-
cies involved in public health emergency pre-
paredness -- both among cabinet agencies --
HHS, DHS, VA, and DOD -- and for offices
within HHS -- ASPR, CDC, and HRSA.  
HHS is the lead cabinet agency for determin-
ing policy and planning for health emergen-
cies.  There is broad consensus among experts
that HHS should remain as the lead agency.
However, other cabinet agencies have differ-
ent types of expertise that are needed during
emergencies, for example, the VA can man-
age large health systems and the VA and DOD
can effectively and rapidly move people,
equipment, and supplies.  The Obama ad-
ministration should ensure that these agen-
cies are well-integrated in the nation’s public
health emergency response system.
A. DEFINING PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A 2008 GAO report highlighted the impor-
tance of a robust national biosurveillance sys-
tem.  In testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives, the lead author of the GAO
report noted that “Infectious diseases have
the potential to develop into widespread out-
breaks and could have significant conse-
quences, such as causing hundreds of
thousands of casualties, disrupting trans-
portation and weakening our economy, dam-
aging public morale and confidence, and
threatening our national security.”138 While
these infectious disease outbreaks could
occur naturally, the United States faces the
possibility that terrorists will use biological
agents as weapons of mass destruction.
It is, therefore, no surprise that the adminis-
tration and Congress have emphasized the
need to improve biosurveillance.  While HHS
is considered the lead agency for public health
response -- including human biosurveillance --
some critical health functions operate out of
the DHS Office of Health, which has devel-
B. Biosurveillance Coordination
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oped three major initiatives to provide early de-
tection and warning of biological threats: the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center
(NBIC), the National Biosurveillance Integra-
tion System (NBIS), and BioWatch. 
Meanwhile, CDC, consistent with HSPD-21, has
set up the Biosurveillance Coordination Unit
(BCU).  The BCU is leading the development
of the National Biosurveillance Strategy for
Human Health and its implementation in col-
laboration with public and private stakeholders.
The development of this strategy is necessary to
leverage current nationwide capabilities and
target new investments where the greatest im-
provement can occur. The specific goal of this
effort is to generate timely and comprehensive
information that is accessible to decision-mak-
ers in government, business, and the public in
a usable and appropriate context; thereby, sav-
ing lives through improved recognition of and
response to urgent health threats.  BCU re-
leased an updated draft on October 31, 2008.  
HSPD-21 also requires the establishment of a
federal advisory committee, including repre-
sentatives from state and local government
public health authorities and appropriate pri-
vate sector health care entities, in order to en-
sure that the federal government is enhancing
state and local government public health sur-
veillance capability.  The National Biosurveil-
lance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS), which
is comprised of prominent public and private
biosurveillance stakeholders and contributors,
was developed to meet this mandate.  The
NBAS will provide independent advice on bio-
surveillance for human health which will be in-
corporated into the National Biosurveillance
Strategy for Human Health.
In addition to systems at DHS and CDC,
there are biosurveillance systems at many
other federal agencies, including USDA,
FDA, EPA, VA, DOD, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
The mission of DHS’s NBIC is to bring all
these disparate biosurveillance feeds to-
gether by developing, operating, and main-
taining an integrated network.  This network,
the NBIS, will be used to detect a biological
event that presents a risk to the United States
or its infrastructure or key assets.
Given the confusion surrounding the existing
national biosurveillance structure, Congress
has commissioned two reports on the subject.
First, IOM and the National Research Coun-
cil are evaluating national biosurveillance sys-
tems to detect biological threats in order to
determine the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of the existing programs in detecting
and responding to biological attacks.  This re-
port is scheduled to be released in the late
spring/early summer of 2009.  Second, GAO
is studying the integration of U.S. biosurveil-
lance systems as mandated by the 9/11 Com-
mission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).  This report
is due out in the spring of 2009.
The Obama administration should review the
recommendations in these two major reports as
well as the recommendations from the NBAS.  
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DHS was required to establish a fully operational NBIC by September 30, 2008 as part of the Im-
plementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).  NBIC’s mission,
as spelled out by the 9/11 Commission Act is to:
 Rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern;
 Integrate and analyze data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental
monitoring systems; and
 Disseminate alerts to member agencies, and state, local, and tribal governments.
NBIC is developing a so-called “system of systems”, the NBIS, that will pull together and integrate
surveillance data from all federal agencies, including CDC.  The NBIC, it is important to note, has
no routine information exchange with the states.  Considering that state and local governments
are the first to respond to public health emergencies, that appears to be a major gap.
Although there is some indication that NBIC intends to move into primary data collection,
public health experts worry that this could lead to duplication.  Especially in an era of declining
resources, they argue that it would be better for NBIC to focus on the integration of data.
According to a 2008 GAO report, there have been numerous difficulties in bringing the NBIC on-
line, including: defining what capabilities the center will provide once fully operational; formalizing
interagency cooperation agreements; and, installing a new information technology (IT) system.  
NBIC continues to negotiate agreements with member agencies on the data they are to pro-
vide for the IT system.  There is an inter-agency working group and MOUs have been finalized
with six of the 11 agencies that NBIC officials deemed important to center operations.  DHS
has signed MOUs with DOD, USDA, HHS, the Department of Interior, State, and Transporta-
tion.  NBIC has MOUs pending with five other agencies:  the Department of Commerce, the
EPA, Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal Service, and the VA.139
In FY 2008, DHS received $8 million to establish the NBIC and has requested an additional
$4.2 million in reprogrammed funds.140
NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER (NBIC)
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BIOWATCH
BioWatch is DHS’s environmental monitoring system, which is designed to serve as an early
warning system in the event of the release of biological agents by monitoring and testing air
samples.  BioWatch sensors were first deployed in 2003 and there are currently some 500 sen-
sors located in some 30 U.S. cities.141
The goals of BioWatch are to:
 Deliver early warning of a biological attack by identifying the biological toxin to minimize ca-
sualties;
 Assist in providing evidence on the source, nature, and extent of an attack to aid law en-
forcement and public health officials; and 
 Determine where the biological attack occurred and what populations were exposed.
The latest generation of BioWatch detectors is in development.  These sensors will be fully
automated and monitor five biological agents.  Samples are collected on a 24/7/365 basis.
Critics of BioWatch point to its high cost -- the annual maintenance and operating budget is
$77 million -- and have suggested that the money would be better spent on enhancing hospital-
based rapid diagnostic capabilities.  BioWatch has also suffered from sensors picking up
bioagents occurring naturally in the environment that were not related to any sort of terrorist
attack.  In fact, most of BioWatch detections have been environmental detection events of
indigenous organisms, while a few were related to lab cross contamination.
State public health laboratories have also faced significant problems related to the BioWatch
program.  There are 24 state public health laboratories that host the BioWatch program and
provide dedicated office and lab space for the BioWatch program free of charge.142 In July 2008
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cy-
bersecurity, and Science and Technology, Dr. Frances Pouch Downes, President of APHL, out-
lined her association’s major concerns with the BioWatch program.143 These included:
 The lack of a contractual relationship between DHS and public health laboratories;  
 Uncompensated laboratory costs;
 Unclear rules for the management and oversight of BioWatch contract employees by state
public health lab employees;
 Gaps in performance data necessary for state and local labs to assess BioWatch responses,
or possible false positives; and 
 Security clearance concerns.  
To address these concerns, APHL recommends that DHS fund BioWatch program partners through
a cooperative agreement so that contractors become employees of state and local jurisdictions and
more easily integrated into the public health labs.  APHL also calls on CDC to direct more funding
from the public health emergency preparedness program grants to labs with BioWatch programs.    
Given the controversy surrounding BioWatch, several organizations are preparing reports on its
effectiveness and place within the broader U.S. biosurveillance system.  First, at the request of
Congress, the IOM and the National Research Council are evaluating national biosurveillance sys-
tems to detect biological threats in order to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the BioWatch system and the U.S. hospital and public health system in detecting and responding
to biological attacks.  The final report will be released in the late spring/early summer of 2009.  
A second group, the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS), which was created
under HSPD-21, is also evaluating Biowatch and other biosurveillance systems to develop a series
of recommendations for the Obama administration.  That report is due in February/March 2009.  
Finally, GAO is working on its own report on the integration of U.S. biosurveillance systems as
mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).  This report is due out in the
spring of 2009.
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In the past year CDC has worked with federal, state, and local
stakeholders to organize current biosurveillance capability for
human health and identify priorities to achieve the capability
we need as a nation to detect acute health emergencies early
and respond effectively. Two important entities have been
stood up to meet the HSPD-21 mandate: the Biosurveillance
Coordination Unit (BCU) and the National Biosurveillance Ad-
visory Subcommittee (NBAS).  
The Biosurveillance Coordination Unit (BCU)
The BCU is responsible for developing the strategy and imple-
mentation plan for an integrated biosurveillance system to
safeguard human health.  In early June 2008, the BCU devel-
oped a draft National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health
that was sent to the CDC Director and over 425 stakehold-
ers.  Based on feedback from this initial review, BCU released
an updated draft on October 31, 2008.  As was done with the
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, BCU will lead the
drafting of an implementation plan for the National Biosurveil-
lance Strategy for Human Health, which will describe specific
tasks and responsibilities of different agencies and programs at
the federal, state, and local level.
In addition, the BCU has developed a conceptual framework
of how CDC plans to integrate all human biosurveillance
activities at the agency.  
The newest element in the 
conceptual framework, is CDC’s
BioPHusion program which will
integrate information from across
CDC experts and programs, as
well external sources to produce
timely and actionable reports.
Multiple information products will
be produced for various audi-
ences, from state and local public
health practitioners to the NBIS. 
The National Biosurveillance
Advisory Subcommittee
(NBAS)
The NBAS, which is a subcommit-
tee to CDC’s Advisory Committee
to the Director (ACD), held its first
meeting in August 2008.  The
NBAS includes representatives
from state and local public health
departments and private sector
health care entities.  Its mission is
to serve as independent advisors
for the development of the next generation biosurveillance capa-
bility.  After carrying out an initial survey of national and interna-
tional biosurveillance programs, the NBAS will provide a series of
priority recommendations to the federal government through the
ACD. NBAS recommendations will also be addressed through fu-
ture versions of the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human
Health.  
The NBAS has set up eight task forces to address key priori-
ties: 
 Integrating Clinical and Public Health Reporting;
 Animal, Food, and Vectors;
 Genomic Epidemiology and Digital Technologies;
 Environmental Monitoring;
 Diagnostics and Laboratory Information Exchange;
 Global Disease Detection and Collaboration;
 Biosurveillance Workforce of the Future; and 
 Cross-Sector Collaborations for Biosurveillance Strategies.
The subcommittee’s first set of recommendations is due out
in March 2009.  The NBAS will also produce an annual assess-
ment on the state of biosurveillance.
CDC BIOSURVEILLANCE INITIATIVES
Source: CDC Biosurveillance Coordination Unit
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In June 2007, HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt
published a Draft BARDA Strategic Plan for
Countermeasure Research, Development and Pro-
curement to guide and facilitate the research,
development, innovation, and procurement
of medical countermeasures and build upon
established national strategies and directives.
There are still, however, major challenges
facing BARDA, the Biomedical Advanced Re-
search and Development Authority.   Several
of these challenges are detailed below.
C. ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERMEASURES
The major obstacle facing BARDA is sufficient
annual funding for advanced development of
medical countermeasures (MCM).  According
to an analysis by the Center for Biosecurity,
while BARDA’s current level of funding has al-
lowed ASPR to set up the infrastructure neces-
sary to support advanced research and
development of MCM, it has been insufficient
to support the successful development of a
whole range of MCM.  The Center for Biosecu-
rity estimates that BARDA needs $817 million
in FY 2009 alone “to support one year of ad-
vanced development for the candidate medical
countermeasures against biological threats that
are currently in development.”144 However, to
achieve the goals identified by the Public
Health Emergency Medical Counter measures
Enterprise, whose mission is to identify high
threat areas and the appropriate MCMs,
BARDA would need a staggering $3.39 billion
in FY2009 alone to have a 90 percent chance 
of ultimately developing successful MCMs for
each biodefense requirement set forth in
HHS’s Public Health Emergency Countermea-
sures Enterprise (PHEMCE) Implementation
Plan.  This funding would have to be sustained
for many years, given the risks and costs associ-
ated with MCM development.  
Funding
A key element for U.S. pandemic preparedness
is the establishment of a pre-pandemic in-
fluenza vaccine stockpile that provides protec-
tion against possible pandemic virus threats,
including the avian influenza virus H5N1.
BARDA is working with manufacturers to facil-
itate research and development on adjuvants
for use with the pre-pandemic vaccine, while
also trying to build a vaccine manufacturing in-
frastructure capable of producing and distrib-
uting the vaccine at pandemic onset.  
Completion of pre-pandemic influenza vaccine stockpile
According to ASPR, “analyses of the phar-
maceutical industry cost models show the de-
velopment of vaccines, drugs and other
biological products is $500 to $700 million
per product over eight to 12 years, with a low
probability of success (12 to 15 percent by
the end of Phase II clinical studies).”145
BARDA must find ways to mitigate and con-
trol risk, including shared cost responsibili-
ties for early and advanced development and
focused advanced development of products
with highest benefit-to-risk profiles.
The inherent risk of medical countermeasures development
Once a company delivers its initial stockpile
to the U.S. government, it is in the best in-
terest of the federal government to maintain
the infrastructure required to provide addi-
tional product upon expiration and/or surge
capacity in the event of an outbreak.  This re-
quires federal investment not only in the de-
velopment of the product, but also in the
sustainability of its investment.
Product line sustainability
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Considering the diverse and dynamic nature
of public health threats, and the expense and
time required to develop MCM, strategies
must prioritize investment and optimize our
ability to protect the nation. Numerous
CBRN threats have been identified, and any
number of emerging infectious diseases may
endanger public health in the future.  It is
important to address the most significant
threats while at the same time retaining suf-
ficient flexibility to respond to changes in
priorities due to events, given the time and
investment required to develop medical
countermeasures for these threats.  
Prioritization of MCM development
Over the past seven years, the White House and
Congress have convened a series of federal ad-
visory committees.  In most cases, the commit-
tee members include representatives from
government, business, academia, community
organizations, and professional associations.
Many of the members serve on multiple federal
preparedness groups.  These committees or
boards are tasked with providing advice and
counsel to federal government agencies on
matters related to public health emergency pre-
paredness.  The reports and documents these
committees produce are often non-binding.  In
addition, it does not appear that these commit-
tees regularly or routinely communicate with
each other.  As such, there is much duplication
of effort.  Although TFAH believes it is very use-
ful for federal agencies to hear from such civil-
ian advisory boards, the Obama administration
should conduct a thorough review of the exist-
ing federal advisory committees and their work.
The administration should pay close attention
to the reports and recommendations devel-
oped by these bodies and, when appropriate,
implement the recommendations to improve
public health emergency preparedness.  If
there are duplicative committees, the adminis-
tration should evaluate their usefulness.  
A summary of the federal public health pre-
paredness advisory committees that TFAH was
able to identify can be found in Appendix D:
Federal Preparedness Advisory Groups, Pan-
els, and Committees.
D. MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Currently, the federal government has a three-
tiered level of medical and public health emer-
gency response teams.  Level I responders are
full-time federal employees, including mem-
bers of the U.S. Public Health Service Com-
missioned Corps (Commissioned Corps), the
VA, and DOD.  The Level I responders are the
equivalent of the full-time professional military
and handle national disasters and emergen-
cies.  Level II responders are part-time or in-
termittent federal employees, such as
members of the National Disaster Medical Sys-
tem (NDMS).  Level II responders are the
equivalent of the military reserves and are ac-
tivated when there is a national disaster or
emergency.  Level III responders are commu-
nity-based volunteer health care professionals
and non-health care professionals, such as
members of the MRC, Community Emergency
Response Teams (CERT), and ESAR-VHP.
Level III responders are the equivalent of the
state national guard.  They are the first re-
sponders when an emergency strikes in their
communities, although in a federally-declared
disaster or emergency, they can be mobilized
to respond at the national level.  
The administration should review the national
strategy to respond to catastrophic public
health emergencies and address any issues that
may impede a successful deployment of this
three-tiered structure, including issues per-
taining to liability protection, licensing and ac-
creditation, and workers’ compensation.  In
addition, the administration should examine
the legal issues relating to when and how DOD
and VA can engage in the response, and issues
pertaining to cross-agency reimbursement.
E. MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS
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The 2006 PAHPA legislation further
strengthened the nation’s preparedness and
response planning.  The legislation included
a series of benchmarks for federal agencies
to meet over the five-year span of the Act.
Seven of these deliverables were due no later
than 180 days after the enactment of PAHPA,
or by the end of June 2007.  Another set of
four deliverables were due no later than De-
cember 2007, or 12 months after enactment.
Three more deliverables are due between
October 1, 2008 and January 2009.  Funding,
however, was not provided for the imple-
mentation of the PAHPA benchmarks.  In
spite of this, as of November 2008, eight of
the 14 benchmarks have been met, which is
commendable, given staffing and funding
constraints at the federal level.  
However, some of the unmet or partially
completed deliverables are crucial to the na-
tion’s preparedness, including:
 Development of new, outcome-oriented
performance measures;
 Enhanced real-time disease detection and
surveillance; 
 Review of the medical and public health
emergency response; and
 Advanced research and development of
countermeasures.
Congress should hold regular oversight hear-
ings to monitor the progress and implemen-
tation of PAHPA.
For more details, see Appendix E: Key Deliv-
erables and Due Dates under PAHPA.
4. The Implementation of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA)
In the event of a public health crisis such as
a bioterrorist attack, natural disaster, or pan-
demic flu, the expected demand on the U.S.
health care system would be extraordinary.
The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan projects
that a pandemic could result in 45 million
additional outpatient visits, with 865,000-
9,900,000 individuals requiring hospitaliza-
tion, depending on the severity of the
pandemic.  Such a major disaster would cross
state lines and quickly overwhelm health
care systems.  A public health crisis of less
magnitude, for example, a major hurricane
or terrorist attack, could also severely test the
U.S. health care system.  According to a 2008
report from the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), “recent incidents -- the Sep-
tember 11th and anthrax attacks of 2001,
and several Gulf Coast hurricanes in 2005 --
have shown the limitations of existing fund-
ing mechanisms in support of public health
and medical incident responses.”146  
With more than 15 percent of Americans
lacking health insurance coverage, the finan-
cial impact on the country’s public health
and health care systems could be disastrous if
hospitals, community health centers, and pri-
mary care facilities treat large numbers of
uninsured.147 Likewise, if uninsured or un-
derinsured patients hesitate to seek treatment
because of fears of out-of-pocket costs, treat-
ing and containing the further spread of a
pandemic would be nearly impossible.  
To save lives, contain any pandemic to the
degree possible, and ensure a functioning
health care system throughout and after such
a catastrophic emergency, the federal gov-
ernment should act now to create a frame-
work for emergency health coverage and
reimbursement.
A public health emergency benefit would
have to address two separate concerns for
providers and patients.  It would have to
guarantee providers some level of compen-
sation for the services they provide during a
pandemic, while encouraging individuals to
come forward for diagnosis or treatment.  
In fact, such legislation was introduced in the
110th Congress by Senator Richard Durbin
5. Additional Federal Issues
A. EMERGENCY HEALTH BENEFIT
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(D-IL) and Representative Lois Capps (D-CA).
The bill, the Public Health Emergency Re-
sponse Act (PHERA), would establish a tem-
porary emergency health benefit for
uninsured individuals and individuals whose
health insurance coverage is not actuarially
equivalent to benchmark coverage.  The ben-
efit could only be triggered if the secretary of
HHS declared that a public health emergency
existed under section 319 of the Public Health
Service Act and chose to activate the benefit.
The benefit would last for up to 90 days; the
HHS secretary could extend it once for an-
other 90 days.  The funding mechanism in the
legislation is the Public Health Emergency
Fund; the bill would clarify that using the Fund
for uncompensated care is permissible.  The
legislation authorizes $7 million each year for
the administration of this fund and for a pub-
lic education campaign about the program,
and Congress would need to appropriate
money to the Fund only after the HHS secre-
tary activated the benefit.  It would also ensure
that coverage would be provided for individu-
als displaced by a public health emergency and
would clarify the scope of coverage.
It is best to create these mechanisms prior to
an emergency, rather than in the heat of the
moment when any delay would be counted
in lives lost.  In addition, prior planning may
enable the government to be more cost-ef-
fective in using scarce resources.  Planning
ahead for a catastrophic public health emer-
gency is the best way to avoid needless loss of
life or wasted resources.  
Controlling the spread of a pandemic flu will
depend on keeping infected persons away from
the uninfected as much as possible.  Doing so
includes getting the infected and their families
to stay home from work.  CDC guidance issued
in February 2007 includes the recommenda-
tion that sick people stay home from work for
seven to 10 days and that family or household
members of those sick remain at home for
seven days.148 This stay-at-home policy will limit
the contact of sick people, and their potentially
infected families, with others when they are con-
tagious.  These recommendations raise a trou-
bling issue, however, because 48 percent of
private-sector workers in the United States lack
paid sick leave benefits and 94 million Ameri-
cans do not have a single paid sick day they can
use to care for a sick child.149  
TFAH encourages Congress to require paid
sick leave to ensure economic stability and
minimize health risks during a pandemic or
infectious disease outbreak.   Although exist-
ing law, the Family and Medical Leave Act, al-
lows employees to take unpaid sick time due
to a serious illness, the law exempts 40 percent
of the workforce who work at small and mid-
size businesses, does not cover less severe com-
municable diseases, and does not mitigate the
fear of lost income among many workers.  
These deficiencies in the law indicate that a
federal paid sick day law is necessary.   Pro-
posed legislation that seeks to address this
need includes the Healthy Families Act.  This
legislation would require employers with 15 or
more employees to offer seven paid sick days
each year, to be used to deal with individual
medical needs or to care for sick family mem-
bers.  Although the bill garnered over 100
House cosponsors and 24 Senate Cosponsors
in the 110th Congress, the Healthy Families
Act was not taken up in either Chamber.  The
legislation is expected to be reintroduced early
in 2009.  While some argue that this legislation
is good for public health in general, because
sick individuals should not attend work and
risk infecting coworkers and the public, others
point out that seven days of paid sick leave may
not be enough to minimize the spread of dis-
ease during a public health emergency such as
a pandemic flu outbreak.  Nor is the legisla-
tion expansive enough to conform with the
CDC recommendation for possible self-quar-
antine for up to 10 days.  However, given the
political realities surrounding the legislation,
such as opposition to any paid sick day re-
quirements by some employer groups, the ex-
isting language is a positive step toward
addressing shortcomings in existing law.  
B. EMERGENCY SICK LEAVE
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Liability protection for those health care vol-
unteers who serve in a public health emer-
gency has proved to be a serious issue as state
and local governments seek to build com-
munity-based volunteer medical and public
health teams to respond to public health
emergencies.  Although 42 states and D.C.
have enacted legislation that offers liability
protection to health care volunteers who
serve during a public health emergency,
there are concerns that not all states have ad-
equate legal authority to extend liability pro-
tection to volunteer health professionals.
(Please see Section 1, Indicator 8 for a de-
tailed discussion of state liability laws.)
This patchwork of state laws raises concerns
about gaps in liability protection for health
professionals seeking to volunteer in a public
health emergency and for emergency plan-
ners seeking to organize volunteer health
professionals in advance of an emergency.  
Existing federal statutes and regulations re-
lated to volunteer health professionals’ lia-
bility during public health emergencies
include:
The Federal Tort Claims Act:  In the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, the federal government
recruited volunteer health professionals for
potential deployment to the impacted re-
gion.150 These volunteer health professionals
were recognized as non-paid, temporary fed-
eral employees (travel and per diem were
paid) and made eligible for Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) liability protection.151,152
The FTCA, with some exceptions, makes the
U.S. government legally liable “for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or
employment.”153 For purposes of FTCA pro-
tection, a federal employee can include any-
one acting in an official capacity on behalf of
a federal agency, whether that person is a tem-
porary or permanent employee and whether
or not he or she is compensated.154  
The Public Health Services Act:  The Public
Health Services Act authorizes FTCA protec-
tion for certain volunteer health profession-
als, such as members of the federal NDMS.
The NDMS recruits citizens with medical, be-
havioral, and public health expertise to serve
on federal response teams that provide med-
ical and ancillary services to those affected by
a public health emergency.  NDMS personnel
are considered intermittent federal disaster-
response employees and, when deployed, are
paid by the federal government on a part-
time basis.155,156 For the purposes of liability
protection, when they are acting within the
scope of their NDMS appointments, these in-
dividuals are considered to be employees of
the federal government’s Public Health Serv-
ice and are given equivalent FTCA protec-
tion.157 To help coordinate state and local
emergency response, in 2006, the PAHPA Act
authorized the HHS secretary to extend sim-
ilar protections to select members of the
MRC during a public health emergency.158   
The Volunteer Protection Act:  The federal Vol-
unteer Protection Act (VPA) was enacted in
1997 in response to concerns that liability is-
sues were affecting people’s willingness to vol-
unteer for a broad range of community
activities, not limited to medical volunteerism
or emergency situations.  Under the VPA, vol-
unteers acting on behalf of a nonprofit organ-
ization or government entity are not liable for
causing harm if they were performing services
without compensation and certain conditions
were met.  The conditions require that the vol-
C. FEDERAL LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES
1. Federal Liability Protections For Volunteer Health Professionals
The following analyses were carried out by the research team at HealthPolicy R&D in affiliation
with Powell Goldstein LLP.  The analysis in these sections does not constitute legal advice.  
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unteer was:  acting within the scope of his or
her responsibilities; properly licensed or certi-
fied if required in the state in which harm oc-
curred; not engaged in willful or criminal
misconduct, gross negligence, reckless mis-
conduct or a conscious flagrant indifference to
the rights or safety of the individual harmed;
and not operating a motor or other vehicle.159
The VPA does not apply to the nonprofit or-
ganization itself, and volunteers remain poten-
tially liable for certain non-economic losses.160
The VPA preempts weaker state laws; however,
states can provide additional liability protection
beyond the VPA.161 States also retain the op-
tion of opting out of the VPA.162
The Public Readiness and Emergency Pre-
paredness Act:  The Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, also
known as the PREP Act, offers liability protec-
tion to manufacturers willing to sell counter-
measures during a national emergency.  The
law protects manufacturers when selling pan-
demic products, security countermeasures,
drugs, devices, and biological products.  It also
extends immunity to distributors and program
planners, as well as to health care professionals
who dispense medical countermeasures.163
The only medical countermeasures that cur-
rently have protection under PREP are those
for which the HHS Secretary has issued decla-
rations.  While the PREP Act would seem to
offer liability protection for volunteer health
professionals and private sector entities that
dispense medical countermeasures during a
public health emergency, it does not offer pro-
tection for other services rendered.  
Volunteer health professionals who are “fed-
eralized” during public health emergencies
have the benefit of liability protection that is
equivalent to federal employees’ protection.
Through the EMAC states can provide liabil-
ity protection to state employees who deploy
from one state to another in an emergency.164
Other volunteer health professionals have
protection, to varying degrees, through state
laws and the federal VPA.  However, confu-
sion and gaps remain, particularly for health
professionals seeking to volunteer across state
lines during a public health emergency.
For example, a significant number of volun-
teer health professionals are private sector and
local government employees.  The state-to-
state agreements under EMAC apply to state
employees and do not expressly cover other
volunteers.165 The federal VPA requires licen-
sure in the state in which harm occurs, yet
many health professionals are only licensed in
the state in which they regularly practice.
Some states attempted to provide a “work-
around” for volunteer health professionals
during Hurricane Katrina by temporarily de-
claring them to be state employees.166 At the
same time, the federal government rushed to
register volunteer health professionals as tem-
porary federal employees and provide them
FTCA protection.  
These federal and state stopgap liability ef-
forts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
demonstrate the limitations of the current
patchwork of volunteer health professional
liability protections. 
Removing barriers to well-organized and
timely response to critical public health
emergencies is an issue of national interest.
Rather than rely on an incomplete, complex
array of federal and state liability provisions
and the use of stopgap measures after an
event, Congress should establish clear statu-
tory authority under the Public Health Serv-
ice Act167 for FTCA protection to be provided
to qualified ESAR-VHP participants activated
by the federal government in response to a
public health emergency.168 A federal liabil-
ity standard need not preempt states’ man-
agement of their individual registries as part
of the ESAR-VHP network.  Instead, it can
help limit confusion on the ground during a
public health emergency and expedite
health expertise to areas in critical need.
Limitations of Current Federal Laws and Regulations
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The federal government’s National Response
Framework for disasters and emergencies clearly
articulates the important role of public-private
partnerships in emergency preparedness.  The
Framework outlines a comprehensive, national
approach to emergency response and affirms
that the government cannot work alone in re-
sponding to events such as public health emer-
gencies.169 Private-sector partners include
hospitals and other critical health care facilities,
as well as businesses and non-profit organiza-
tions that can help supply and deliver vital serv-
ices and maintain community functions before,
during, and after an event.  
Although individual volunteer responders
working with private-sector entities can secure
varying degrees of liability protection through
a number of different existing federal and state
mechanisms, many organizational entities that
are key partners in emergency response do not
typically qualify for immunity protections.170
This lack of liability protection and the expo-
sure it creates can limit or delay organizations’
willingness to join in an emergency response
and can hinder the timely action required to
address a public health emergency.
This section reviews public health emer-
gency-related liability issues for two different
groups of entities: 1) hospitals; and 2) busi-
nesses and non-profit organizations.
2. Public Health Emergencies and Entity Liability
Hospitals are not often included in public
health emergency-related immunity cover-
age.171 Instead, hospitals can potentially be
held liable for their own actions or as a result
of the actions of health care professionals
and staff that are imputed to the hospital.172
In certain public health emergency situa-
tions, hospitals’ liability exposure may in-
crease when circumstances make it difficult
for hospitals and their personnel to follow
standard protocols and when the scope of
the emergency response compels hospitals to
take on new and unfamiliar medical staff.  
During a public health emergency, hospitals
may urgently need additional professional
staff to meet their obligations to provide
health care services.173 One tool for address-
ing capacity needs in large-scale events is vol-
unteer health professionals, although the use
of volunteer health professionals has the po-
tential to increase a hospital’s liability risk.174  
Some have suggested that risk management
policies can help mitigate these concerns.175
Good policies could include, for example,
well-defined processes and practices for se-
lecting and managing volunteer health pro-
fessionals during a public health emergency.176
However, these processes and practices can be
thwarted by events.   For example, some hos-
pital administrators in New York City reported
that they were unable to use health profes-
sionals who volunteered in response to the
9/11 tragedy because the hospitals could not
confirm basic information about the volun-
teers’ licensing and credentials due to com-
munications system breakdowns.177  
To address the need for rapid verification of
volunteers’ credentials during an emergency,
in 2006 PAHPA required the HHS secretary
to establish a national interoperable network
that links state systems for verifying volunteer
health care professionals’ credentials and li-
censes (ESAR-VHP).178 The network does not
specifically address hospitals’ potential liability
exposure, but it is an attempt to create a read-
ily available resource to expedite hospitals’
credential verification processes, which may
have the potential to improve hospitals’ risk
management.  Nonetheless, systems failures
and other events are real threats to this and
other mechanisms designed to pre-certify the
credentials of volunteers, leaving hospitals
with continued concerns about meeting
emergency-related surge demand while man-
aging their facilities’ liability exposure.
To address hospital liability issues, Congress
may wish to consider providing hospitals and
health care organizations with liability pro-
tection for the actions of qualified ESAR-VHP
participants accepted into hospital facilities
during a federal public health emergency.
Hospitals
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Congress established ESAR-VHP under fed-
eral law to help states develop registry systems
for identifying and verifying the credentials
of volunteer health professionals who could
respond during a public health emergency.179
Additional federal actions have encouraged
ESAR-VHP’s growth and development.180
However, under existing law, hospitals and
health care organizations may assume liability
risk when accepting volunteers.181  
If federal and state governments are engaged
in actively building a network of health care
volunteers that can be deployed in response
to emergencies, the government also has a
stake in removing barriers to health care fa-
cilities accepting qualified volunteers.  One
mechanism to advance this goal would be to
alleviate the actual and perceived liability
concerns attached to accepting volunteers by
protecting hospitals when the volunteers are
vetted through this established federal-state
partnership program for recruiting and cer-
tifying volunteer health professionals. 
In a public health emergency, a network of
community entities may be needed to expedite
goods and services to individuals and critical
infrastructure sites, to provide shelter and basic
necessities, and to help maintain and restore
other vital community functions.  Although
Good Samaritan laws at the state level are likely
to protect individual volunteers, these laws,
with some exceptions, generally leave signifi-
cant gaps in liability protection for businesses
and non-profit organizations that voluntarily as-
sist during a public health emergency.182  
In a large-scale event, sizable numbers of vol-
unteers, facilities and other private-sector re-
sources are necessary to augment government
resources.  Advocates have pointed to the mag-
nitude of Hurricane Katrina and the various
needs it created for volunteers to: 1) support
law enforcement, emergency medical and fire
response; 2) assist with preserving and repair-
ing infrastructure, including schools; and 3)
provide social support services such as coun-
seling and sheltering.183 Businesses and non-
profit organizations not only have the capacity
to organize large numbers of people, they also
can provide other resources, such as hotels,
stadiums, and other facilities that can be vital
tools in emergency response.184  
Although many groups face liability issues in a
public health emergency, there are certain en-
tities that may already have liability protection
under federal law for specific response-related
actions.  Under the federal PREP Act enacted in
2005, if the HHS secretary declares that a coun-
termeasure is necessary to confront a disease or
other threat, immunity from tort claims is es-
tablished for, among other things, the develop-
ment, distribution, dispensing, prescribing and
administration of the countermeasure.  The
limited immunity applies only to covered coun-
termeasures for which declarations have been
issued, and may be subject to other limitations
that the Secretary specifies in the declaration.
There is an exception to this liability protection
for willful misconduct.185 The PREP Act created
a federally supported emergency fund to com-
pensate individuals for injuries caused directly
by a countermeasure initiated under the Secre-
tary’s declaration, but funds have not yet been
appropriated for this compensation fund.186
The first declaration under this provision of the
PREP Act was for the H5N1 vaccine to protect
against the avian influenza virus.187  
A variety of leading public health and disas-
ter preparedness organizations, including
the American Red Cross, the American Col-
lege of Emergency Physicians, APHA, and
TFAH support the expansion of Good
Samaritan laws to protect a wide range of vol-
unteers and their sponsoring entities during
a public health emergency.188  
To address liability issues for businesses and
non-profit organizations, Congress may wish
to create a federal floor for the minimum
protection that should be available to these
emergency response partners when working
in concert with government agencies.  For
example, a federal liability “gap-filling” bill
could recognize states that have acted on this
issue already and create protections in those
states without coverage.  This approach
would be consistent with the approach taken
by Congress in the VPA.  The VPA preempts
weaker state laws, but allows states to exceed
Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations
DOD and SNS both maintain large stockpiles
of medications and vaccines in order to en-
sure that both military and civilian popula-
tions have access to needed antidotes and
treatments in the event of a medical emer-
gency. In order to save federal dollars, FDA
and DOD developed a system of extending
the shelf-life of these drugs and vaccines be-
yond the manufacturer’s expiration date.
The Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) is
administered jointly by the FDA and DOD.
The SNS also participates in the program.189
The program has resulted in substantial sav-
ings.  According to CDC’s analysis, the return
on investment for SNS participation in the
SLEP is that for each dollar ($1.00) spent on
SLEP costs, which includes testing, shipping,
and re-labeling, SNS saved $13.00.190  
Despite the substantial savings at the federal
level, states’ stockpiles of antivirals -- purchased
through an HHS-subsidized program as part of
states pandemic preparedness -- are not eligible.
HHS designated $170 million to subsidize
states’ purchases of up to 31 million treat-
ment courses of Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) and
Relenza® (zanamivir).  HHS will subsidize 25
percent of the cost, and states will pay the
other 75 percent.  As of September 30, 2008
state and local jurisdictions have stockpiled
nearly 22 million treatment courses of antivi-
rals, of which almost 21 million were pur-
chased using the federal government subsidy.
In 2006, ASTHO surveyed its members re-
garding the stockpiling of antivirals.  At the
time, states indicated that inventory man-
agement, including the storage, rotation,
and shelf-life extension strategies, were of
critical concern.191 State public health budg-
ets are stretched thin already.  Without a fed-
eral compromise on the SLEP, many states
will be unwilling to commit scarce dollars to
buy antivirals that will expire in only seven
years.  Although the May 2006 National Strat-
egy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan
asked HHS, DOD, and the VA to explore the
possibility of extending SLEP to state and pri-
vately-held stockpiles, according to a 2008
IOM report, “nothing has been released
about the feasibility, cost, and other barriers
of extending the program to properly main-
tained non-federal stockpiles.”192  
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the VPA’s protections.  A distinction would
be that a federal provision providing busi-
nesses and non-profit organizations with
Good Samaritan protections would be lim-
ited to actions occurring during a public
health emergency, whereas the VPA provides
protections that are broader in scope.
D. SHELF-LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM
Prompted by recent nationwide Salmonella
and E.Coli outbreaks, Congress held nearly 30
hearings on food safety in the 110th Congress
and introduced over 100 pieces of legislation
designed to improve the nation’s food safety
net.  However, no new food safety laws were
enacted in 2007 or 2008.  In November 2007,
FDA released its Food Protection Plan, a
modernization strategy designed to enhance
FDA’s ability to prevent and detect foodborne
disease and contamination.  In June 2008,
Congress increased FDA’s FY 2008 funding by
$150 million, $66 million of which was desig-
nated for food safety.  However, as of Sep-
tember 2008, FDA had not yet told Congress
how much money was required to fully im-
plement the Food Protection Plan.
As FDA and Congress seek to strengthen the
nation’s food supply, they face a number of
obstacles, including:  
 Inadequate federal leadership, coordina-
tion, and resources;
 Outdated laws and policies; and
 Limited federal, state, and local coordination.
(For a detailed discussion of food safety,
please see our April 2008 report Fixing Food
Safety: Protecting America’s Food Supply from
Farm-to-Fork and the October 2008 report
Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing
the Federal Public Health System to Focus on Pre-
vention and Preparedness,  both available on-
line at: www.healthyamericans.org.)
E. FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY REFORMS
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In a public health emergency, such as a
bioterror attack or catastrophic natural dis-
aster, U.S. hospitals and health care facilities
will be on the front lines providing triage and
medical treatment to individuals.  In the best
of times, however, most emergency depart-
ments must confront bed shortages and
staffing issues; in a mass casualty event, the
situation could quickly spiral out of control.  
For the past five years, the U.S. government
has worked to improve hospitals’ overall
surge capacity, which the Agency for Health-
care Research and Quality (AHRQ) defines
as the ability to of a health care system to ex-
pand quickly beyond normal services to meet
an increased demand for medical care in the
event of bioterrorism or other large-scale
public health emergencies.194 
The challenge of how to equip hospitals and
train health care staff to handle the large in-
flux of critically injured or ill patients who
show up for treatment after or during a pub-
lic health emergency remains the single,
most challenging issue for public health and
medical preparedness.  
The following section outlines the steps that
have been taken and highlights some crucial
gaps in medical preparedness, including in-
formation on:
1. The Hospital Preparedness Program;
2. Mass casualty care;
3. Financing hospital preparedness; and
4. Preparedness and health reform.
Hospital Emergency 
Preparedness 3S E C T I O N
SURGE CAPACITY IS A HEALTH CARE SYSTEM’S ABILITY TO EXPAND QUICKLY BEYOND
NORMAL SERVICES TO MEET AN INCREASED DEMAND FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE EVENT OF
BIOTERRORISM OR OTHER LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES. 193
— AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (AHRQ)
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”
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The Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) fo-
cuses on improving the clinical response to a
large-scale health emergency.  Initially run by
HRSA, HPP is now run by ASPR as mandated by
PAHPA.  ASPR awards one-year funding grants
to hospitals and other health care facilities to im-
prove surge capacity and enhance community
and hospital preparedness for all-hazards, in-
cluding bioterrorism and pandemic influenza.  
HPP activities are to focus on the following
five core goals:195
1. Integration:  Integration of public and pri-
vate medical capabilities with public
health and other first responder systems;
2. Medical Preparedness:  Increasing the pre-
paredness, response capabilities, and
surge capacities of hospitals, other health
care facilities (including mental health fa-
cilities), and trauma care and emergency
medical service systems with respect to
public health emergencies;
3. At-risk Populations:  Taking into account
the public health and medical needs of at-
risk individuals in the event of a public
health emergency;
4. Coordination:  Minimizing duplication of,
and ensuring coordination among all levels
of planning, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities; and 
5. Continuity of Operations: Maintaining
vital public health and medical services in
the event of a public health emergency.
Grantees are expected to be compliant with
NIMS, provide education and preparedness
training to staff and hospital personnel, ex-
ercise and drill according to HSEEP guid-
ance, and clearly articulate which at-risk
populations with medical needs are being
served by the health care facility.  
In addition, grantees are required to address
the following capabilities:
 Interoperable Communication Systems;
 Tracking of Bed Availability via the Na-
tional Hospital Available Beds for Emer-
gency and Disasters (HAvBED);
 ESAR-VHP;
 Fatality Management;
Medical Evacuation / Shelter in Place; and 
 Partnership/Coalition Development.
If these capabilities are being adequately ad-
dressed, HPP grantees can work on these ad-
ditional activities:
 Alternate Care Sites;
Mobile Medical Assets;
 Pharmaceutical Caches;
 Personal Protective Equipment; and
 Decontamination.
In FY 2008, HPP awarded $398 million to 50
states and Washington, D.C., for an average of
$82,500 a year per hospital.  An article in the
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics notes that
“this barely permits the hiring of a prepared-
ness coordinator, leaving nothing for the in-
frastructure development and maintenance
that would be required.”196 In fact, a 2006
study by the Center for Biosecurity estimated
that true hospital preparedness for a severe
pandemic influenza would require a one-time
investment of at least $1 million per hospital
plus an additional $200,000 per year in main-
tenance costs, for a total of $5 billion for the
5,000 general hospitals in the United States.  
Beginning in FY 2008, HPP grantees, for the
first time, were subject to maintenance of 
funding requirements and had to meet specific
evidence-based benchmarks.  Grantees are ex-
pected to maintain their health care prepared-
ness expenditures at a level not less than the
average of expenditures during the previous
two-year period.  The maintenance of funds
refers to state or local contributions to health
care preparedness and not federal dollars.
As mandated by the 2006 PAHPA legislation,
HPP grantees that fail to meet the evidence-
based benchmarks will have funds withheld
from their FY 2009 awards.197 There is no
penalty for states who fail to meet mainte-
nance of funding requirements.  
Some public health experts have questioned
whether reducing HPP funding to certain hos-
pitals or states that fail to meet the evidence-
based benchmarks is the correct approach.
They argue that these are the places that might
need the money most to reach benchmarks.  
1. Hospital Preparedness Program
75
According to GAO, as of 2005, there were ap-
proximately 950,000 staffed hospital beds in
the United States, meaning that health care
staff was available to attend to the patient oc-
cupying the bed.  However, in a mass casualty
event, such as a severe pandemic influenza,
HHS expects that demand would far exceed
capacity.198 
The question for hospitals, health care facili-
ties, clinicians, and hospital administrators is
how to handle the surge of patients.  Not only
in terms of space for the critically injured and
sick, but in allocating scarce resources such
as ventilators and pharmaceuticals, and find-
ing enough trained, licensed health care
workers to care for the patients.
2. Mass Casualty Care
There is growing recognition in the United
States that a mass casualty event, particularly
a pandemic influenza, will result in the need
to alter and adapt the traditional standards
of care appropriate to the situation.  Unfor-
tunately, as an article in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine notes, under current federal
and state law, governors can declare a state
of emergency during disasters, “suspending
some of the normal standards without giving
any idea of what the alternative standards
ought to be.”199
According to the federal government, “states
in conjunction with professional societies will
determine the appropriate standards of care
for the situation -- not HHS or the federal gov-
ernment.”200 Although AHRQ has published
two documents on mass casualty care -- Altered
Standards of Care in Mass Casualty Events (2005)
and Mass Medical Care with Scarce Resources
(2007) -- these are intended merely to serve as
planning guidance for states and professional
associations as they develop “definitive guid-
ance.”201 Several states, including New York202
and California,203 and professional associations,
such as the American Nurse Association204 and
the American Health Lawyers Association,205
have taken the lead in this arena.  
Altered Standards of Care
Despite the release of guidance documents,
many disaster plans fail to account for the re-
ality a mass casualty event will present.  To
help develop comprehensive guidance for
managing mass casualty events, leading public
health and medical preparedness officials
convened a Task Force of Mass Casualty Criti-
cal Care.  The Task Force is composed of 37
experts from various fields, such as bioethics,
critical care, emergency medicine, infectious
diseases, law, nursing, and government plan-
ning and response, including HHS, DHS,
DOD, and the VA. According to a write-up
from the Task Force’s January 2007 meeting
in Chicago, “disaster plans have assumed that
critical care resources will be available when
needed, and generally this assumption has
been correct.  However, with the anticipation
of large volumes of critically ill patients in fu-
ture disasters, some believe that hospital ca-
pacity, and in particular critical care capability,
will be a major limiting factor for survival.”206
Not only will emergency departments be
overwhelmed in an emergency, but so would
critical care units and rehabilitation beds.
For instance, following the 2003 Rhode Is-
land nightclub fire, the emergency depart-
ment response lasted several hours while the
intensive care unit (ICU) admitted 47 criti-
cally injured patients with an average length
of stay of 21 days.207  
Any sort of mass casualty event with prolonged
hospitalizations will put a strain on hospitals
and health care workers.  To help hospitals pre-
pare for such an event, much of the current
guidance focuses on the three S’s -- supplies,
staff, and space.
Hospital Planning Considerations
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Today’s hospitals and health care facilities
function with a “just-in-time supply chain,”
meaning very limited supplies, including
pharmaceuticals, are stored on-site and in-
stead, are replenished on an as-needed basis.
While the use of a just-in-time supply chain
keeps hospital storage costs down, it also
“creates a significant threat to successful dis-
aster response.”208 Hospital administrators
argue that it is not feasible for hospitals to
stockpile large quantities of supplies as they
lack both the space to do so and the re-
sources to pay for these extra supplies.
In addition to the supplies, hospitals are likely
to run short of needed technologies, such as
ventilators and decontamination units.  
Ventilators are especially crucial in the event
of a pandemic influenza.  The write-up from
the 2007 meeting on mass critical care in
Chicago noted that ventilators in particular
are “unique to the critical care environment,
and they are essential equipment for the
management of respiratory failure.”  The task
force went on to note that in a pandemic in-
fluenza there will be a shortage and “scarce
mechanical ventilators will need to be allo-
cated to those patients who are prioritized.”209
The president’s FY 2009 budget request in-
cluded $25 million to support the advanced
development of next generation ventilators.
The new ventilators are to be portable, inex-
pensive, and equipped with universal parts.
HHS has specified that the ventilators should
be easy enough to use so that “inexperienced
health care providers with no respiratory
support training could safely use the de-
vice.”210 Congress, however, failed to pass the
FY 2009 budget and instead, adopted a six-
month continuing resolution.  Although
there is no funding for the project in the cur-
rent budget, ASPR continues to insist that
the development of these next generation
ventilators is a priority.  HHS envisions their
FDA approval over a two to three year span.
However, even if hospitals were to stockpile
additional easy-to-use ventilators, they would
likely still not be able to treat all the patients
seeking care in a pandemic influenza.
Supplies/Equipment
Workforce shortages plague hospitals and
health care facilities even in the best of times.
It is no wonder then that workforce shortages
are a serious concern for mass casualty event
planning.  According to a June 2008 report
from the Center for Studying Health System
Change, “the day-to-day shortages of key
health personnel -- such as nurses, physi-
cians, pharmacists, laboratory technicians,
and respiratory therapists -- exacerbate the
challenge of having sufficient numbers of
health workers in an emergency.”211 The re-
port goes on to note that until elected offi-
cials and policy makers address these
challenges, “the ability to have adequate per-
sonnel for an emergency will be limited.”212  
Staff
During a mass casualty event, hospitals will be
pressed to treat a sudden influx of injured and
sick patients.  In order to make room for the
surge of patients, the California Department of
Public Health surge capacity guidelines recom-
mend that hospitals take the following actions:213
 Rapid discharge of emergency department
and other patients who can continue their
care safely at home;
 Cancel elective surgeries and procedures
and reassign surgical staff and space;
 Reduce use of imaging, laboratory testing,
and other ancillary services; 
 Group like-patient types together to maxi-
mize efficient delivery of patient care;
 Convert single rooms to double rooms and
double rooms to triple rooms if possible;
 Use cots and beds in flat space areas such as
classrooms and lobbies within the hospital;
and 
 Identify wings, areas, and spaces that can be
opened or converted for use as patient treat-
ment areas, including outpatient clinics,
waiting rooms, conference rooms, physical
therapy gyms, and medical office buildings.
Space
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Other mechanisms to expand surge capacity
include:
 Encouraging home care for less severely ill
patients;
 Telemedicine, which allows health care
providers in hospitals to care for and moni-
tor patients at home with the use of elec-
tronic information and telecommunications
technologies; and 
Call centers, which will allow patients at home
to contact health care providers in hospitals
to obtain medical advice for home care.
A 2001 study by the American Hospital Asso-
ciation found that a typical metropolitan hos-
pital needed an estimated $3 million in
upgrades just to achieve baseline disaster pre-
paredness.  This figure does not include the
money for additional staff, support personnel,
or medical supplies and equipment.  A 2006
study by the Center for Biosecurity suggested
that a 164-bed hospital would need $1 million
just to be minimally prepared for pandemic
influenza.  However, a 2006 IOM report found
that average federal grant to hospitals is far
below that.  “Of significance, current policy
dictates that the source of funding for hospi-
tal preparedness originates from general tax
revenues.  Medical payers (e.g., Medicare,
Medicaid, and private insurance) directly
fund little, if any, of the preparedness bill.”214  
Hospitals and health care associations have ar-
gued that the easiest way to address this prob-
lem is to boost hospital preparedness program
grants from general revenue taxes.  The
American Hospital Association has said that
$11 billion is needed to achieve basic hospital
preparedness.  A top White House official has
suggested that funding for the Hospital Pre-
paredness Program be more than doubled to
a steady, sustained $1 billion a year.  However,
the worsening economic situation in the
United States and around the world may pre-
vent the Obama administration from seriously
increasing hospital preparedness funding.
3. Financing Hospital Preparedness
President-Elect Obama, his administration,
and the 111th Congress are likely to re-visit
the notion of health reform.  Any discussion
of expanding access to quality health care
should include a commitment to a strong
public health system and public policies fo-
cused on prevention of disease and injury
and public health emergency preparedness.
In order to strengthen public health and pre-
paredness, the nation must ensure that any
health care financing system that is devel-
oped includes stable and reliable funding for
core public health functions and clinical and
preventive services.  The nation must ade-
quately fund federal, state, and local public
health departments and programs to be able
to fulfill their responsibility of protecting the
public’s health, and, at the same time, public
health needs a sustainable funding stream.
Building healthy, prepared communities re-
quires a financial commitment.  
The health reform debate is likely to include a
conversation about the role of information
technology in health care delivery and public
health.  The federal, state, and local public
health agencies need to have the near real-
time capacity to monitor the delivery of health
care to the population in order to identify un-
usual illnesses or health events, whether natu-
ral or man-made.  Health care providers are
interested in electronic health records (EHRs)
to improve patient care and efficiency.  The
needs of both clinicians and public health of-
ficials should be considered when discussing
the role of health information technology.  
For a thorough discussion of what a reformed
health system would like and what it will take
to build one, please see TFAH’s October 2008
report Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modern-
izing the Federal Public Health System to Focus on
Prevention and Preparedness.  The full report is
available online at www.healthyamericans.org.
4. Preparedness And Health Reform
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Evidence shows that acts of terror often take
place in the weeks and months before or after
elections and political transitions.215 Terror-
ists seek opportunities to exploit weaknesses
in national security, whether real or made-up,
and a presidential election and transition is
seen as a period of increased vulnerability.216
During a transition period, the outgoing ad-
ministration has the ability to implement pol-
icy affecting national or international
security, and the next day, the new adminis-
tration and leadership may have a completely
different strategy.  The changing of policies
coupled with the perceived lack of experi-
ence of a new administration may create a
target of opportunity to those wanting to in-
jure the security of the nation in transition. 
Some documented events that have occurred
during national as well as international tran-
sitions include:217
March 2004:  Terrorists bombed commuter
trains in Madrid, Spain just three days before
the country’s general election.
December 2003:  A suicide bomber deto-
nated explosives aboard a commuter train
near Yessentuki, Russia two days before the
national elections.
 September 2001:  Nine months after Pres-
ident George W. Bush’s transition, terror-
ists attacked New York City and the
Pentagon, killing nearly 3,000 people.  
 February 1993:  Terrorists detonated a car
bomb underneath the World Trade Center
in New York City, killing at least five people
and injuring scores more, just a month after
President Bill Clinton was sworn into office.
March 1992:  Irish Republican Army con-
ducted a bombing campaign in Britain
aimed at influencing the upcoming election.
 November 1989:  President Rene Moawad
of Lebanon was killed by a bomb -- he had
been in office for only 17 days.
 October-December 1982:  An outbreak of
violence, causing more than 30 deaths, oc-
curred in Northern Ireland in opposition
to elections to form a Provincial Assembly.
History shows the increased vulnerability of
new administrations, and although it may be
impossible to prevent an attack or crisis dur-
ing the transition, steps can be taken to
lessen the risks to national security.  Some
recommendations include:
 Select and confirm quickly senior execu-
tive branch leaders who have significant
national security responsibilities;218
 Put in place an accelerated screening and
confirmation for the main members of the
new president’s national security team;219
 President-Elect Obama should provide the
names of those whom he intends to nomi-
nate as soon as possible so that investiga-
tions can begin;220
 The outgoing president should be cau-
tious of any activity taken in the last few
days of the administration that could in-
terfere with the incoming administration’s
transition efforts, such as:221 
 Establishing or revising national secu-
rity organizations, policies, or programs
that are clearly counter to the positions
of the incoming president;
 Interacting with foreign leaders that
may have the perception of attempting
to portray future U.S. foreign policy de-
sires; and
 Undertaking any steps that would have
a negative effect or produce unin-
tended national security consequences.
Additional Issues 
and Concerns
1. TRANSITION TERROR:  ARE WE PREPARED?
4S E C T I O N
Before, during, and after an incident, mem-
bers of at-risk populations may have addi-
tional needs in one or more of the following
functional areas: 
Maintaining independence; 
 Communication;
 Transportation;
 Supervision; and 
Medical care.   
In addition to those individuals specifically
recognized as at-risk in PAHPA ( i.e., chil-
dren, senior citizens, and pregnant women)
individuals who may need additional re-
sponse assistance should include people who:
 Have disabilities;
 Live in institutionalized settings; 
 Are from diverse cultures; 
 Have limited English proficiency or are
non-English speaking;
 Are transportation disadvantaged; 
 Have chronic medical disorders; and 
 Have pharmacological dependency.
The 2006 PAHPA legislation directed the na-
tion’s public health agencies to take the needs
of “at-risk individuals” into consideration when
managing preparedness programs, such as the
SNS and federal grants to states and hospitals.  
The Center for Biosecurity convened a
roundtable discussion in April 2008 on com-
munity resiliency and the implementation of
HSPD-21.  According to a draft meeting re-
port, the roundtable meeting discussed the
meaning of “community resilience” and
came up with an illustrative definition:224
“Community resilience is the ability of a commu-
nity to rebound from a disaster with a new focus
on recovery and mitigation and a renewed sense
of trust in government and other community lead-
ership.  Community resilience is achieved when a
community has forged meaningful social networks
with the goal of emergency preparedness among
community members, leaders, government, and
private industry.”  
Overall the meeting attendees agreed that the
concept of community resilience is beneficial
because it shifts the conversation away from
fear and toward the collective attitudes and ac-
tions necessary to build strong communities
and ensure a swift recovery from major tragedy.
The report finds that it is important for federal,
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments
to include community-based groups and faith-
based organizations in the response and pre-
paredness activities, specifically for “at-risk”
groups.  The group agreed that community re-
silience is a positive turn for national policy and
in order to build community resilience, the fol-
lowing issues should be considered:
 Cross-sector partnership;
 The critical role of community- and faith-
based organizations, especially as interme-
diaries with vulnerable populations;
 Strong social networks and robust com-
munication linkages;
 Active engagement of the public in pre-
paredness policy decisions;
 Vital, interconnected public health, safety,
and medical institutions; and
 Strong diversified economic base with
broadly distributed opportunity.
80
 The new president may want to have prior
administration officials maintain their se-
curity clearances and receive briefings re-
garding previous, current and emerging
threats and to learn of the prior adminis-
tration’s national security policy and pro-
gram successes and failures.222
 Congress should work with the new admin-
istration to understand its national security
priorities and where applicable, have the
changes in policies and programs reflected
in the 2009 budget and pass FY 2009 ap-
propriations without unnecessary delay.223
2. AT-RISK POPULATIONS AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
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Children under the age of 18 represent one
quarter of the U.S. population.  Planning to
care for the nation’s 73.6 million children
and adolescents during a public health emer-
gency presents complex considerations and
challenges.  Children are not “small adults”
and special consideration needs to be given
to complicated issues ranging from child-ap-
propriate doses of medications and vaccines,
to caring for children if schools and childcare
facilities are closed for extended periods.
Parents and other caregivers may also be-
come sick or injured during a disaster, com-
plicating their ability to care for children.
Columbia University’s National Center for
Disaster Preparedness has identified the fol-
lowing issues of concern for biological,
chemical and nuclear attacks:225
 Children are more vulnerable to chemical
agents that are absorbed through the skin
or inhaled; 
 Children have special susceptibilities to de-
hydration and shock from biological agents; 
 Children can not be decontaminated in
adult decontamination units; 
 Children require different dosages or differ-
ent antibiotics and antidotes to many agents; 
 Children are more susceptible to the ef-
fects of radiation exposure and require dif-
ferent responses than adults; 
 Children have unique psychological vul-
nerabilities, and special management
plans are needed in the event of mass ca-
sualties and evacuation; 
 Emergency responders, medical profes-
sionals, and children’s health care institu-
tions require special expertise and training
to ensure optimal care of those exposed to
chemical, biological, or nuclear agents; 
 Children’s developmental ability and cogni-
tive levels may impede their ability to escape
danger; and 
 EMS, medical, and hospital staff may not
have pediatric training, equipment, or fa-
cilities available. 
Other concerns related to children and pre-
paredness include the following:
Children, particularly children under the age
of five, exhibit significantly higher mortality
rates in disasters when compared with
adults.226 Because children have unique vul-
nerabilities -- physiological, developmental
and psychological -- it is crucial that their
needs be incorporated into all stages of disas-
ter planning to improve the response system
for children in emergencies.227 Currently, the
United States has fewer than 300 pediatric
hospitals, a fraction of all hospitals (five per-
cent), and only 40 percent of emergency de-
partment hospitals have specific procedures
regarding pediatric transfers.228
3. CHILDREN AND PREPAREDNESS
Limited pediatric care facilities
According to a recent Newsweek article,
shortly after Hurricane Ike hit Texas, San An-
tonio officials compiled a list of statistics
about evacuees in their city.  City officials
counted a total of 5,303 persons who had
been forced to leave their homes, including
561 individuals with special medical needs,
but there was no separate tally for children.229
According to disaster-relief experts, this is
not uncommon as kids are rarely counted in
evacuations.  Like hospitals, emergency shel-
ters are often unprepared to handle children
in emergencies, with essentials such as baby
wipes and diapers nowhere to be found.230
Unprepared emergency shelters
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In the United States, there are approximately
13 million children (63 percent) under the
age of five in some type of child care arrange-
ment during the day.231 As of 2004, approxi-
mately 59 million students were enrolled in
prekindergarten through grade 12.232 At
school, children rely on adults to protect
them, therefore teachers and staff must be
prepared to help students through a crisis and
get them home safely.233 There are thousands
of fires in schools each year, yet there is mini-
mal harm to students because staff and stu-
dents are prepared and have regular drills.
More plans need to be in place for the event
of other emergencies such as floods, earth-
quakes, tornadoes, infectious disease out-
breaks, and acts of terrorism.234 The time for
childcare facilities and schools to plan and
practice is now, before an emergency occurs.
The good news is that many states do have
specific emergency plans for child care facil-
ities and schools.235 For example, the Office
of Child Care and Head Start in Maine put
together an emergency response plan that
serves as a planning tool for child care pro-
grams across the state.236  
Schools and daycare emergency plans
OBESITY, CHRONIC DISEASES AND PREPAREDNESS
According to CDC, the states and federal agencies are having serious problems evacuating and
sheltering obese and chronically ill people.  At a 2008 CDC conference on emergency pre-
paredness, the agency reported that 40 percent of evacuees during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike
were obese, and many of those individuals were unable to stay in local shelters because of
their condition.237 Also, earlier this year, during the flooding in Iowa, a similar problem oc-
curred and many people who were obese or on oxygen were unable to stay at local shelters
and instead, these individuals had to stay in hospitals -- taking up a bed that might be needed
for an actual emergency case.238
Evidence from Hurricane Katrina also suggests that a large proportion of the evacuee popula-
tion displaced to shelters had a significant burden of disease.239 Among those who arrived at
shelters (in the sample study), 55.6 percent had a chronic disease, with hypertension, hyperc-
holesterolemia, diabetes, and pulmonary disease as the most common chronic conditions.240  
Caring for evacuees who are obese or afflicted with one or more chronic disease increases the
resources needed at each shelter to prevent further morbidity and mortality.  
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A catastrophic disaster, whether man-made or
naturally occurring, can lead to a variety of psy-
chological consequences, including depres-
sion, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
increased substance use, as well as a rise in
pain intensity.241 At the same time, the disaster
can severely limit a community’s ability to pro-
vide mental health and substance abuse serv-
ices, also referred to as behavioral health.  It is
important for communities to have a behav-
ioral health emergency preparedness plan in
place, not only for the benefit of the individ-
ual, but also in order to have a productive
workforce.  In distressed populations, mental
health issues may be manifested by a rise in
work-related injuries, excessive absenteeism,
and lower productivity.242   
Addressing mental health issues following a
disaster requires planning and coordination
among federal, state, and local governments
and private sector groups to effectively deliver
mental health and substance abuse services.
It is also important to have a plan regarding
how to handle those already mentally ill or
dealing with substance abuse prior to a disas-
ter, such as the importance of ongoing access
to medications and support services.  Re-
search on past disasters and public health
emergencies shows that psychological casual-
ties (e.g. multiple unexplained physical symp-
toms, acute anxiety, etc.) can vastly
outnumber medical casualties and place a
large and rapid expanding burden on emer-
gency medical care organizations and
providers. Therefore, effective behavioral
health preparedness and response is also an
important consideration for medical surge
capacity planning.
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) works to
integrate mental health and substance abuse
services into the federal public health emer-
gency response.  To provide short-term crisis
counseling after a disaster, the federal gov-
ernment offers grants to states and localities
through the FEMA Crisis Counseling Assis-
tance and Training Program (CCP), which is
administered by SAMHSA.  To qualify for a
CCP grant, a state must demonstrate that the
need for crisis counseling in the affected area
is beyond the capacity of state and local re-
sources.  In a 2008 report on federal efforts to
help states prepare for the mental health con-
sequences of disasters, however, GAO argued
that it is difficult to determine whether pro-
gram funds are used efficiently and effectively
to help alleviate psychological distress.243
In FY 2003 and FY 2004 SAMHSA awarded
$6.8 million in preparedness grants to men-
tal health and substance abuse agencies in 35
states for disaster planning.244 The total
amount awarded to each state ranged from
$105,000 to $200,000.  Since then, SAMHSA
has not allocated any additional funds to the
states for mental health preparedness.  In-
stead, according to the 2008 GAO report,
funding in more recent years has come from
CDC and HRSA/ASPR.  These preparedness
funds may be used for mental health and
substance abuse preparedness, “but the agen-
cies’ data-reporting requirements do not pro-
duce information on the extent to which
states used funds for this purpose.”245 
At the federal level, HHS directed the U.S.
Public Health Service Commissioned Corps
to organize into five Rapid Deployment Force
teams, which each include four mental health
providers, and five Mental Health teams made
up of about 20 mental health providers.246
HHS has also increased the number of anti-
depressants and antipsychotics in the Federal
Medical Stations’ cache of drugs, and added
five new classes of drugs, including those to
treat sleeping disorders.247
In June 2008, HHS’s National Biodefense Sci-
ence Board (NBSB) convened a group of ex-
perts to study the mental health consequences
of disasters and study how to protect, pre-
serve, and restore individual and community
mental health in catastrophic events.248 Rec-
ommendations from the Disaster Mental
Health Subcommittee were presented before
the NBSB on November 18, 2008.
4. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
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According to a 2007 survey by ASTHO, over
100,000 workers are employed in state public
health, in addition to the 160,000 workers NAC-
CHO estimates are employed in local health de-
partments.249 However, by 2020, the Association
of Schools of Public Health estimates that state
and local health departments will need an ad-
ditional 250,000 public health workers.250
Public health workers are the backbone of the
U.S. public health system and carry out a range
of duties including epidemiologic surveillance,
laboratory testing and analysis, prevention and
treatment of infectious and chronic diseases,
and emergency preparedness.  
The public health workforce, however, is seri-
ously strained, according to the 2007 ASTHO
survey.  Twenty-four states have 25 percent or
more of their state public health workforce el-
igible to retire within in the next five years,
while 10 states have 35 percent or more of
their state public health workforce eligible.
Only seven states have less than 25 percent of
their state public health workforce eligible to
retire within the next five years.  
The state public health workforce has con-
tinued to age since ASTHO’s last survey in
2003 and the average age of a state public
health employee is now 47.  According to
ASTHO, “Despite ongoing efforts, the state
public health agency workforce is graying at
a higher rate than the rest of the American
workforce and state health agencies continue
to be affected by workforce shortages.”251  
A 2006 survey by CSTE reported a current total of
2,502 epidemiologists working in state and terri-
torial health departments.  The survey, however,
also reported an estimated need for 3,361 epi-
demiologists to reach ideal capacity, a 34 percent
increase.252 In the field of bioterrorism/emer-
gency preparedness the gap between current and
needed capacity was even larger at 37 percent.
As state health departments struggle with the
inevitable “exodus of highly skilled older work-
ers,” they face numerous challenges to recruit-
ing and retaining qualified, trained personnel,
including the following:253
 Budget constraints;
 Lack of competitive wages for public health
careers;
 Lack of interest by recent graduates in
public health careers;
 Lack of visibility of public health careers; and
 Red-tape that hampers the recruitment
and hiring of qualified candidates.
For a more detailed discussion on the chal-
lenges in recruiting and retaining a well-
trained public health workforce, including
recommendations for the Obama adminis-
tration and the 111th Congress, please see
TFAH’s report Blueprint for a Healthier Amer-
ica: Modernizing the Federal Public Health System
to Focus on Prevention and Preparedness, avail-
able online at www.healthyamericans.org. 
5. PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE 
Source: ASTHO’s 2007 State Public Health Workforce Survey Results.  Note: Twenty states did not respond to this ques-
tion on ASTHO’s survey (AR, AZ, CA, DC, FL, HI, ID, KS, KY, LA, MA, ME, MI, NV, NM, NY, RI, SD, VT, and WA).
States with < 25% of workforce 
eligible for retirement.
Connecticut (19%)
North Carolina (23%)
Ohio (14%)
South Carolina (15%)
Tennessee (16%)
Texas (23%)
Utah (22%)
States with ≥ 25% of workforce 
eligible for retirement.
Alabama (32%) Montana (34%)
Alaska (27%) Nebraska (56%)
Colorado (37%) New Hampshire (50%)
Delaware (25%) New Jersey (49%)
Georgia (25%) North Dakota (27%)
Illinois (39%) Oklahoma (29%)
Indiana (25%) Oregon (32%)
Iowa (30%) Pennsylvania (29%)
Maryland (31%) Virginia (60%)
Michigan (39%) West Virginia (30%)
Minnesota (27%) Wisconsin (54%)
Missouri (37%) Wyoming (32%)
Public Health Workforce Eligible to Retire within the Next Five Years
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Important progress has been made since
September 11, 2001 and the ensuing anthrax
tragedies. Passage of PAHPA and updated
federal directives have been important mile-
stones in the effort to protect the American
people from major health disasters.  The pas-
sage of the legislation, however, does not
mean the changes called for have been
achieved.  In fact, without increased and sus-
tained funding and political prioritization,
many of the gains that have been made will
be jeopardized and new objectives and out-
comes for public health preparedness will
unlikely be realized.  Americans deserve
basic protections in the event of health emer-
gencies, and right now, many of these pro-
tections are lacking, leaving Americans
vulnerable to unacceptable levels of risk.
At the state level, there has been significant
progress in some areas of preparedness, in-
cluding enhancing critical laboratory capac-
ity and the development of pandemic
preparedness plans.  However, significant
work remains in areas such as medical coun-
termeasures distribution and dispensing,
surge capacity, and legal protections for vol-
unteers working during emergencies.  
To further strengthen emergency prepared-
ness, TFAH recommends action across the
following key areas:
1. Funding;
2. Restructuring of federal health agencies;
3. Transparency, accountability, and oversight;
4. Surge capacity;
5. Preparedness and health reform;
6. Public health workforce;
7. Research and development;
8. Legal preparedness;
9. Health and sick leave benefits;  
10. Food safety reforms; and 
11. Community resiliency.
Recommendations
Overall, this report finds that significant progress has been made in thenation’s preparedness to respond to public health emergencies based
on state-by-state measures and available data.  Yet much work remains on criti-
cal issues of preparedness, including: surge capacity, legal protections for health
care volunteers, and eliminating geographic disparities in preparedness plan-
ning.  Above all, preparedness requires a sustained effort and ongoing invest-
ment of funds.  The progress we have seen is threatened by diminishing federal
support to states and localities for their preparedness activities, and it is un-
likely that these states and localities can make up the funding shortfalls, given
the current nationwide financial crisis.  Our country is only as secure as the
least prepared state; there is a federal interest and responsibility to assure a min-
imum level of preparedness throughout the country.
5S E C T I O N
86
1. FUNDING  
Recommendations for Funding
Fully fund and stabilize funding for FY 2008 funding for programs dedicated to 
state public health emergency bioterrorism and public health emergency 
preparedness activities preparedness capabilities, specifically programs 
intended to support upgrading state and local 
capabilities and hospital readiness, was $704 million.
The PHEP Cooperative Agreement should be
funded at $1.03 billion, which is the FY 2005
level adjusted for inflation.  These funds are used
to develop core boots-on-the-ground support for 
disaster response and any reduction in funding 
leaves the country at unnecessary levels of risk.  
Inconsistencies in funding from year to year means
that states cannot predict how much money they will
receive and this affects their ability to hire and train
staff, expand capacity, and implement new programs.  
End the practice of “reprogramming” In recent years, the PHEP Cooperative Agreement 
and redirecting money from the state not only has seen its base funding decline, but 
preparedness grants for special projects   further reductions as portions are carved out for 
special projects.  For example, in FY 2007 HHS took
$35 million from the PHEP to fund a Poison Control
Partnership Program (PCPP) to enhance real-time
disease detection program. HHS did not renew this
funding in FY 2008.  It is not clear how HHS expects
to maintain any gains in enhanced collaboration
among state health departments and poison control
centers without additional funding.  HHS should re-
frain from one-year-carve outs that waste taxpayers’
money.  Instead, PHEP base funding should be in-
creased and maintained so these relationships and
workforces can be built and sustained.  
Public health preparedness requires a well-
trained public health workforce, a sustained
effort at research and development, the build-
ing and maintenance of stockpiles of coun-
termeasures, and hospital surge capacity.
When funding declines -- whether at the fed-
eral, state, or local level -- the immediate im-
pact on public health preparedness may not
be evident.  Funding cuts frequently result in
workforce reductions or hiring freezes.  With-
out a trained public health workforce, pre-
paredness suffers. Preparedness requires that
we have enough qualified laboratory scientists
who analyze lab specimens and transmit those
results to federal, state, and local health offi-
cials; epidemiologists and health information
specialists who develop and run biosurveil-
lance systems to monitor disease rates and
warn of bioterror or foodborne disease out-
breaks; stockpile managers who receive, store,
and dispense medical countermeasures; and
public health nurses and doctors who vacci-
nate populations against infectious diseases
such as pandemic flu.  The federal govern-
ment should provide increased and sustained
funding for preparedness activities to state
and local health departments.  It is a shared
responsibility between the federal govern-
ment and the states.  State-generated revenues
invested in public health should, therefore, in-
crease as well.  As demonstrated in this report,
federal funding has fluctuated -- limiting the
ability of states to build the kind of response
capacity that is needed to prepare for every-
thing from a pandemic to a natural disaster to
a terrorist attack.  The variation in critical state
investment in public health also reflects a sig-
nificant variation in geographic capacity.  
87
Recommendations for Funding
Fully fund hospital preparedness The HPP focuses on improving the clinical response to a large-scale health emergency,
which includes both developing surge capacity and continuity of operations planning.  
On average, hospitals receive about $100,000 per year, with some as low as $10,000 
per year.  In FY 2008, the HPP was funded at $398 million.  In the short-term, this
crucial program should be funded at $596 million, which is the FY 2004 level
adjusted for inflation.  In the long-term, the administration and Congress should 
examine ways to build hospital preparedness into the federal health care financing 
system, by providing, for example, enhanced reimbursement rates under Medicare to
those facilities that are willing to enhance and maintain their emergency response 
capacity.  This would remove the funding of hospital preparedness from the unpre-
dictability of the annual appropriations cycle.
Increase pandemic influenza funding The Obama administration should provide a detailed assessment of long-term 
funding needs for pandemic preparedness.  In the short-term, Congress should 
appropriate $870 million in no-year FY 2009 pandemic preparedness 
funding, $363 million above the recommended level of $507 million, providing
additional resources for the development and purchase of vaccine, antivirals, 
necessary medical supplies, diagnostics and other surveillance tools.  Additionally, 
an appropriation of $662 million is recommended for ongoing annual pan-
demic preparedness activities at HHS, $350 million above the recommended
level of $312 million, providing additional resources for state and local 
preparedness.
Increase funding for BARDA In FY 2008, BARDA received $101 million, which is nowhere near the amount 
needed for advanced research and development of medical countermeasures.  
Congress should appropriate $1.29 billion over multiple years for BARDA’s 
Pandemic and Emerging Disease Program for the advanced development of 
pandemic influenza vaccine and pre-pandemic vaccine and antiviral stockpiles.  
Another $850 million for biological countermeasures and diagnostics should be 
appropriated, and made available over multiple years in the Public Health and 
Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF) for BARDA’s Advanced Research and 
Development Fund.  
Funding should be appropriated for the The next secretary of HHS should give the president and Congress a professional 
replenishment and maintenance of judgment budget that includes the cost of replenishing and maintaining stockpiles.  
national stockpiles as many parts of the Funding to buy new medical countermeasures may require a new Act of Congress 
stockpile are set to expire in the as the 2004 Project BioShield does not allow for replenishment and 
coming years maintenance costs.
Funding should be appropriated for the PAHPA required HHS to work in coordination with the research community and 
development of new evidence-based evaluation specialists and develop new objectives to measure how well states 
benchmarks and objective standards respond to major public health emergencies.  PAHPA specifically required CDC’s
CPHP to focus on systems research, but overall CPHP funding was not increased to
account for the program.  CDC should provide Congress with a professional 
judgment budget that includes the cost of fully funding the CPHPs and the PERRCs 
to carry out their important work on public health workforce preparedness and 
public health emergency preparedness research and evaluation.
Provide a transparent accounting of Nearly $5 billion of FY 2006 pandemic influenza funding was designated as ‘no-year 
pandemic influenza funding  funding,’ meaning HHS was able to spend that money as needed over the next 
several years.  This approach enables HHS to contract with pharmaceutical manufac-
turers to advance the development of new-line vaccines and medications and bolster
production capacity over several years.  HHS should provide a clear plan for how the
remaining funds will be spent. 
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2. RESTRUCTURING OF FEDERAL HEALTH AGENCIES
Recommendations for Restructuring of Federal Health Agencies 
Ensure a broad understanding of health The Obama administration should appoint a 
security issues within the Executive Deputy Assistant to the President for Health 
Office of the President Security Affairs who can coordinate domestic and 
global health security issues across the National 
Security Council, Homeland Security Council, 
Domestic Policy Council, and National 
Economic Council.
Clarify roles and responsibilities HHS is the lead cabinet agency for determining 
among federal agencies  policy and planning for emergencies.  There is 
broad consensus among experts that HHS should 
remain as the lead agency. However, other cabinet
agencies have different types of expertise that are
needed during emergencies. For example, the VA 
can manage large health systems, and the VA and
DOD can effectively and rapidly move people, 
equipment, and supplies. The White House Home-
land Security Council should review Emergency 
Support Function-8 to determine whether any
changes in protocol are needed, and if any new 
authorities are needed to permit larger contributions
by VA and DOD during emergencies. 
Clarify the role of the Office of Health While HHS is considered the lead agency for public 
Affairs in DHS health response, some critical health functions 
operate out of the DHS Office of Health Affairs
(OHA), including bio-monitoring activities such as
BioWatch, a bio-aerosol environmental monitoring 
system for early detection of biological events. 
OHA is also responsible for integrating emergency
management and medical response at all levels of
government.  The White House Homeland Security
Council should review the health-related functions 
of DHS and establish a structure to make sure these
systems are well-coordinated and housed in the 
most appropriate agencies.
Prevention, preparedness, and public health
are vital to the well-being of families, commu-
nities, workplace productivity, U.S. competi-
tiveness, and national security.  The incoming
Obama administration and the 111th Congress
should make protecting the health of all Amer-
icans a priority.  However, the nation’s public
health structure is broken and needs to be
fixed.  The current federal structure for public
health emergency preparedness has several
specific problems.  Major limitations include:
 Lack of clear, strong leadership;
 Understaffing; and 
 Limited coordination within health agen-
cies and poor coordination across agencies
in the federal government.
The following recommendations represent a
set of options that could be addressed together
as a whole or individually by the Obama ad-
ministration and Congress.  They are drawn
from TFAH’s October 2008 transition paper
Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing the
Federal Public Health System to Focus on Prevention
and Preparedness.  The full report is available
online at www.healthyamericans.org.
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Recommendations for Restructuring of Federal Health Agencies 
Elevate the current Assistant Secretary This office should oversee a strategic approach to 
for Health position to be an prevention, preparedness, and public health to 
Undersecretary for Health (USH) increase coordination and accountability among
agencies, including all Public Health Service 
agencies, ASRP, and the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services reporting to this official. The
USH is not meant to disempower agencies or add
another bureaucratic layer, but to help coordinate
and provide leadership.  
Ensure appropriate division of labor Under the current structure, ASPR functions as 
within HHS both a policy arm and operating division.  As a 
policy office, it recommends and oversees policy
and coordination for all HHS agencies and interacts
with other cabinet agencies and the White House
on preparedness issues. As an operating division, 
it manages some programs including hospital pre-
paredness grants and medical response (ESF-8).
Some officials have suggested that all preparedness
grants should be managed by ASPR rather than
CDC, even though CDC has traditionally func-
tioned as an operating division and has expertise 
in managing grants. Roles must be clarified.  With 
support from a new Undersecretary of Health
(USH), ASPR should focus on consistency in policy
and coordination among programs, to ensure that
all HHS agencies follow the policy guidance of
ASPR. CDC should continue to be responsible 
for the public health emergency response, which 
includes serving as the main operating division for
preparedness grants, to avoid adding more 
bureaucracy and confusion for state and local 
government grantees. 
Leadership and accountability Designate a single official within HHS to be 
responsible, accountable, and fully empowered to
plan and coordinate implementation of the 
National Health Security Strategy called for in
PAHPA.  This official should either perform or 
oversee all the preparedness-related activities of
the new Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response, the Assistant Secretary for Health, and 
all other components of HHS. Further, he or she
must ensure the needed coordination and integra-
tion across all the agencies that have a role to play.
Appoint a strong, independent The Surgeon General must be given the 
Surgeon General independence to speak directly to the public on 
matters of public health emergency preparedness
and personal preparedness, and be given the 
resources needed to ensure those messages 
are heard.
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3. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT
Recommendations for Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Oversight
Publish regular progress reports on the HHS should regularly provide publicly available updates on the progress made on 
implementation of PAHPA benchmarks and deliverables under the PAHPA statute.  The first progress report 
was released in November 2007.  An update is planned for late 2009.
Develop new evidence-based CDC’s Division of State and Local Readiness’ Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation 
benchmarks and objective standards Branch is  working closely with PHEP program and evaluation specialists to develop a
new set of performance based metrics to measure organizational readiness and re-
sponse to public health emergencies.  The objectives should focus on outcome results
from real-life drills and exercises.  Benchmarks currently in use are more process-
oriented and not clear predictors of how well a state will respond to an emergency. 
Develop and implement the use of CDC, in coordination with other government agencies, state and local health 
standardized preparedness exercises departments, research organizations, and universities, should develop and 
implement the use of standardized public health preparedness exercises.  The 
exercises should include a thorough evaluation and after-action report that is made
publicly available.  Any weaknesses or gaps identified in the evaluation should be 
addressed within a specific amount of time. 
Incorporate lessons learned into The use of real-life exercises and drills, in addition to table-top exercises, gives states 
future planning the ability to accurately gauge how well they would perform in a public health 
emergency.  The lessons learned from these evaluations, however, are only useful if
they are demonstrably incorporated into revised and updated preparedness plans.
Collect performance data; assess the As required by PAHPA, HHS is in the process of developing a standardized reporting 
results; and, annually release the form for all states and hospital grantees.  The use of this form will allow HHS to 
findings publicly on a state-by-state basis rate the performance of the grantees and to assure the proper expenditure of funds.
Data from this form and other evaluations of states’ emergency preparedness should
be reported yearly on a state-by-state basis.  This allows Americans to appropriately
assess their states’ progress and document how states have used taxpayer-supported
preparedness funds.  
Transparency The federal government, in collaboration with the states, should share states’ pandemic
preparedness plans and performance grades with the public to increase transparency 
and build community resiliency.  CDC, which published its first report on the PHEP 
Cooperative Agreement in February 2008, should continue to share evaluation results 
on a state-by-state basis, in addition to releasing the specific criteria it uses for evaluating
states, and providing the public a basis for interpreting these scores.  The more people
know about state and local preparedness, the better equipped they are to make their
own family and household plans.  CDC’s next report will be released in early 2009 and
will provide an evaluation of the agency’s preparedness programs and activities.  
Continuous revision and strengthening Federal and state agencies need to keep preparedness plans updated to account 
of preparedness plans for changes in the environment and advancements in scientific knowledge. 
PAHPA not only demonstrated the resolve of
Congress and the Bush administration to
continue to address public health emergency
preparedness, but gave the federal agencies,
namely HHS, a series of deliverables and
deadlines to produce and meet.  While much
progress has been made on the implementa-
tion of PAHPA, which is notable in light of
personnel and funding constraints, much re-
mains to be done.  To ensure HHS fully com-
plies with PAHPA and does so in an open and
transparent manner, pursuant to the provi-
sions of the statute, Congress should use its
oversight powers to ensure full implementa-
tion and execution of PAHPA.
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Surge capacity remains the largest threat to
the nation’s ability to respond to a major ca-
tastrophe such as a pandemic influenza.
Much remains to be done to ensure that the
U.S. health care system is able to function in
a mass-casualty event.  In addition to the
funding recommendations discussed above,
TFAH suggests the following:
4. SURGE CAPACITY
Recommendations for Surge Capacity
Altered standards of care Legal issues are a major barrier for many states (and hospitals) in their planning for 
scenarios that would involve altered standards of care and the allocation of scarce re-
sources.  The federal government should take steps to address the legal issues associated
with shifting to a different paradigm of providing health care when the need for care 
overwhelms available resources (i.e., staff, supplies, space) during catastrophic public
health emergencies.  
Regional coordination of health care Hospitals, local health departments, and emergency management agencies should build 
facilities, including alternative care sites, regional consortiums to organize and plan for public health emergencies.  Such regional 
with public health and emergency collaboration can lead to more efficient use of resources among hospitals and health 
management departments, including personnel, and facilitate the sharing of promising practices. This 
coordination should include all federal resources active in the region, including VA and
DOD facilities. (Regional efforts could be within a locality or across county and/or state
lines depending on the size of the communities involved.)
Alternate care sites Despite the clear need for alternative care sites following a mass casualty event, there 
are several barriers to their successful roll-outs.  To address these barriers, TFAH 
recommends the following measures:  1) Increase local, state, and regional planning with
clear delineation of responsibilities and authority;  2) Foster public-private partnerships
among health care practitioners; 3) Employ operational drills to test the deployment of
mobile units and the creation of alternative care sites; and, 4) Address licensing and 
liability concerns for health care workers, behavioral health professionals, and 
volunteers and liability concerns for non-health care volunteers and third-party entities
that play host to alternative care sites.  In addition, emergency planners will need to 
obtain, stockpile, and store supplies, equipment and medicines for use in the alternative
care sites.  
Enhance communication systems Hospitals must develop communication systems that allow health care facilities and
public health departments to talk to each other and collectively manage an 
emergency response.
Designation of a disaster coordinator Strong leadership is essential to mounting and sustaining a successful public health 
for each hospital emergency response at the national, state, and local levels.  This applies to hospitals 
as well, which should designate a strong leader, respected and trusted by staff, to 
serve as a disaster coordinator.  The person who fills this role will be required to 
assure that many difficult decisions are made, including the use of altered standards 
of care, alternate care sites, limited resources, and the call-up of volunteer 
medical personnel.       
Surge workforce Public and private health care organizations should develop means to boost staff
during a public health emergency, either through the use of incentives for current 
staff or through the use of volunteers or non-traditional staff, such as emergency
medical technicians and medical and nursing students.  The surge workforce should 
be recruited in advance in order to ensure licensing and accreditation issues are
resolved before an emergency strikes.  
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America must provide quality, affordable health
care to all. A strong public health system and
public policies focused on prevention of disease
and injury, and preparedness for public health
emergencies, should be a cornerstone of a
health reform plan.  A strong public health sys-
tem is necessary to help promote better health,
monitor the health of the country, and protect
people from health threats that are beyond in-
dividual control, including bioterrorism, food-
borne illness, and natural disasters. The nation
must ensure that a reformed health care system
will be prepared to react to and mitigate the
consequences of a public health emergency.  
5. PREPAREDNESS AND HEALTH REFORM
The growing workforce shortage in the health
care and public health fields threatens U.S.
emergency preparedness.  America’s response
will be severely limited, unless the workforce
challenges the public health system faces are
addressed.  PAPHA contained two key provi-
sions related to workforce development,
whose implementation TFAH supports.  But
much more remains to be done to address the
public health workforce crisis.
6. PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE
Recommendations for Preparedness and Health Reform
Build preparedness and prevention into Past health reform discussions have focused on how best to care for people after 
health reform they become sick or harmed.  As the next president, administration, and Congress de-
bate 21st century health reform, an emphasis should be placed on prevention of dis-
ease and preparedness against public health emergencies.  A reformed health care
system should assure stable funding for a strong public health infrastructure and fi-
nance the preparedness role of the health care system.
Recommendations for Public Health Workforce
Fund and implement PAHPA Congress should appropriate and allocate the necessary funds to implement the HHS 
workforce provisions workforce demonstration project.  This student loan repayment project is intended for
individuals who: 1) are eligible for the National Health Service Corps loan repayment
program and 2) also agree to serve in a state health department that provides service to 
a significant number of health professional shortage areas or has areas that are at risk of a
public health emergency.  Congress should also appropriate and allocate monies necessary
to execute the second PAHPA workforce provision, which allocates grants to states to
assist in operating state loan repayment programs.
Enact and fund comprehensive public Institute a grant and/or loan repayment program to college juniors and seniors and 
health workforce scholarship initiatives graduate students (in their final years of training) who commit to entering 
governmental public health. Students would have to meet certain academic 
requirements, such as achieving a B average, to qualify for the program.
Federal match for state and local workforce The federal government should provide federal matching funds to state and local govern-
ments to invest in recruitment, retention, training, and retraining for public health workers.
Allow federal funding to support more Currently, only the nation’s 40 schools of public health can compete for certain CDC 
public health education programs and other funding to support governmental public health professionals. Universities 
that offer master’s programs in public health (outside the schools of public health) 
and other related master’s programs should be allowed to compete for funding. 
Strengthen the U.S. Public Health Congress should strengthen the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps 
Service Commissioned Corps by increasing the number of active duty personnel, creating a “Ready Reserve,” and 
establishing a dedicated funding stream for all Corps activities under the management
and fiscal control of the Surgeon General.
Streamline the registration and The expansion of ESAR-VHP and the mandatory participation in the program in 
accreditation of emergency health order to receive preparedness funds is a major step in the right direction.  HHS 
care volunteers should integrate other health care volunteer systems such as the MRC and the 
NDMS into ESAR-VHP in order to eliminate confusion among participants and avoid
double-counting potential health care volunteers.  Health care volunteers enrolled in
these systems should participate in federal, state, and local emergency drills.
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The basic technology and tools of public
health need to be modernized.  Too often
front-line health care professionals are rely-
ing on outdated diagnostic tests and med-
ications.  As new tests and therapies are de-
veloped and as older ones become obsolete,
the SNS should be replenished.
7. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Recommendations for Research and Development
Enhance research and development of Basic technology and tools of public health must be modernized to adequately 
vaccines and public health technologies protect the American people.  This includes research and development of vaccines
and new technologies; and improved chemical laboratory testing capabilities.  
Collaboration with the private sector, as envisioned under BARDA and Project
BioShield, will be essential.
Clarify requirements and deliverables ASPR should coordinate with NIH, FDA and CDC to ensure future BioShield requests 
under Project BioShield contracts for proposals and procurement contracts for new countermeasures have clearly 
articulated requirements, expectations, and deliverables.
Replenish and augment the SNS Ensure the SNS contains enough supplies and dosage recommendations for adults and
children.  In addition, future federal appropriations cycles must take into account the 
need to replenish currently stockpiled countermeasures that pass their expiration dates.
Currently, the bulk of SNS medications were purchased under the 2004 BioShield Act.
Many of these vaccines and drugs are beginning to expire -- even within the Shelf Life
Extension Program -- which leaves a huge gap in our nation’s preparedness.
Complete purchases of antiviral The federal government has met its goal of stockpiling 50 million treatment courses 
medications of antivirals.  States have collectively stockpiled 22.5 million treatment courses towards 
the 31 million goal.  The 26 states that have not yet purchased 100 percent of their
subsidized antivirals should do so.  Meanwhile, the federal government should 
re-examine this shared responsibility in light of major gaps in antiviral stockpiling in certain
states.  Additionally, if federal guidance on the use of antivirals shifts from treatment to
prophylaxis, stockpiling goals will change and more purchases will be needed.  
Expand the Shelf Life Extension Program Congress should extend the Shelf Life Extension Program (or establish a new, parallel,
SLEP-like program within FDA) to include state and local antiviral and antibiotic 
stockpiles.  Currently, state and local stockpiles could have shorter shelf lives even
though the nation is depending on state and local stockpiles to meet national goals.
Modernize disease surveillance systems Every health department and health agency should be part of a 21st century surveillance
system that meets national standards and is interoperable between jurisdictions and
agencies to ensure rapid information sharing.  Surveillance systems should be able to
detect infectious disease outbreaks or a bioterrorist attack.  Plans should ensure 
adequate laboratory surveillance of influenza and other infectious diseases, as well as
testing for pathogens such as E. Coli, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA), and extensively drug-resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB).
Public health should be a central part of Current health information technology is concentrated on electronic health records 
the design and implementation of health (EHRs), which are used to improve patient care and efficiency.  As the use of EHRs 
information technology systems grows, public health officials’ need for near real-time data on disease surveillance
should be factored into their design and implementation.  Public health can use data
from EHRs to monitor the health of the population and the demand for care,
invaluable tools to help detect and mitigate public health emergencies.
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This report has underscored the critical need
for states to develop full legal preparedness
for all-hazards public health emergencies.
All four core elements of public health legal
preparedness should be addressed: laws and
legal authorities; competency in using law;
coordination across sectors and jurisdictions
in implementing law-based interventions;
and legal best practices.
8.  LEGAL PREPAREDNESS
Recommendations for Legal Preparedness
State legal preparedness for all-hazards States should review and apply tools that have been developed for their use in 
public health emergencies assessing and making needed improvements in their legal preparedness for public health
emergencies.  These tools include, for example, model legislation (e.g., the Draft Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act) and draft memoranda of understanding (e.g.,
between public health and law enforcement agencies), such training curricula as 
“Forensic Epidemiology 3.0” and “Public Health Emergency Law 3.0”, the Menu of
Suggested Provisions for Mutual Aid Agreements, The Social Distancing Law Assessment
Template, and the National Action Agenda for Public Health Legal Preparedness.  (These
and additional tools are accessible at http://www.cdc.govv/phlp)
State liability protections for volunteer Liability concerns are a growing challenge to emergency preparedness officials.  
health professionals Volunteers and private entities have expressed reluctance to participate in response and
recovery efforts for fear that their actions may make them liable.  State legislatures 
should adopt the UEVHPA which has been approved by both the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association, or enact
similar legislation that extends liability protection to volunteer health professionals in a
public health emergency.  
Federal volunteer health professional Congress should amend the Public Health Service Act to provide Federal Tort Claims 
liability protection Act protection to qualified ESAR-VHP participants when they are activated by the 
federal government to respond to a public health emergency.  The federal Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 authorized the ESAR-
VHP to help states develop registry systems for the timely identification, verification and
use of volunteer health professionals during public health emergencies.254 In 2006,
PAHPA required the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services to link the state
systems into a single national network of systems.255 The state systems continue to be
maintained by the individual states, with guidance from the federal government.  Despite
ongoing efforts to build this national network, the liability issues that can arise from
activating the ESAR-VHP remain an area of concern.256    
State entity liability protection State legislatures should consider extending Good Samaritan liability protections to
those non-health care volunteers and business and non-profit entities that provide
emergency assistance.
Federal entity liability protection To address liability issues for businesses and non-profit organizations, Congress may wish
to create a federal floor for the minimum protection that should be available to these
emergency response partners when working in concert with government agencies.  
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A public health emergency will create finan-
cial hardships for individuals and the health
care system.  Because compliance with rec-
ommendations to seek immediate care
and/or self-isolate or quarantine may be crit-
ical to containing the spread of influenza or
a terrorist-introduced organism, TFAH be-
lieves the federal government should take
steps to assure that lack of health insurance
or sick leave do not prevent compliance with
public health recommendations.
9. HEALTH AND SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
Recommendations for Health and Sick Leave Benefits
Establish an emergency health benefit Congress should establish a short-term emergency health benefit, which would allow
hospitals and health care centers to keep functioning during a prolonged public health
emergency, while ensuring care to uninsured and underinsured individuals affected by
the crisis.  Legislation currently under consideration in Congress, the Public Health
Emergency Response Act (PHERA), would help ensure that victims of catastrophic
public health emergencies have meaningful and immediate access to medically
necessary health care services. 
Set up emergency sick leave policies The federal government should clarify whether the Department of Labor’s Disaster 
and procedures Unemployment Assistance Program, as currently established, would cover workers
without sick leave who self-quarantine in the event of a pandemic flu.  Congress
should pass legislation that would require employers with 15 or more employees to
offer a minimum of seven paid sick days each year, to be used to deal with individual
medical needs or to care for sick family members.  Having paid leave may be critical 
to assuring compliance with public health recognitions for voluntary quarantine by
individuals in a pandemic influenza.
Reforms are needed to make the U.S. food safety system preventive, instead of reactive.
10. FOOD SAFETY REFORMS   
Recommendations for Food Safety Reforms
Unified and prevention-oriented statutory In the short-term, HHS should split the FDA into two separate entities: one that 
mandate and organizational structures handles drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices and one that handles food.  By splitting the
agency, HHS will ensure that food safety gets the attention, resources, and priority it
deserves and does not take a back seat to the more profitable drug and medical 
regulation.  In the long-term, Congress should enact legislation that paves the way for a
single, unified food safety agency to carry out a prevention-focused, integrated food safety
strategy, including mandatory implementation of preventive controls by producers and
processors.  The single food safety agency should include: FSIS; the food regulatory
functions of FDA, including CFSAN, the Center for Veterinary Medicine, and the food
portion of FDA’s field resource; and the food safety aspects of EPA’s pesticide program.  
Increased resources for research, A modernized food safety system will require additional resources for (1) research 
standard-setting, inspection, and data collection on the incidence and causes of foodborne disease, new food 
enforcement, and education safety technologies and prevention strategies, and consumer behavior, (2) setting food
safety performance standards and establishing a mandatory standard of care for
preventing food safety problems, (3) inspection and enforcement to ensure standards 
are consistently met by both domestic and foreign producers and processors, and (4)
food safety education of commercial food handlers and consumers. 
Risk-based resource allocation The federal government should direct its resources for food safety research, regulation,
and education in the manner most likely to maximize reduction in foodborne disease. 
This would require repealing the current FSIS inspection mandate and substituting a
modernized mandate for the entire farm-to-table food safety system that would ensure 
an adequate resource base for inspection, but require the inspection and other resources
be applied in the manner most likely to contribute to disease reduction. 
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HSPD-21 identifies community resilience as
one of “the four most critical components of
public health and medical preparedness,”
along with mass casualty care, mass distribu-
tion, and biosurveillance.  The U.S. govern-
ment defines “community resiliency” as the
ability of a community to cope and recover
from a disaster or public health emergency.
A CDC-funded study states that in order “for
a community to be resilient, its members
must put into practice early and effective ac-
tions, so that they can respond to adversity in
a healthy manner.”257  
Taking this into account, preparedness plans
need to consider the diverse needs of the
U.S. population, in particular, “at-risk,” “spe-
cial needs,” and “vulnerable” populations.
Only by effectively reaching out to all seg-
ments of the U.S. population can the country
appropriately be prepared to survive and
overcome crises.  
11. COMMUNITY RESILIENCY
Recommendations for Strengthening Community Resiliency
Guard against complacency One of the biggest challenges facing public health
emergency preparedness is complacency.  Federal,
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments 
must maintain a sense of urgency regarding
preparedness.  Officials should communicate the
importance of preparedness to the public while 
not resorting to scare tactics.  Engagement with
media is the key to building a heightened sense of
awareness around the issues of emergency
preparedness, especially at the community level.    
Engage communities in planning Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments must engage communities in local
emergency and pandemic planning.  Too often
emergency planners just look to their grantees and
ignore other key stakeholders, such as volunteer
organizations, religious institutions, and schools and
universities.  Planners must proactively approach
these diverse groups and bring them to the table.  
Focus on disease prevention and The president and Congress should invest 
health promotion strategically in community-based disease 
prevention programs.  Americans cannot be 
prepared if they are unhealthy, yet chronic disease
rates are spiraling out of control in this nation.  
More than two-thirds of American adults are
overweight or obese.  One in four has heart disease;
and one in three has high blood pressure.  Twenty-
four million Americans have type 2 diabetes and
another 54 million are pre-diabetic.  These 
underlying health conditions pose a challenge when
residents are asked to evacuate due to a public 
health emergency.  Persons dependent on
prescription drugs also face challenges when asked 
to shelter-in-place as they may run out of their
medicines.  
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Recommendations for Strengthening Community Resiliency
Communicating effectively with at-risk Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials 
individuals must design culturally competent risk 
communication campaigns that use respected,
trusted, and culturally competent messengers.
Current research and best-practices regarding
emergency preparedness communication strategies
for at-risk populations should direct the creation 
and dissemination of these messages.  
Children are not small adults Children are inherently vulnerable as they depend
upon adults for food, shelter, supervision and
guidance.  As such, their needs should be taken 
into account in all public health emergency and
pandemic preparedness efforts.  Because disease
susceptibility, outcome, and transmission will likely
differ for children when compared to adults,
recommendations for child social distancing during
a pandemic, will likely differ from social distancing
recommendations for adults.  Evacuation and
reunification planning should reflect the fact that
children are often separated from their parents for
much of the day. Child advocates, such as teachers
and pediatricians, should be consulted as plans are
made.  Preparedness plans should be clearly
communicated to parents, schools, and daycare
facilities.   
The president and Congress should The National Commission on Children and 
carefully consider the recommendations Disasters, a bi-partisan panel appointed by the 
from the National Commission on president and Congressional leaders, held its 
Children and Disasters, which are due first meeting in October 2008.  Over a period 
out in 2010. of two years, the Commission will examine and
assess the needs of children independently, and in
relation to the preparation, response and recovery
from all emergencies, hazards and disasters.
Following its investigation, the Commission will
issue a final report, complete with findings and
recommendations, to the next president and
Congress.  These recommendations should be
acted upon with utmost urgency.
Behavioral health considerations Disasters have far reaching behavioral health
consequences.258 Federal and state emergency
planners should, therefore, coordinate with 
mental health and substance abuse agencies to
ensure effective and ongoing response to 
all-hazard emergencies.    
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APPENDIX A:  CDC AND ASPR PREPAREDNESS GRANTS BY STATE
BIOTERRORISM FUNDING BY SOURCE AND YEAR
FY 2007 FY 2008 % Change 
State CDC ASPR Total State CDC ASPR Total FY 07-FY 08
Alabama $10,228,439 $6,330,289 $16,558,728 Alabama $10,241,093 $6,073,401 $16,314,494 -1.5%
Alaska $5,015,000 $1,349,441 $6,364,441 Alaska $5,015,000 $1,312,013 $6,327,013 -0.6%
Arizona $14,284,449 $8,317,173 $22,601,622 Arizona $14,227,671 $7,972,742 $22,200,413 -1.8%
Arkansas $7,533,981 $4,063,403 $11,597,384 Arkansas $7,435,489 $3,906,396 $11,341,885 -2.2%
California $52,023,574 $34,106,620 $86,130,194 California $50,161,370 $32,625,884 $82,787,254 -3.9%
Colorado $11,234,142 $6,525,958 $17,760,100 Colorado $11,141,885 $6,260,449 $17,402,334 -2.0%
Connecticut $9,112,072 $4,943,121 $14,055,193 Connecticut $8,927,705 $4,747,354 $13,675,059 -2.7%
Delaware $5,000,000 $1,581,970 $6,581,970 Delaware $5,000,000 $1,534,297 $6,534,297 -0.7%
D.C. $9,129,492 $1,737,218 $10,866,710 D.C. $6,698,743 $1,707,585 $8,406,328 -22.6%
Florida $33,289,391 $23,432,938 $56,722,329 Florida $32,940,501 $22,422,494 $55,362,995 -2.4%
Georgia $18,230,415 $12,370,869 $30,601,284 Georgia $18,689,009 $11,847,828 $30,536,837 -0.2%
Hawaii $5,296,353 $2,129,653 $7,426,006 Hawaii $5,228,184 $2,057,849 $7,286,033 -1.9%
Idaho $5,439,853 $2,359,069 $7,798,922 Idaho $5,405,739 $2,277,157 $7,682,896 -1.5%
Illinois $19,245,542 $13,163,842 $32,409,384 Illinois $19,912,211 $12,605,863 $32,518,074 0.3%
Indiana $13,406,349 $8,503,785 $21,910,134 Indiana $13,335,867 $8,151,131 $21,486,998 -1.9%
Iowa $7,832,164 $4,280,453 $12,112,617 Iowa $7,702,063 $4,113,883 $11,815,946 -2.4%
Kansas $7,709,812 $4,004,077 $11,713,889 Kansas $7,598,339 $3,849,684 $11,448,023 -2.3%
Kentucky $9,905,373 $5,832,130 $15,737,503 Kentucky $9,750,535 $5,597,192 $15,347,727 -2.5%
Louisiana $10,536,471 $5,935,695 $16,472,166 Louisiana $9,998,186 $5,696,194 $15,694,380 -4.7%
Maine $5,381,949 $2,175,388 $7,557,337 Maine $5,271,144 $2,102,569 $7,373,713 -2.4%
Maryland $12,815,412 $7,619,177 $20,434,589 Maryland $13,038,391 $7,305,500 $20,343,891 -0.4%
Massachusetts $14,418,081 $8,660,567 $23,078,648 Massachusetts $14,805,770 $8,301,006 $23,106,776 0.1%
Michigan $21,555,319 $13,298,463 $34,853,782 Michigan $20,453,241 $12,734,552 $33,187,793 -4.8%
Minnesota $12,587,653 $7,050,445 $19,638,098 Minnesota $12,616,406 $6,761,826 $19,378,232 -1.3%
Mississippi $7,797,260 $4,189,754 $11,987,014 Mississippi $7,629,747 $4,027,180 $11,656,927 -2.8%
Missouri $13,236,793 $7,906,932 $21,143,725 Missouri $13,029,088 $7,580,577 $20,609,665 -2.5%
Montana $5,026,488 $1,697,530 $6,724,018 Montana $5,022,876 $1,644,766 $6,667,642 -0.8%
Nebraska $5,966,406 $2,741,751 $8,708,157 Nebraska $5,877,064 $2,642,978 $8,520,042 -2.2%
Nevada $7,662,442 $3,663,636 $11,326,078 Nevada $7,652,253 $3,524,243 $11,176,496 -1.3%
New Hampshire $5,308,479 $2,166,921 $7,475,400 New Hampshire $5,317,054 $2,093,475 $7,410,529 -0.9%
New Jersey $17,584,884 $11,560,312 $29,145,196 New Jersey $18,788,803 $11,072,985 $29,861,788 2.5%
New Mexico $7,249,926 $2,977,887 $10,227,813 New Mexico $7,054,780 $2,868,709 $9,923,489 -3.0%
New York $22,935,076 $14,561,258 $37,496,334 New York $22,518,790 $13,941,707 $36,460,497 -2.8%
North Carolina $16,570,173 $11,727,581 $28,297,754 North Carolina $16,696,497 $11,232,884 $27,929,381 -1.3%
North Dakota $5,028,972 $1,306,102 $6,335,074 North Dakota $5,023,132 $1,270,585 $6,293,717 -0.7%
Ohio $22,745,252 $15,050,914 $37,796,166 Ohio $21,838,104 $14,409,789 $36,247,893 -4.1%
Oklahoma $8,871,195 $5,037,444 $13,908,639 Oklahoma $8,740,269 $4,837,520 $13,577,789 -2.4%
Oregon $9,192,614 $5,191,530 $14,384,144 Oregon $9,100,217 $4,984,817 $14,085,034 -2.1%
Pennsylvania $24,743,362 $16,271,242 $41,014,604 Pennsylvania $23,758,643 $15,576,347 $39,334,990 -4.1%
Rhode Island $5,048,931 $1,853,432 $6,902,363 Rhode Island $5,012,619 $1,793,799 $6,806,418 -1.4%
South Carolina $9,972,754 $5,978,140 $15,950,894 South Carolina $9,968,869 $5,736,768 $15,705,637 -1.5%
South Dakota $5,000,000 $1,491,255 $6,491,255 South Dakota $5,000,000 $1,447,580 $6,447,580 -0.7%
Tennessee $13,009,292 $8,155,520 $21,164,812 Tennessee $12,844,807 $7,818,211 $20,663,018 -2.4%
Texas $44,570,881 $30,301,320 $74,872,201 Texas $43,355,376 $28,988,249 $72,343,625 -3.4%
Utah $7,174,066 $3,732,769 $10,906,835 Utah $7,162,839 $3,590,331 $10,753,170 -1.4%
Vermont $5,039,717 $1,290,942 $6,330,659 Vermont $5,041,316 $1,256,092 $6,297,408 -0.5%
Virginia $17,109,122 $10,189,048 $27,298,170 Virginia $17,222,047 $9,762,140 $26,984,187 -1.2%
Washington $14,168,202 $8,608,090 $22,776,292 Washington $14,012,182 $8,250,841 $22,263,023 -2.3%
West Virginia $6,026,051 $2,805,313 $8,831,364 West Virginia $5,933,288 $2,703,739 $8,637,027 -2.2%
Wisconsin $12,667,934 $7,544,102 $20,212,036 Wisconsin $12,188,297 $7,233,733 $19,422,030 -3.9%
Wyoming $5,000,000 $1,152,882 $6,152,882 Wyoming $5,000,000 $1,124,115 $6,124,115 -0.5%
Grand Total 
CDC Total ASPR Total Grand Total CDC Total ASPR* Total Grand Total Percent Change 
FY 07* FY 07* FY 07* FY 08* FY 08* FY 08* FY 07 - FY 08
$645,917,558 $378,925,351 $1,024,842,909 $636,383,499 $363,379,009 $999,762,508 -2.4%
*Note that CDC total funding for FY 2007 includes CRI, Level 1 chemical lab capacity, real-time disease detection, and EWIDS funding.  It does NOT include pandemic
influenza funding.  FY 2008 CDC total funding includes CRI, Level 1 chemical lab capacity, and EWIDS funding.   **Note that totals do not include funds for 3 major U.S.
metropolitan areas, Chicago, L.A. County, and New York City, U.S. Territories, such as Puerto Rico and Guam, and Freely Associated States of the Pacific, such as the
Marshall Islands.   Source:  1) HHS.  HHS Provides More Than $1 Billion to Improve All Hazards Pubilc Health.  News Release, June, 3, 2008.  <http://www.hhs.gov/news/
press/2008pres/06/20080603a.html> (accessed June 6, 2008). 2) CDC. Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program Announcement
AA154 - FY 2008 (Budget Period 9).  Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008, p. 22-24.  http://emergency.cdc.gov/cotper/coopagreement/08/pdf/
fy08announcement.pdf   (accessed September 16, 2008).  3)  HHS.  HHS Provides $430 Million to States to Enhance Hospital and Other Health Care Facilities Preparedness for
Public Health Emergencies. News Release, June 28, 2007 <http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2007pres/06/pr20070628a.html> (4 CDC.  Guidance Document for Continuation of
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreements (Budget Period 8).  Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007, p. 22-24.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagreement/pdf/fy07announcement.pdf (accessed September 16, 2008). 
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APPENDIX B:  INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUG PURCHASES BY
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND SELECT CITIES 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUGS STOCKPILE PURCHASES -- STATES, LOCALITIES, AND TERRITORIES
State Population Initial Allocation* All Antivirals Purchased Percent of Allocation 
(06/30/06) by State (09/30/08) Purchased
Alabama 4,503,726 472,860 533,553 112.84%
Alaska 648,280 68,065 77,030 113.17%
Arizona 5,579,222 585,780 67,717 11.56%
Arkansas 2,727,774 286,397 382,398 133.52%
California** 25,591,206 2,686,899 2,752,151 102.43%
Colorado 4,547,633 477,470 215 0.05%
Connecticut 3,486,960 366,107 22,829 6.24%
Delaware 818,166 85,902 121,164 141.05%
District of Columbia 557,620 58,546 45,000 76.86%
Florida 16,999,181 1,784,796 66,000 3.70%
Georgia 8,676,460 910,968 474,022 52.03%
Hawaii 1,248,755 131,111 172,487 131.56%
Idaho 1,367,034 143,529 8,567 5.97%
Illinois** 9,779,966 1,026,829 516,018 50.25%
Indiana 6,199,571 650,912 650,912 100.00%
Iowa 2,941,976 308,887 312,631 101.21%
Kansas 2,724,786 286,084 286,084 100.00%
Kentucky 4,118,189 432,381 216,224 50.01%
Louisiana 4,493,665 471,804 471,804 100.00%
Maine 1,309,205 137,457 0 0.00%
Maryland 5,512,310 578,754 210,727 36.41%
Massachusetts 6,420,357 674,093 50,662 7.52%
Michigan 10,082,364 1,058,578 1,076,950 101.74%
Minnesota 5,064,172 531,703 340,640 64.07%
Mississippi 2,882,594 302,652 338,648 111.89%
Missouri 5,719,204 600,477 600,477 100.00%
Montana 918,157 96,400 8,174 8.48%
Nebraska 1,737,475 182,423 71,952 39.44%
Nevada 2,242,207 235,416 135,514 57.56%
New Hampshire 1,288,705 135,305 68,000 50.26%
New Jersey 8,642,412 907,393 880,293 97.01%
New Mexico 1,878,562 197,236 77,409 39.25%
New York (includes NYC) 19,212,425 2,017,172 2,444,836 121.20%
North Carolina 8,421,190 884,167 677,882 76.67%
North Dakota 633,400 66,503 57,000 85.71%
Ohio 11,437,680 1,200,877 1,388,858 115.65%
Oklahoma 3,506,469 368,155 54,015 14.67%
Oregon 3,564,330 374,230 26,523 7.09%
Pennsylvania 12,370,761 1,298,844 1,298,792 100.00%
Rhode Island 1,076,084 112,981 11,900 10.53%
South Carolina 4,148,744 435,589 459,960 105.59%
South Dakota 764,905 80,310 80,310 100.00%
Tennessee 5,845,208 613,706 613,706 100.00%
Texas 22,103,374 2,320,701 1,023,141 44.09%
Utah 2,352,119 246,956 52,033 21.07%
Vermont 619,343 65,027 71,036 109.24%
Virginia 7,365,284 773,304 827,661 107.03%
Washington 6,131,298 643,744 417,902 64.92%
West Virginia 1,811,440 190,189 227,561 119.65%
Wisconsin 5,474,290 574,763 363,729 63.28%
Wyoming 502,111 52,718 52,718 100.00%
State Subtotal: 278,048,349 29,193,150 21,185,815 72.57%
Other Entity
American Samoa 57,884 6,077 0 0.00%
Chicago 2,869,121 301,238 200,545 66.57%
Fed States of Micronesia 108,143 11,354 0 0.00%
Guam 163,593 17,176 0 0.00%
LA County 9,871,506 1,036,440 1,036,440 100.00%
Marshall Islands 56,429 5,925 0 0.00%
Northern Marianas Islands 76,129 7,993 0 0.00%
Palau 19,717 2,070 0 0.00%
Puerto Rico 3,877,881 407,151 407,151 100.00%
Virgin Islands 108,814 11,425 0 0.00%
Entity Subtotal 17,209,217 1,806,849 1,644,136 90.99%
TOTAL 295,257,566 30,999,999 22,829,951 73.65%
Source: ASPR, information as of September 30, 2008.  * Initial allocation is for subsidized treatment courses only; 25% federal subsidy per treatment course.  Many 
states have purchased additional antivirals at unsubsidized prices.  ** The population count for California and Illinois does not include residents of Los Angeles County or
Chicago, respectively.  These two localities, along with the District of Columbia, received their own allocation of federally-subsidized antivirals based on their populations.
100
The data for the state indicators come from
a variety of publicly available sources.  
Methodology for Mass Distribution -- Strategic
National Stockpile 
Source:  CDC, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness
and Response, Division of the Strategic National Stockpile.
TFAH used the states’ 2007 -- 2008 scores on
the CDC technical assistance review (TAR)
of state SNS plans.  According to CDC, states
must score 69 or higher out of 100 to satis-
factorily document their SNS planning ef-
forts.  States were given an opportunity to
verify the SNS TAR scores CDC provided to
TFAH in coordination with ASTHO.
Methodology for Mass Distribution -- Antiviral
Stockpiling 
Source: ASPR.
ASPR provided TFAH with the pandemic in-
fluenza antiviral drugs stockpile purchases
for states, localities, and territories as of Sep-
tember 30, 2008. 
Methodology for Flu Vaccination Rates 
Data for this analysis was obtained from the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS) dataset (publicly available on the
web at cdc.gov/brfss).259 BRFSS is an annual
cross-sectional survey that measures behav-
ioral risk factors in the adult population (18
years of age or older) living in households.
Data are collected from a random sample of
adults (one per household) through a tele-
phone survey.  The BRFSS currently includes
data from 50 states, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands.  The 2007 statistics are
the most recent data available.
To conduct the analyses, TFAH contracted
with Daniel Eisenberg, Ph.D., assistant pro-
fessor, and Edward N. Okeke, MBBS, Health
Service Organization and Policy Doctoral
Student, at the Department of Health Man-
agement and Policy of the University of
Michigan School of Public Health.  Re-
searchers weighted the data using sample
weights provided by CDC in the dataset and
then merged data on the FLUSHOT variable
from 2004-2007.260  Researchers dropped
observations where either the survey partici-
pant answered “don’t know” or refused to an-
swer. These accounted for less than 0.4
percent of the data. Researchers then calcu-
lated three-year rolling averages for each
state restricting the sample to only individu-
als aged 65 and older, and then carried out
hypothesis testing to determine if there were
statistically significant changes in the per-
centage of adults 65 and over who reported
receiving vaccination for the flu.
Researchers reported three-year averages for
2004-2006 and 2005-2007 as well as standard
errors and 95 percent Confidence Intervals.
They also reported which states experienced
a statistically significant change from 2004-
2006 to 2005-2007. Sample sizes were 246,773
and 300,530 respectively.
Methodology for Public Health Laboratories --
Lab Pickup and Delivery Services 
Source: APHL
APHL surveyed state public health lab direc-
tors between September and October 2008.
All 50 states and D.C. responded to the survey.
Respondents were asked:  
Does your State Public Health Lab currently
have an intra-state courier system (non-mail)
that operates 24 hours per day for specimen
pickup and delivery? For the purposes of this
assessment, intra-state courier service refers
to a system that is state owned and operated
or contracted to a designated carrier.
Yes
No.  Please explain what system is in place:
______________________
Decline to respond
APPENDIX C:  DATA AND METHODOLOGY FOR STATE 
INDICATORS
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Methodology for Public Health Laboratories --
Pandemic Influenza Planning
Source: APHL
APHL surveyed state public health lab direc-
tors between September and October 2008.
All 50 states and D.C. responded to the survey.
Respondents were asked:  
1) Are you familiar with the expectations for
your laboratory’s capabilities described in
your state’s pandemic influenza plan? 
Yes
No
Decline to respond
2) Can your laboratory meet the expectations
of your state’s pandemic influenza plan? 
Yes
No 
Decline to respond
Methodology for Biosurveillance - NEDSS
Source: CDC, National Center for Public Health Informat-
ics, Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services.
In order to determine FY 2009 grant alloca-
tions, CDC’s Division of Integrated Surveil-
lance Systems and Services queried state
health departments on their NEDSS status.
According to CDC, for a state to be consid-
ered NEDSS-compatible, the state health de-
partment must have systems that meet three
basic requirements: 
1) An internet browser-based system;
2) Electronic laboratory results (ELR) re-
porting; and 
3) An integrated data repository.
States were given an opportunity to verify
CDC’s NEDSS-compatibility assessment in
coordination with ASTHO.
Methodology for Health Care Volunteer
Emergency Liability Protection 
TFAH contracted with the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health
Services.  A research team consisting of an ex-
perienced lawyer and team members with ex-
perience in reading and interpreting statutory
text assembled all relevant statutes and then
assessed the statutes using methods of plain
text analysis. Because of growth in the adop-
tion of UEVHPA and the comprehensiveness
of the statute, researchers adopted the follow-
ing three-tier approach to the review: 
1) States adopting the UEVHPA or enacting
its full equivalent, as measured by the terms
of state statutory law; 
2) States whose laws offer some, but not all,
of the emergency volunteer protections avail-
able under UEVHPA; and 
3) States offering only minimal protections
in the form of Good Samaritan Statutes.
The “minimal protections” or “low” category
represents those states with only Good Samar-
itan or similar laws under which volunteers
may be provided with an affirmative defense,
but not necessarily immunity from liability.
The “some protections” or “medium” group
of states extend protections to volunteers dur-
ing times of emergency, but may not explicitly
identify health practitioners, may require af-
filiation with a regional or local emergency
compact, or may not provide coverage to vol-
unteers in the event of injury during render-
ing of services.  Finally, the “UEVHPA” or
“high” protection states have adopted the
model statute or all of its elements.  
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Methodology for Entity Emergency Liability
Protection
TFAH contracted with the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health
Services.  A research team consisting of an ex-
perienced lawyer and team members with ex-
perience in reading and interpreting statutory
text assembled all relevant statutes and then
assessed the statutes using methods of plain
text analysis.   Researchers examined state law
to identify states that have enacted “volunteer
entity” protections to incentivize emergency
response by public and private actors.  
In assessing state law relevant to entity protec-
tions, researchers drew from model language
developed by the Public/Private Legal Pre-
paredness Initiative, a special undertaking of the
North Carolina Institute for Public Health.261
Key elements of this model law are as follows:
1) The establishment of a specific coverage
trigger (e.g., a Gubernatorial declaration of
a state of emergency); 
2) Retroactive coverage that reaches pre-
planning and training activities; and 
3) An approach to protection that follows the
immunity model used for volunteers rather
than the more limited, “affirmative defense”
approach.  
State statutes that extended to entities what
might be thought of as “property” immunity --
that is, immunity with respect to injuries involv-
ing real or other property owned or controlled
by an entity -- were not included.  Rather, in
order to qualify for designation, a state statute
must have focused on protecting conduct un-
dertaken by entities during an emergency.  
Methodology for Community Resiliency --
Medical Reserve Corps
Source: OCVMRC
The OCVMRC provided TFAH with the raw
data on 791 MRC units nationwide as of Oc-
tober 28, 2008.  Variables included: state; re-
gion; date established; volunteer count total;
sponsoring organization type; jurisdiction
type; unit focus; Is your MRC unit compliant
with NIMS requirements? (Y/N); If no, is
your MRC unit working towards NIMS com-
pliance? (Y/N); Are your MRC members in-
cluded in the State volunteer registry (ESAR-
VHP)? (Y/N); If no, do you plan to include
your members in the State volunteer registry
(ESAR-VHP)? (Y/N); Is there a State MRC
Coordinator? (Y/N).
In consultation with OCVMRC, TFAH lim-
ited the analysis of MRC units to those 716
units that were more than six months old. 
Methodology for Food Safety -- Detection
and Diagnosis
Source: CDC.  Summary Statistics for Foodborne Out-
breaks, 2004, 2005, and 2006.  Atlanta, GA: U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 2005, 2006, and
2007.  Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/foodborne-
outbreaks/outbreak_data.htm  
Data for this indicator were obtained from
CDC’s Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveil-
lance System (publicly available at
ht tp ://www.cdc .gov/foodbor neout-
breaks/outbreak_data.htm.)  State health
department are responsible for reporting
foodborne disease outbreaks to CDC
through the Electronic Foodborne Disease
Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS).  
TFAH analyzed data from 2004 through 2006
(the most recent year for which data were
available at the time of publication).  For
each year, TFAH calculated the total number
of reported outbreaks per state and the total
number of reported outbreaks with con-
firmed etiology (bacterial, chemical, para-
sitic, viral, or multiple) per state.  TFAH also
calculated the national total number of re-
ported outbreaks and national proportion of
confirmed outbreaks.  TFAH combined the
2004 to 2006 data and calculated the three
year average for each state and the nation.
States that met or exceeded the national av-
erage of confirmed outbreaks (44 percent)
achieved a point on this indicator; states that
fell below the national average of confirmed
outbreaks earned zero points.
All data for 2004 - 2006 were collected elec-
tronically through eFORS without confirma-
tion of etiology by CDC staff; all etiologies
are as reported by the state.
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Methodology for Funding Commitment -- State
Public Health Budgets
TFAH conducted an analysis of state spend-
ing on public health for the last budget cycle,
fiscal year 2007-2008.  For those states that
only report their budgets in biennium cycles,
the 2007-2009 period (or the 2008-2010 and
2009-2010 for Virginia and Wyoming respec-
tively) was used, and the percent change was
calculated from the last biennium, 2005-2007
(or 2006-2008 and 2007-2008 for Virginia
and Wyoming respectively).
This analysis was conducted from August to
October of 2008 using publicly available
budget documents through state govern-
ment web sites.  Based on what was made
publicly available, budget documents used
included either executive budget document
that listed actual expenditures, estimated ex-
penditures, or final appropriations; appro-
priations bills enacted by the state’s
legislature; or documents from legislative
analysis offices.
“Public health” is defined to broadly include
all health spending with the exception of
Medicaid, CHIP, or comparable health cov-
erage programs for low-income residents.
Federal funds, mental health funds, addiction
or substance abuse-related funds, WIC funds,
services related to developmental disabilities
or severely disabled persons, and state-spon-
sored pharmaceutical programs also were not
included in order to make the state-by-state
comparison more accurate since many states
receive federal money for these particular
programs.  In a few cases, state budget docu-
ments did not allow these programs, or other
similar human services, to be disaggregated;
these exceptions are noted.  For most states,
all state funding, regardless of general rev-
enue or other state funds (e.g. dedicated rev-
enue, fee revenue, etc.), was used.  In some
cases, only general revenue funds were used
in order to separate out federal funds; these
exceptions are also noted.
Because each state allocates and reports its
budget in a unique way, comparisons across
states are difficult.  This methodology may in-
clude programs that, in some cases, the state
may consider a public health function, but
the methodology used was selected to maxi-
mize the ability to be consistent across states.
As a result, there may be programs or items
states may wish to be considered “public
health” that may not be included in order to
maintain the comparative value of the data.
Finally, to improve the comparability of the
budget data between FY 2006-2007 and FY
2007-2008 (or between biennium), TFAH ad-
justed the FY 2007-2008 numbers for infla-
tion (using a 0.95 conversion factor based on
the U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics; Consumer Price Index Inflation Cal-
culator at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/).    
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APPENDIX D:  FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS ADVISORY
GROUPS, PANELS AND COMMITTEES
TITLE MISSION
The Department of Homeland The Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Advisory Council 
Security Homeland Security provides advice and recommendations to the secretary of DHS on a variety of 
Advisory Council homeland security issues, including public health and health care.262 The Committee 
is the secretary’s primary advisory body and its 21 members are experts from state
and local governments, terrorism prevention and response communities, academia
and the private sector, including health care.
The Department of Homeland The Department of Homeland Security National Advisory Council (NAC) 
Security National Advisory was born post-Katrina and has 30 members across the country.  The NAC’s work 
Council (NAC) has focused on the National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident
Management System (NIMS), and special needs populations.  The NAC reports to 
the administrator of FEMA, which has started to place a heavy emphasis on regional
coordination.  NAC members are appointed by the FEMA administrator and are
drawn from a wide cross-section of society, both in terms of geographic location and
professional experience.  The initial NAC charter expires in February 2009 and must
be renewed in accordance with the law.263
The Healthcare Sector The Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC) was self-established 
Coordinating Council (HSCC) by the health care sector, as a part of the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Protection
Program as part of HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
Protection.  Per HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, HHS serves 
as the Sector Specific Agency for the health care and public health sector.  HSPD-7 also
encouraged the creation of an independent self-governed sector coordinating council 
for 17 critical sectors of the U.S. economy, including health care.  The HSCC is to
coordinate with a wide variety of health care components including direct health care
delivery systems (hospitals, clinicians/personnel, etc), insurers/payors, health 
information technology, laboratories and blood services, mass fatality/mortuary 
services, medical materials management (manufacturers/distributors/suppliers),
occupational health, and the pharmaceutical/biotech industry and share this sector’s
concerns with HHS.  The HSCC includes over 100 representatives of the companies,
organizations, trade associations, and professional societies that either own and 
operate or play a critical role in ensuring the continuity of the nation’s healthcare 
system. HSCC has responsibility for activities such as communicating potential risks,
threats, and vulnerabilities to private health care organizations.264 The HSCC and the
HPH GCC work closely together to better protect the nation’s critical infrastructure 
and key resources.
The Healthcare and Public Health As a partner to the HSCC, the HPH GCC is led by HHS and consists of 
Sector Government Coordinating representatives from a wide-variety of federal agencies, national associations 
Council (HPH GCC) representing state, local, tribal, and territorial public health entities, and members
from various state and local jurisdictions.  The HPH GCC was also established in 
response to HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  The HPH 
GCC is tasked with the same mission as the HSCC but to represent the federal, 
state, local, tribal, and territorial public health and health care entities.  The HSCC 
and the HPH GCC work closely together to better protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure and key resources.
The Homeland Security Science The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 
and Technology Advisory (HSSTAC) serves as a source of independent, scientific and technical planning 
Committee (HSSTAC) advice for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.   The Committee’s 
primary focus is the use of science and technology to prevent or mitigate the effects 
of catastrophic emergencies -- both terrorist attacks and natural disasters.265
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TITLE MISSION
The Interagency Coordinating The Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and 
Council on Emergency Preparedness Individuals with Disabilities was established in 2004 to ensure that the federal 
and Individuals with Disabilities government appropriately supports safety and security for individuals with disabilities in
disaster situations.266 Housed within DHS, the Council has three priorities.  First, the 
Council is to consider the unique needs of federal agency employees with disabilities and
individuals with disabilities whom the agency serves.  Second, the Council is to 
encourage state, local, and tribal governments to consider the unique needs of 
employees and individuals with disabilities in emergency preparedness planning.  Finally,
the Council is to facilitate cooperation among federal, state, local, and tribal governments
and private organizations and individuals in the implementation of emergency
preparedness plans as they relate to individuals with disabilities.  Council members 
include the heads of executive departments, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Administrator of General Services, the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, and the Commissioner of Social Security.  
The IOM Forum on Medical and The IOM Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Catastrophic 
Public Health Preparedness for Events serves to bring together leaders from government, academic, and private 
Catastrophic Events sectors to openly discuss issues of concern.  The Forum members identify topics of
interest for meetings and workshops.  Initially, the Forum has focused on: medical surge
capacity, disaster preparedness training, communication and distribution, psychological
and community resilience, and research and evaluation.  The Forum is sponsored by
federal agencies, state and local associations, health professional associations, and 
private sector business associations.  There are 32 members and a staff of four.  
The National Advisory Committee The National Advisory Committee on At-Risk Individuals and Public 
on At-Risk Individuals and Public Health Emergencies, formerly the National Advisory Committee on Children 
Health Emergencies and Terrorism, was created under the 2006 PAHPA legislation to focus on public
health emergencies as they relate to at-risk individuals.  According to the Office for 
At Risk Individuals, Behavioral Health, and Human Services Coordination at ASPR, 
the charge for the Advisory Committee on At-Risk Individuals and Public Health
Emergencies has significantly evolved since its previous iteration and steps must be
taken to determine how best to reconstitute the group and reestablish it.  In the
meantime, HHS is currently working on related at-risk issues through existing 
relevant advisory committees, such as the National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB)
and the Commission on Children and Disasters.267
The National Biodefense Science The National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB) was created under PAHPA 
Board (NBSB) and has a five-year mandate (2007 -- 2012).268 The NBSB was established to provide 
expert advice and guidance to the secretary of the HHS (HHS) on scientific, technical, 
and other matters of special interest to HHS regarding activities to prevent, prepare for,
and respond to adverse health effects of public health emergencies resulting from
chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological events, whether naturally occurring,
accidental, or deliberate.  On March 4, 2008, the charter of the NBSB was amended to
allow the NBSB to provide advice and guidance to the secretary on other matters 
related to public health emergency preparedness and response.269 There are 13 voting
members of the NBSB in addition to non-voting, ex officio members.  There are five
working groups under NBSB that focus on: pandemic influenza, disaster medicine,
medical countermeasures R&D, medical countermeasures sustainability and market
development, and personal preparedness; and one subcommittee on disaster mental
health.  NBSB planned to issue a series of recommendations from each working group 
in the summer and fall of 2008
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TITLE MISSION
The National Biosurveillance The National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS) was created 
Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS) as part of HSPD-21, which mandated that the secretary of HHS, in collaboration with
other federal agencies, create an “Epidemiologic Surveillance Federal Advisory
Committee” that includes representatives from state and local government public
health authorities and appropriate private sector health care entities.  The
Committee’s role is “to ensure that the federal government is meeting the goal of
enabling state and local government public health surveillance capabilities.”270 The
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee is a subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee to the Director of CDC.271
The National Commission on The National Commission on Children and Disasters was established in 
Children and Disasters December 2007.  The commission chair and nine members are appointed by the
president and bipartisan members of Congress.  The panel of experts will 
recommend changes that federal, state, and local governments need to make to 
meet the needs of children in emergencies, including planning, response and recovery
efforts.  The Commission held its first meeting October 14, 2008, more than 10
months after its creation, and well into the 2008 hurricane season, which saw
devastating storms Gustav and Ike tear across the Gulf states.272  
The National Science Advisory The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was developed by HHS 
Board for Biosecurity to help confront the so-called “dual-use dilemma” -- that the research in biology,
chemistry, and radiology can be used inappropriately for the purposes of bioterrorism 
or biowarfare.  NASBB offers advice and recommendations on how to further
biotechnological research while minimizing the risk of harm.  NASBB is housed in the
Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) within the Office of the Director, NIH.273
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APPENDIX E:  KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES 
UNDER PAHPA
KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Why the Deliverable 
Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 201 (g) (1) -- Achievement This demonstrates the federal June 2007 Yes.  HHS is using new 
of measurable evidence-based government’s ability to develop capability-based performance 
benchmarks and objective standards.  clear, evidence-based measures for the PHEP 
Not later than 180 days after the date performance metrics to grantees.274 As CDC and the 
of enactment of the Pandemic and evaluate federal and state research community build a 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the emergency preparedness. stronger research base on 
HHS secretary shall develop or where preparedness, CDC expects to 
appropriate adopt, and require the roll out new objectives.
application of, measurable evidence-
based benchmarks and objective 
standards that measure levels of 
preparedness.  In developing such 
benchmarks and standards, the secretary 
shall consult with and seek comments 
from state, local and tribal officials and 
private entities, as appropriate.  Where 
appropriate, the HHS secretary shall 
incorporate existing objective 
standards.
Section 201 (g) (2) -- Criteria for This demonstrates the federal June 2007 Yes.  HHS sent a letter with 
pandemic influenza plans.  Not later government’s ability to provide criteria and guidance to states 
than 180 days after the date of clear direction and guidance to on January 26, 2007.275  
enactment of the Pandemic and state emergency planners and 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the HHS keep variation among states Revised guidance was sent out in 
secretary shall develop and pandemic plans to a minimum.  March 2008 and revised plans 
disseminate to the chief executive were submitted in June 2008.  
officer of each state criteria for an ASPR expects to release the 
effective state plan for responding results of the review in 
to pandemic influenza. December 2008, although delays
in the review and the presidential
transition may postpone the 
release.276
Section 202 (d) (2) -- Public Health This reflects federal commitment June 2007 Yes.  On October 31, 2008 
Situational Awareness.  Not later than to a near real-time electronic CDC’s Biosurveillance 
180 days after the date of enactment surveillance system, which is Coordination Unit (BCU) 
the Pandemic and All- Hazards necessary to quickly identify and released the latest draft version 
Preparedness Act, the HHS Secretary track disease outbreaks and of the National Biosurveillance 
shall submit to the appropriate biological and chemical incidents Strategy for Human Health.
committees of the Congress a (accidental or intentional).
strategic plan demonstrating the 
steps the HHS secretary will 
undertake to develop, implement, 
and evaluate the interoperable 
network of systems for real-time 
disease detection and surveillance.
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KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Why the Deliverable 
Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 301(a) (C) (2) -- Joint review This demonstrates the ability of June 2007 Yes. The Department has 
and medical surge capacity strategic HHS to lead and coordinate with completed a joint review with 
plan. Not later than 180 days after date other key federal agencies on the Departments of homeland 
of enactment of the Pandemic and issues of concern for public health security, defense, and veterans 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the HHS preparedness, such as medical affairs of the National Disaster 
secretary, in coordination with the surge capacity. Medical System (NDMS), although 
secretary of Homeland Security, the final report has not yet 
secretary of Defense, and secretary of been released.
Veterans Affairs, shall conduct a joint 
review of the National Disaster 
Medical System. Such review shall 
include an evaluation of medical surge 
capacity.
Section 201(j) (1) -- Annual reporting This demonstrates the federal June 2007 Yes.  ASPR receives annual 
requirements.  Each entity shall prepare government’s commitment to health-department prepared, 
and submit to the HHS secretary annual tracking the use of federal standardized progress reports 
reports on its activities under this preparedness dollars. on HPP grantee program activities.  
section and section 319C-2 of the ASPR uses these reports to 
Public Health Service Act. Each such properly evaluate HPP 
report shall be prepared by, or in grant-related performance and 
consultation with, the health assure the expenditure of funds 
department. In order to properly requirements are met for HPP.277
evaluate and compare the performance 
of different entities assisted under this 
section and section 319C-2 and to 
assure the proper expenditure of funds 
under this section and section 319C-2, 
such reports shall be in such 
standardized form and contain such 
information as the HHS secretary 
determines and describes within 
180 days of the date of enactment 
of the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act.
Section 303(a) -- Not later than 180 This reflects the federal June 2007 Yes.  The department expanded 
days after the date of enactment of the government’s ability to set forth a the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness nationally recognized certification to provide for an adequate supply 
Act, the HHS secretary, in collaboration process for health care volunteers of volunteers in the case of a
with state, local, and tribal officials, shall who serve in emergency public federal, state, tribal, territorial, 
build on state, local, and tribal health events and recruit said or local public health emergency.
programs in existence on the date volunteers.
of enactment of such Act to 
establish and maintain a Medical 
Reserve Corps to provide for an 
adequate supply of volunteers in the 
case of a Federal, State, local, or tribal 
public health emergency. The corps shall 
be headed by a director who shall be 
appointed by the HHS secretary and 
shall oversee the activities of the corps 
chapters that exist at the state, local, 
and tribal levels.
109
KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Why the Deliverable 
Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 401 -- Not later than six months This illustrates the federal June 2007 Yes.  On July 7, 2007, Secretary 
after the date of enactment of the government’s ability to set a Michael Leavitt published a 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness national strategy for research and Draft BARDA Strategic Plan for 
Act, the HHS secretary shall develop development, innovation support, Countermeasure Research, 
and make public a strategic plan to and procurement of Development and Procurement, to 
integrate biodefense and emerging countermeasures to chemical, guide and facilitate the research, 
infectious disease requirements biological, radiological, and nuclear development, innovation, and 
with the advanced research and (CBRN) agents and emerging procurement of medical 
development, strategic initiatives for infectious diseases. countermeasures and build upon 
innovation, and the procurement of established national strategies 
qualified countermeasures and qualified and directives.
pandemic or epidemic products. 
Section 303(b) -- Not later than 12 This reflects the federal December Yes.  The department has written 
months after the date of enactment of government’s ability to set forth a 2007 compliance requirements for 
the Pandemic and All-Hazards nationally recognized certification state participation in the 
Preparedness Act, the HHS secretary process for health care volunteers ESAR-VHP program.  As of 
shall link existing state verification who serve in emergency public October 1, 2008 (FY 2009) 
systems to maintain a single national health events. participation in ESAR-VHP will be 
interoperable network of systems, a mandatory requirement to 
each system being maintained by a state receive future grant dollars 
or group of states, for the purpose of from the PHEP.
verifying the credentials and licenses of 
health care professionals who volunteer 
to provide health services during a public 
health emergency. 
Section 402 -- The HHS secretary shall This illustrates the federal December Yes.   On May 24, 2007, Secretary 
establish the National Biodefense government’s ability to convene 2007 Leavitt established and issued a 
Science Board to provide expert advice leading experts from government, call for nominations to the 
and guidance to the HHS secretary on private sector and research National Biodefense Science 
scientific, technical and other matters of institutions to come together to Board (NBSB).  
special interest to the Department of guide the national strategy for 
Health and Human Services regarding research and development, On December 17, 2007 Secretary 
current and future chemical, biological, innovation support, and Leavitt announced the 13 
nuclear, and radiological agents, whether procurement of countermeasures members of the NBSB.278  
naturally occurring, accidental, or to chemical, biological, radiological, 
deliberate. and nuclear (CBRN) agents and 
emerging infectious diseases.
Section 402(A) -- Not later than one This illustrates the federal December Yes.  Secretary Leavitt held the 
year after the date of enactment of the government’s ability to convene 2007 inaugural meeting of the NBSB 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness leading experts in government, December 17 -18, 2007.279
Act, the HHS secretary shall hold private sector and research 
the first meeting of the National institutions to come together to 
Biodefense Science Board. guide the national strategy for 
research and development, 
innovation support, and 
procurement of countermeasures 
to chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear (CBRN) agents and 
emerging infectious diseases.
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KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Why the Deliverable 
Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 102(d) -- Amends the Public This benchmark reflects how well December Yes.  The Pandemic and 
Health Service Act by inserting Section the federal government is 2007 All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
2814(1). The HHS secretary shall implementing plans to reach at-risk Progress Report released in 
oversee the implementation of the populations, including the elderly November 2007 describes the 
national preparedness goal of taking and other special needs individuals. progress made toward 
into account the public health and implementing duties related 
medical needs of at-risk individuals to at-risk individuals.
in the event of a public health 
emergency.  Not later than one year 
after the date of enactment of the 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Act, the HHS secretary shall prepare 
and submit to the U.S. Congress a 
report describing the progress made 
on implementing the duties 
described in this section.
Section 201(g) (5) -- Withholding of This component of the bill links October 2008 Yes.  CDC established 10 
amounts from entities that fail to funding with accountability, which (FY 2009) benchmarks that state and local 
achieve benchmarks or submit motivates states to meet grantees are required to meet in 
influenza plans. preparedness benchmarks. order to receive their full PHEP 
base funding.  States that fail to 
meet these benchmarks can lose 
up to 10 percent of their FY 2009
base PHEP funding.280 This funding 
will be distributed in August 2009.
ASPR established five state-level 
and seven hospital-level 
performance measures that HPP
grantees much achieve.  Those 
that fail to substantially meet the
benchmarks will have funds 
withheld from FY 2009 
awards.281,282 This funding will be
distributed in August 2009.
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KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Why the Deliverable 
Deliverable is Important Due Date Met?
Section 202 (d) (1) -- Public Health This reflects federal commitment January 2009 In progress.  In early 2008, CDC 
Situational Awareness.  Not later than to a near real-time electronic established the Biosurveillance 
two years after the date of enactment surveillance system, which is Coordination Unit (BCU) to lead 
of the Pandemic and All-Hazards necessary to quickly identify and the development of a strategy 
Preparedness Act, the HHS secretary, in track disease outbreaks and and implementation plan for 
collaboration with state, local, and tribal biological and chemical incidents integrated human biosurveillance.  
public health officials, shall establish a (accidental or intentional). However, a DHS entity, the NBIC, 
near real-time electronic nationwide will integrate all biosurveillance, 
public situational awareness including data from CDC, USDA, 
capability through an interoperable FDA, DOD, EPA, VA, and ODNI.
network to share data and 
information to enhance early 
detection of rapid response to, and 
management of, potentially 
catastrophic infectious disease 
outbreaks and other  public health 
emergencies that originate 
domestically or abroad. Such network 
shall be built on existing state situational 
awareness systems or enhanced systems 
that enable such connectivity.
Section 103 -- Amends the Public Health This quadrennial review of public 2009 In progress.  HHS has completed 
Service Act and adds Section 2802(a) (1).  health emergency preparedness the preliminary work of defining 
Preparedness and response regarding illustrates the importance of the key terms and creating a 
public health emergencies.  Beginning in issues and the need to keep framework to guide development 
2009 and every four years thereafter, continually updating and revising of the National Health Security 
the HHS secretary shall prepare and preparedness plans. Strategy.  HHS is now being 
submit to the relevant committees supported by the RAND 
of the congress a coordinated Corporation to carry out a broad 
strategy (to be known as the community engagement plan 
National Health Security Strategy) and finalize the strategy and 
and any revisions thereof, and an accompanying implementation 
accompanying implementation plan plan and evaluation framework.  
for public health emergency HHS anticipates meeting the 
preparedness and response. 2009 legislative deadline in 
delivering the strategy 
to Congress.283
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.  Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act Progress
Report.  Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, November 2007.  http://www.hhs.gov/aspr
/conference/pahpa/2007/pahpa-progress-report-102907.pdf (accessed October 31, 2007), except where noted.
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